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ABSTRACT
THE NATURE OF RIGHTS
February, 1986
Richard Harrison Wiley, Jr.
B.A., Brown University
M.A.
,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
In THE NATURE OF RIGHTS I critically evaluate several
important approaches to the analysis of rights, and present
and defend my own theory of their nature. I argue that all
rights involve claim-rights, and suggest an analysis of
claim-rights in terms of owed obligation.
I present and evaluate several theories of the nature
of rights, including: theories of rights as protections of
freedoms, theories of rights as protections of interests,
theories, in particular that of Joel Feinberg, which
characterize rights as claims of some sort, Ronald
Dworkin's recent account of rights as political concerns or
trumps, and Theodore Benditt's polar opposite view that
rights are not concerns at all, but that they are cited
merely to summarize the conclusions of legal and moral
reasoning. I argue that these approaches are problematical.
My own theory of the nature of rights emerges from an
investigation of the relations which generally hold between
vi
rights and obligations. I discuss a number of attempts to
anaLyze rights in terms of obligation. They fail. I suggest
that, rather than attempting to analyze rights in terms of
obligation, simpiiciter, we should concentrate on the more
hopeful project of analyzing them in terms of owed
obligation (obligations _to specific individuals). I discuss
the nature of owed obligations, including their structural
and Logical characteristics. I argue that rights can be
correlated to owed obligations, propose several such
correlations, and defend this against recently proposed
counterexamples to such correlativity . 1 develop out of
these correlations an analyses of rights in terms of owed
obligation
.
vi i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
v
Introduction
j
Chapter
I. THEORIES OF RIGHTS AS PROTECTIONS 17
The WiLL Theories 18
First Approach 18
Second Approach 19
Interest Theory 31
Combined WiLL and Interest Theory 37
Protection 39
Notes 40
II. THEORIES OF RIGHTS AS CLAIMS 4 3
Notes 76
III. OWORKIN'S THEORY 82
Dworkin’s Two Accounts 82
The Normative Account 83
The Functional Approach 87
Criticism of Dworkin's Functional Approach .... 94
Theory Relativity Eliminated 94
Criticism 98
MoraL Rights L06
Notes LL5
IV. BENDITT'S THEORY 124
Features of Rights to be accounted for L24
The Justificatory Function of Rights 124
Conflicts 126
AIL -in Rights 128
Notes 1-56
V. AN ANALYSIS OF CLAIM-RIGHTS 158
Claim-rights as Owed Obligations 186
Notes
vi i i
VI. THE CORRELATI VITY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ... 194
Correlations 201
Adjustments 208
Notes 212
VII. PROPOSED COUNTEREXAMPLES TO CORRELATIVITY
EXAMINED 216
Immunities 218
Powers 225
Liberties 227
Others 240
Notes 244
VIII. A NEW ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS 248
APPENDIX 259
A. SOME UNDERLYING METAPHYSICAL AND LINGUISTIC
ISSUES 259
Transparency 261
Rights as Things 266
Forsenic Aspect of Rights 275
Forsenic Features in Moral Rights 286
Rights are Composites of their Extent .... 291
Meaning, Reference, and Rights 295
Reference 300
Definite Description Approach 301
Natural Kinds Approach 302
Notes 311
B. THE STANDARD LOCUTION 317
Notes 340
C. OWED OBLIGATIONS 345
Notes 366
D. LYON'S ABSTRACT OBJECTIONS TO CORRELATIVITY ... 370
Notes 38 ^
BIBLIOGRAPHY 388
introduction
1 The groundwork for current discussion of the nature
of rig its was Laid in the Late L 8 00 1 s by the jurisprudent
WesLey Newcomb Hohfeid.[l] Hohfeid argued that it was
crucial, in practice as weLL as in theory, to distinguish
carefuLLy severaL distinct concepts commonLy attached to
rights". He proposed a partLy anaLytic, partLy revisionary
system to distinguish these concepts. His system has been
infLuentiaL. For exampLe, a derivative system has been
adopted by the American Law Institute for use in its
summaries of court cases. [2]
Hohfeid worries that "rights"[3] is normaiLy used
impreciseLy, that it may signify any one of severaL very
basic, precise juraL reLations: claim-right, priviLege
(Liberty), power (to change Legal. reLations), and immunity
(from changes in one's legaL reLations). Hohfeid seems to
think that "rights" is truly ambiguous, there being at
least five distinct meanings which it may have: one
corresponding to each of the four basic juraL reLations,
and one general one encompassing them aLL. This ambiguity,
Hohfeid feared, could Lead to error in theory and practice,
and he proposes the use of the more precise terms used
above rather than the problematic "rights". In his own work
he studiously foLLows this advice.
I
2These four basic legal relations, Hohfeld claimed, are
® generis, lhus indefinable (he seems to have in mind a
traditional genus/species definition [4]). However, he does
think that these conceDts can be elucidated by exploiting
t.ieir interrelations. Some are correlatives, and some,
opposites, of others: (diagonal lines indicate opposites,
vertical lines, correlatives).
right (claim) privilege (liberty) power immunity
duty no-right liability disability
Hohfeld suggests that of the four narrow senses of
"rights", one is the most "proper".
If, as seems desirable, we should have a synonym for
the term "right" in this limited and proper meaning,
perhaps the word "claim" would prove the best. [5]
Rights have often been identified with claims. In modern
presentations of Hohfeld's schema writers often try to
avoid confusion between the broad sense of "rights" and
this narrow sense by using "claim" or "claim-right" instead
of "right" for the narrow sense. I will generally use
"claim-right". The claim-right concept, and the relation it
represents, are central both to our concept and
understanding of rights, and to their composi tion . [ 6 ] I
will refer to them as the "core" concept and relation
( respectively)
.
3Hohfeld suggests that claim-rights hold between
precisely two persons. [7] They are the correlatives of
legal duties. Thus, x has a right against y if and only if
y has a duty to x.
if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off
the farmer's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is
that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the
place. [8]
Claim-rights are the opposite of no-rights
.( 9 ] I will
follow more modern presentations of the schema, and use
"liberty" (privilege minus its elitist and special case
connotations) rather than "privilege" to express the
opposite of duty. To be at liberty to do z is to have no
duty not to do z
.
In addition to his position on the meaning of
"rights", Hohfeld also seems to hold that all legal
relations are reducible to the basic jural relations. This
applies to complex legal relations which, in the loose
(general) sense of "rights", are rights (for example,
property). Thus, for Hohfeld, many of what are ordinarily
thought of as rights are complex legal relations reducible
to the basic jural relations. They are complexes of basic
jural relations.
2. In this dissertation my central project will be to
investigate the nature of rights. The linguistic questions
surrounding the use of the term "rights (eg. , what is its
4meaning
,
is it ambiguous, what are its senses,
connotations, etc.) are peripheral to this project. Thus,
generally, when I speak of the "concept" of rights, I am
interested, not necessarily in a linguistic item (a
meaning)
,
but rather in the (one of the) normative
relations signified, or referred to, by assertions of
rights. Also, when I speak of "analyses" of rights, I am
interested in attempts to specify or characterize such
normative relations. A successful analysis, in this sense,
of rights may have important implications for the
resolution of linguistic questions surrounding the meaning
and use of "rights"; however
,
such issues are sufficiently
complex and controversial that bringing them into my
investigation (except occasionally) will only create
confusion. (One exception to this is Appendix A, where I
give considerable attention to linguistic aspects o f
"rights". ) Thus , when I evaluate proposals as to the
analysis of rights, I will generally treat them as
proposals about the nature of rights, rather than as
attempts at linguistic analysis
.
For example. Hohfeld talks of the ambiguity and
multiple senses of "rights," but I am unsure how literally
we should take such linguistic aspects of his proposal. For
our purposes, the meat of the proposal will be a view about
the nature of rights: that there are several distinct legal
5relations which are rights (which assertions of rights
commonly signify).
Hohfeld's view suggests that some rights are general,
and some simple. General rights are complex rights. Rights
such as property rights, and such grand political and legal
rights as the rights to liberty, free speech, and due
process of law seem to be complex. They seem not to be
simple legal/moral relations, but to be complexes or
aggregates [10] of more simple legal/moral relations,
perhaps Hohfeldian basics. On the other hand, some rights,
such as rights to perform specific actions, or to have
others perform specific actions, do not seem to be
compos i t iona 1 ly complex. Such simple rights seem to be
composed of one and only one basic jural relation .[ 1 1
]
Going slightly beyond Hohfeld's suggestion, I wilL assume
that general rights are complexes of basic legal/moral
relations which include at least one simple right. (I
discuss the nature of such rights, and the justification of
this assumption at length in Appendix A.)
My primary interest in this dissertation is in the
nature of simple rights. Given the above, understanding of
simple rights will go a long way toward providing
understanding of general rights. Also, if 1 am mistaken
about general rights, and they, too, are simple, the
understanding of simple rights will be even more directly
helpful in the understanding of those rights 1 have
classified as general.
3* In chapters 1-4, I will investigate a number of
attempts to get clear on the nature of rights. The views
represented in these chapters are generally drawn from
attempts to specify the nature of legal rights, but success
there must also carry over to moral rights if the analysis
is to be correct.
Chapter 1 will focus on the popular conception of
rights as protections. Some have held that rights are
protections of freedoms (will theories). Others have held
that rights are protections of interests. Still others have
combined these proposals
,
suggesting that rights are
protections o f f reedoms to act to satisfy certain
interests
.
Chapter 2 investigates the popular view that rights
are claims
,
or are closely linked to claims
,
and that to
have a right is to be in a position to make a claim of a
certain sort.
Chapter 3 takes up Dworkin's fascinating views on
rights. For Dworkin, political rights are political
concerns (principles) of a specific sort, concerns which
must be taken into account in making political decisions.
Chapter 4 presents and briefly evaluates Benditt s
7recently developed theory of rights. Renditt's theory is
in many respects the polar opposite of Dworkin's. For
Benditt, rights are not moral concerns at all, they are not
things which must be weighed in coming to decisions, nor
are they things which are moral forces which bear on the
legal or moral status of actions. Tney merely summarize the
conclusions of legal and moral reasoning.
These approaches are problematical. Yet, the
intuitions about rights which underlie them are often
important, and must be accounted for by any adequate theory
of rights. We will return to some of these in Chapter 8.
In Chapters 5-7 I will concentrate on a fruitful
approach to the analysis of rights. These chapters will
combine to show that simple rights are claim-rights. I will
provide powerful evidence that Hohfeld was mistaken in his
view that powers, immunities, and liberties are rights.
In Chapter 5 I will discuss a number of attempts to
analyze rights in terms of (correlative) obligation. They
fail. I will suggest that, rather than attempting to
analyze rights in terms of obligation, simpliciter, we
should concentrate on the more hopeful project of analyzing
them in terms of owed obligation (obligations _to specific
individuals). I will tentatively propose an analysis along
these lines.
theIn Chapter 6 I take a slightly different path to
same anaLysis. I discuss several versions of the
Cor relativi ty Thesis: the view that rights can he
correlated with obligations. Hohfeld characterized cLaims-
rights in terms of such correlation. If we find that rights
can be correlated in a simple manner with owed obligations,
then rights are claim-rights. We will discover that this
can be done in a manner that suggests an analysis of rights
in terms of their correlative obligations similar to the
tentative proposal of the previous chapter.
In Chapter 7 I will consider a wide variety of
counterexamples to the thesis that rights imply
obligations. I will argue that these counterexamples fail
to refute the theory I have put forward.
Chapter 8 will discuss some alternatives to the
proposed analysis which can be developed out of some of our
earlier insights.
I have relegated to appendices several issues which
merit discussion, but which would detract from tne flow of
discussion if included in the main body of the text.
Appendix A includes a lengthy discussion of the
metaphysical nature of rights, especially general rights,
and some related linguistic issues. Appendix 3 presents,
clarifies, and defends my use of a somewhat unnatural
standard locution for- signifying rights. Appendix
9discusses the nature of owed obligations, and some of their
structural and logical properties. Appendix D evaluates
abstract objections made by David Lyons' to the
correlativi ty of rights with obligations.
4. Before proceeding to the body of the text, however,
it will be usefuil to draw some distinctions.
4.1 The language of rights suggests a three-way
distinction between types of rights based on their content.
The "content" of a right is what the right is a right to
,
the thing which the right is said to protect or require.
There are three sorts of things which rights are commonly
spoken of as being _t_o: (l) Abstract items such as life,
liberty, the pursuit of happiness, freedom(s) (of various
sorts), health, due concern on the part of others, and so
on. (2) Things. We have property rights in our possessions,
and perhaps, in our own bodies as well. (3) Events or
states of affairs. Usually these are actions of ourselves
or others. We have a right to sing in the shower, a right
to worship as we please, a right to turn right on red
Lights (after a stop), and perhaps to help from our friends
and relatives when we are iiL and in need.
I have already suggested that the first two classes
(they are general rights) are reducible to the third (plus
other basics). I will also assume that rights the content
10
of which appears to be an event or state of affairs which
is not an action are really rights to events which are
actions of the person owing, or the person having, the
right, lor example, suppose A promises B that there will be
a computer at B s disposal at work. B, then, has a right
(against A) that there will be a computer at his disposal
at work. This appears to be a right to the occurrance of an
event or a state of affairs: there being a computer at B's
disposal at work. I suggest that this right is really a
right to an action on A's part, the right that A make sure
there is a computer at B's disposal at work. I think that
all rights, the apparent content of which are events or
states of affairs which are not actions, are properly
understood to be rights to actions.
4.2 This reductionist view brings out the importance of
getting clear on rights to actions (and forbearances): they
will be important components of all rights. The flexibility
of English, however, creates special difficulties for the
study of such rights. Thus, I will adopt quasi- technical
locutions for expressing such rights which will aid in
their clear specification. I find the following especially
useful, and will employ them wnen special clarity is
needed
:
has a right against to
has a right against that [12]
11
where the first two blanks will be filled in by expressions
denoting things (usually people), and the third so filled
in that 'that ' in the second locution, and ' '
in the first denote specific actions. For exampLe, John's
right (against me) to speak his piece at the rally tomorrow
would be expressed:
John has a right against me that John speak(s) his
piece at the rally tomorrow.
or
,
John has a right against me to John's speaking his
piece at the rally tomorrow.
Such locutions will be used to express a 3-place
relation between the bearer of the right (x), the "ower"
(for Lack of a better term) of the right (y), and the
content of the right, the action protected or assured by
the right (z). Thus, I will often use expressions like:
x nas a right against y that z
and
x has a right against y to z.
Sometimes, where z is an action which x may perform, I will
employ
:
x has a right against y to do z.
One attraction of these locutions is that their syntax
makes very clear and explicit the three major roles created
by a right, the right-holder, the right-ower, and the
12
content of the right, i.e., what is owed. However, these
locutions are not quite ordinary English, and may require
some clarifaction before they can be fully understood and
comfortably employed. I discuss the meaning of these
Locutions and the benefits of their use in Appendix B.
4*3 It is common to distinguish between positive,
negative, active and passive rights (claims-rights )
.
Feinberg [13] characterizes these distinctions as follows.
Positive claim-rights are rights to the positive actions of
others. Negative claim-rights are rights to ommissions or
forbearances by others. Two subclasses of negative claim-
rights are: (i) Active: rights to act or not as one
chooses. (Presumably, active rights are negative because
they involve rignts to non-interference, or something like
that, on the part of others.) (ii) Passive: rights not to
be done to by others in certain ways.
Unfortunately these distinctions are neither as clear
nor as useful as might be hoped. It is not implausible that
active rights are all passive rights. That is, rights to do
things may just be rights not to be interferred with (in
certain ways) in one's attempts to do them. Even the
positive/negative distinction blurs: it is doubtful whether
there is an important natural distinction between positive
action and active forbearance. Does a promise to forbear
create a positive or a negative right? The more natural
13
(and important) distinction between action and ommission
(as opposed to forbearance) is passed over by these
distinctions. Also, some would deny the existence of
certain of these classes of rights. In Chapter 1, for
example, we will discuss will theories, which hoLd that all
rights are rights to will (or not), superficially, at
least, active negative rights.
The unclarity of these distinctions may be brought out
in another way. It is plausible that John's right against
Bill to speak at the rally may be the same as John's right
against Bill that Bill not interfere with John's speaking
at the rally (or something very close to that). If this is
correct, the same right is both active and passive.
I will diverge from such useage, and employ a simpler
distinction. Rights to do things, I will call "negative",
or "active". Rights to the actions of others, I will term,
"positive". Some of the above unclarities remain, but for
our purposes the distinction will do nicely.
NOTES
1. His two influential articles on this issue are
collected in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS, (Waiter Wheeler Cook, ed.), (Yale U. Press,
1919). Page references to HohfeLd are to this book ( FLC)
.
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2
- See, eg., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY,
American Law Institute (1936)
3. My interest is in "rights" as it is used to signify
rights, and not in its other uses (to mean, say,
permission, or requirement).
4. Even if he is correct about this, it might be that
other sorts of analysis are possible. In fact, Raz (Joseph
Raz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, (Oxford, 1970), p.181)
points out that Hohfeld does define "privilege" as "no duty
not to do".
5. Hohfeld, FLC
,
p.38
6. The claim-right is, I will argue, a compositional
element found in all rights.
7. In discussing the bearers and owers of rights,
Hohfeld tends to speak of persons and draw examples from
humankind. It should be noted, however, that some legal
persons are not human, eg., the state, corporations,
trusts, etc. Whether or not legal relations involving them
are reducible to legal relations between humans is unclear.
Nor am I certain of Hohfeld's view on this.
3. Hohfeld, FLC, p.38. More on correlativity later in
this chapter, and in chapters four and five.
9. But how, as Hohfeld suggests, can this help us to
understand c laim- rights ? "No-right" is an undefined
15
technical term, and as such supplies Little leverage for
clarifying toe concept of a claim-right. HohfeLd's answer
seems to be that even though the concept no-right is not
t'ormaLly defined, we can get a grasp on it through its
correlativity to the concept privilege. It is tempting to
ascribe to Hohfeid the view that knowledge of the
correLativities and oppositions holding between the four
basic concepts is sufficient to focus even initially fuzzy
understanding of these concepts. That is, generally, that
by understanding certain relations which hold between
poorly grasped concepts, our grasp may be made clear, even
without formal analysis. I find this both plausible and
intriguing, but will not persue it here.
10. Raz (THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM, (Oxford, 1970)
p.180) has criticized this view of Hohfeld's. Raz suggests
that Hohfeid treats such rights as sets of basic jural
relations, and criticizes this by arguing that the right
and such a set would have different existence conditions. I
think that by including conditional basic jural relations
in such sets, Hohfeid could avoid Raz's objection.
Also, I see no evidence that Hohfeid held that such
general rights were sets. Rather, I think that it is better
to interpret rights as logical constructions (employing
conjunction, disjunction, conditionals, etc.) built out of
the basics. Such complexes would have structure. ivith
16
rights under a contract, for example, the structure of the
right would be evident: it would be the way the content of
the right was built, by the logic of the contract, out of
the basics. Raz's point does not tell against such a
concept of composition.
11. For such simple rights it is plausible that getting
clear on the nature of the relation involved itself
clarifies the linguistic concept of such a right. Thus, if
there are distinct simple rig’nts-relations
,
it is plausible
that "rights" is ambiguous, having one meaning for each
such relation.
12. x has a right to its being the case that.
13. Joel Feinberg, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (Prentice Hall,
1973), p . 59
CHAPTER I
THEORIES OF RIGHTS AS PROTECTIONS
Many jurisprudents seem to think, Hohfeld
notwithstanding, that there is a single relation signified
by rights. One common approach is to characterize rights as
protections of some sort, usually either of legal
abilities, freedoms or options (Will Theories), or of
interests (Interest Theories). Some combine these elements,
as does Paton:
A right is legal because it is protected (or at
least recognized by a legal system - hence the
criterion of enforceability must be discussed. The
holder of a right exercises his will in a certain way,
and that will is directed to the satisfaction of a
certain interest. Each of these elements - protection,
will, and interest - is essential to a true description
of a right, but many disputes have arisen because of a
false emphasis either on the will which is exercised or
on the interest desired. Thus some define right in
terms of will, and others in terms of interest
alone
.
[ 1 ]
Most legal theorists are in vague agreement with Paton,
holding that when the law creates rights, it is protecting
(or perhaps facilitating) the abilities of individuals to
work their will in pursuit of their interests. Yet there is
great variation as to specifics. "Will" theorists drop the
"interests" requirement, proposing that rights are merely
protections of an individual's will, or choice, against
interference by others. "Interest theorists drop the will
17
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requirement, proposing that rights are protected interests.
Paton suggests that, by itself, neither of these approaches
is adequate.
We will discuss several such proposals here. Although
there is great variation even within these classes of
theory, they can, to a large extent, be evaluated at a
fairly abstract level.
2
.
The Will Theories
.
Two sorts of will theory stand out. The first sort
treats rights as options to protections (protections
available at the will of the right-holder). The second
treats rights as protected options or freedoms. I will
sketch the first, but evaluate it elsewhere (Ch.3). The
second I will outline and evaluate.
2 . 1 First Approach
Kelson, for example, takes the first approach. [2]
Kelson worked in the European legal tradition, and took
seriously the fact that the same term (in French and
German) is used to express both "law" and "a right". For
Kelson, to have a right was to have, in a sense, your own
law ("subjective law"). That is, to have, by law, the
ability to, at one's option (will), gain state support in
the form of sanctions against those who would fail in their
legal duty. Thus, to have a legal right is to have, as
one's own, the law and sanctioning power of the state.
L 9
A right is, thus, a legal norm in its relation to the
individual who, in order that the sanction shall be
executed, must express a will to that effect. The
subject of a right is the individual whose
manifestation of will is directed to tne sanction,
i.e., whose suit is a condition of the sanction. If we
denote the individual in whom the legal order confers
the possiblitiy of bringing suit, a potential
plaintiff, then it is always a potential plaintiff who
is the subject of a right. [3]
Interest is not essential, according to Kelsen.
The legal order usually confers that possibility on the
individual in whom the legislator presumes a certain
interest in the sanction. But if the legal order
confers that possibility upon an individual, this
individual has a right even if, in a concrete case, he
should lack such an interest and thus also a "will"
that the sanction be executed. A right is no more the
interest or the will of the individual to whom it
belongs than a duty is the fear of the sanction or the
compulsion in the mind of the obligated individual. The
legal right is, like the legal duty, the legal norm in
its relation to an individual designated by the norm,
viz., the potential plaintiff . [4]
(Kelsen views himself as denying the "will" theory, but I
think he has a different sort of theory in mind than we do,
and that his theory falls into the category under
examination
.
)
His theory grants rights to just those who can lay
claim to them (plaintiffs). Such claims theories will be
considered in detail in the next chapter, and we will here
pass on to the second sort of will theory.
2 . 2 Second Approach
The second approach, which we will for now
call the
treats rights as protected options or
"will theory",
20
wi 1 lings
,
rather than options to pro tec tions
.
[ 5 ] The idea
here seems to be that one has a Legal right when the law
provides protection for a range of action or choice on the
part of the right-holder.
But care must be taken to distinguish two concepts
which might be involved here: will (freedom to act in a
certain way), and option. An event is part of one's area of
freedom if one can efficaciously will it to occur. If,
however, one has an option to an event, one can
efficaciously will it to occur, or one can opt not to, as
one chooses. To protect the option to an event is thus
different from merely protecting a freedom efficaciously to
will that the event occur. This distinction generates two
versions of the will theory, the "option" version, and the
"freedom" version.
Some have argued against the option view on the
grounds that not all rights are rights to options. Often,
where rights are unwaivable, they protect rights to do
certain things, but not the option not to. For example,
there are the legal rights of children to schooling, the
rights of the insane and retarded to care, and the rights
of everyone to certain sorts of freedom (one cannot sell
oneself into slavery). One can easily imagine granting
medical patients the right to continued use of medical life
21
support devices once hooked into them, but not allowing
them the option of being disconnected. One cannot
ordinarily waive the legal right not to be killed. Suicide
illegal. Contracts can create non—waivable rights.
Suppose your neighbor seldom cuts his lawn. You decide it
is worth it to pay him to do so, and you contract with one
another that he cut his lawn once a week. He has a right to
cut his lawn, but he no longer has the option of not
cutting it
.
It would seem, then, that legal rights are not legally
protected options. Yet this is too hasty. If we take the
"will" seriously, the following approach is suggested:
legal rights are legally protected options of a certain
sort, options to will or not will an event. The concept of
will employed here will be the concept of efficacious
voluntary choice.
How will this help? On this view we can understand how
a right can be an option and still be unwaivable. The above
counterexamples have force only if the option protected by
a right is the option of willing an event or willing its
non-occur ranee . They showed that one may have a right to do
something, but not have the right not to, i.e., to
efficaciously will its non-occurrance . But the new proposal
does not imply that rights to an event protect the option
to its non-occurrance, but only that they protect the
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right-holders option to refrain from willing that event,
i.e., the option to refrain from voluntarily and
efficaciously choosing that event.
For example, the right to attend school is, on this
account, the protected option of freely and efficaciously
choosing to attend school, or to refrain from freely and
efficaciously willing to attend school. On this account, an
option is protected, but that option does not include the
freedom to stay away from school, it only protects the
freedom to not will to go to school. So, one could be
forced, against one * s will
,
to go to school and at the same
time have one's option protected. The state must protect
you in your freely choosing to go to school, and protect
you in your going to school, if you voluntarily choose to.
If, however, one is forced, against one's will, to go to
school, the state has not violated the right, because it
has "allowed" you to go involuntarily. The fact that the
right to attend school is unwaivable does not imply that
the right does not protect this very specific sort of
option.
But because protection of such options comes to little
more than protecting the freedom to act, [6] this theory
comes so close to collapsing into the simpler freedom
approach that we will pass on to that version of the will
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theory
.
On this approach, to have a right is to have legal
protection for one s (efficaciously) willing the occurrence
of an event.
Paton (and this is a common criticism) criticizes the
will theory, pointing out that it, taken strictly, ignores
many rights. it does not do a bad job with rights to do
things, but it seems incapable of handling rights to the
actions of others (eg., the right to have one's contracts
honored, and rights to certain benefits from the state).
But this objection is not as strong as it may seem. A
case can be made that sometimes the acts of others can be
viewed as extensions of our own will. For example, just as
one can extend one's will by using a tool (you filled in
the swamp with (by using) your bulldozer), one can also
extend one's will - range of action - by using people as
tools. This happens, for example, when a king wages war
while staying at home by sending his troops to battle, or
when a person appoints someone to serve as his agent for
certain purposes. Such agents perforin acts for the person
represented, and, in the relevant sense, the actions of the
agent are the actions of that person. The person
represented is responsible for those actions. By granting
someone my power of attorney I extend my will in a very
broad way.
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It is not unreasonable to view promises and contracts
in a similar light, as ways of extending one's agency
through the actions of others. By contracting to do z for
A, B makes himself a tool for A with respect to z. A has
extended his range of action so that z may be considered an
action of A's as well as an action of B's. So, if B
contracts with A to murder C, and does so, both A and B are
guilty of murder. From another angle, we might think of B
as having put his will at the service of (under the power
of) A with respect to C's murder. This is born out by the
fact that, at least usually, the requirement that one keep
a promise is at the option of the promisee - under the
control of his will. It can be waived or required (usually,
it can even be required that the promise not be kept) by
the promisee.
So, rights arising from contracts that others act in
specified ways can be seen as consistent with the will
theory, for these acts can be seen as extensions of the
will, or range of action or freedom, of the right-holder.
Legal rights to the actions of others created non-
contractually
,
however, are more difficult to account for
on this model. What can be said, for example, for rights to
aid arising under good Samaritan laws, rights to
compensation for torts, and welfare rights (the right to
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buy food stamps, the right to receive specific weLfare
payments )
?
Perhaps the best that can be done here is to suggest
that by creating such rights, the government thereby
extends the range of agency of the individuals possessing
them. (Perhaps the intent of the Legislature is relevant
here.) Thus, when a person's need invokes his right to the
aid of a bystander under a good Samaritan law, we are to
view him as helping himself through the actions of the
bystander. In a sense, the bystander is to be viewed as an
agent of the person in need. Similarly, when the law
creates agencies to provide welfare aid to individuals,
such agencies might be thought of as the arms of those
individuals entitled to aid, they are the tools with which
the individuals entitled to aid act to claim the aid.
Generally, when legal rights are so created, the wills
(range of action) of individuals can be seen to be extended
because procedures are provided through which they can act
to claim their entitlements. The procedure may be as simpLe
as, in the case of good Samaritan laws, calling for help.
Or, as with welfare rights, it may require formal
application. This view takes seriously such claims as, " You
apply for and receive welfare through your local agency."
In some cases it is very plausible that the law
extends the wiLL or agency of individuals in this way. Toe
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courts are a tool through which individuals can use the
power of the state to extend their agency. By protecting an
individual's access to the courts, and enforcing court
decisions, tne state protects the actions that individual
can take through the courts. Such actions are, on this
account, rights.
It could further be suggested that where this metaphor
breaks down there are no rights. Suppose, for example, good
Samaritan laws do not put aid at the behest of those in
need (or, perhaps, the reasonable assumption that the
person would will it if he (were rational and) could), but
merely require that aid be given, independently of their
will. Whether a person in need requests your help or
refuses it has no bearing on your obligation to help them.
No extension of the will of the needy would thereby be
created, and thus no right (though there would be a legal
duty to help). Similarly, where welfare aid is not at the
behest of the needy, and cannot be reasonably viewed as an
extension of their range of action, they are not rights. If
the law required courts to send people to jail at their
request, the law would be an extension of their range of
action, and they would have rights. But it does not, and
the guilty party does not have a right to imprisonment, for
it will be inappropriate to view the law as extending his
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range o f action . The law was not created to extend his
range o f action, and his choice in the matter is not
directly relevant to what the courts sentence must be.
Paton also objects:
And the law grants rights not to the human will
as an end in itself, but to a human will that is
pursuing ends of which the legal system approves. [7]
That is, the law protects only certain willings, those
connected to certain legally recognized interests. Also,
some hold tnat the law is created to protect the interests,
not the bare assertions of will, of citizens.
I do not find these points telling against the theory.
First, I do not see that the will theory is committed to
the human will as an end in itself. It does not grant
rights to all willings, but only to certain limited sorts.
Indeed, some who advocate the will theory may also hold
that human freedom (will) is an end in itself, to be
limited only when its exercise would harm others. But I do
not see how this is relevant to the question of the
analysis of the concept of a legal right. Second, legal
systems may grant rights to pursue activities of which they
(or their creators, at any rate) do not approve. In our
system, for example, citizens have rights to be atheists,
homosexuals, and to make anti-government speeches;
lawmakers seem, generally, to disapprove of such behavior.
Paton mentions another common objection, and one of
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the more interesting: the law may grant rights to things
which do not have wills, things which are incapable of
intentional action. Babies, the severely mentally retarded,
brain-damaged living (once human) bodies, corporations, and
even religious idols may be, and have been, granted legal
rights. Stone, in Should Trees have S tanding? [ 8 ] has
proposed that, in order to insure that future generations
are able to enjoy such things, trees, and even certain
inorganic natural objects, should be granted legal
rights. [9] Even the dead may have legal rights.
It is unclear what Paton thinks of this objection. He
points out that even in these cases wills may be involved;
these objects, when granted rights, generally get them by
the creation of some guardian, executor, or other agent who
does have a will. By itself, however, this will not do. The
will theory requires that those who have the right be able
to act. That they have agents who can does not seem to make
them capable of having rights, but only their agents.
The full response must also propose that when such
agents exist, their will becomes, legally, the will of
their ward. Such agents act not merely in the interest of
their ward, but on behalf of their ward, or for their ward;
their legal actions as the agent of the ward just ar_e the
legal actions of their ward.
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A mentalistic conception of will, however, cannot do
the job for such a theory, for granting a non-conscious
being a legal will in the sense employed here will not
invoLve changing their psychology. A very trimmed-down
concept must be employed, the concept of the ability to
(freely) perform legal actions. By assigning agents to such
objects, we can create for them this ability. Of course,
this is a peculiarly legal concept.
The will theory, then, provides a powerful conception
of legal rights which can be defended, with at least some
plausibility, against many of the common objections which
have been raised to it.
There are, however, some remaining difficulties with
which proponents of this theory must deal. (1) How does the
theory account for the prima facie nature of rights, the
weight of rights, the conflict of rights, and the
justificatory nature of such rights? (2) How can this
theory be extended to account for moral rights?
Concerning (1). If rights are merely protected
freedoms, then it is unclear how they can interact,
override one another, and justify interference with the
rights of others. How can one be more weighty (important)
than another? Both are simply actions which are protected.
One available response is suggested by a distinction
some philosophers have drawn between prima facie and all-in
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Legal/moral concerns. I will discuss this distinction
briefly in chapter 4. Roughly, prima facie legal/moraf
concerns are concerns which have a bearing on the overall
normative status of actions, but which may not, by
themselves, determine that status. Thus, such concerns may
weigh in favor of or against an action's being, say, wrong,
but because it conflicts with other moral concerns which
outweigh it (override it) the action may, on balance, be
right. it might be proposed, then, that some actions are
prima facie protected. These prima facie protections will
have various weights, and will compete. All-in rights are
those freedoms protected after all legal concerns are
weighed. Prima facie rights are freedoms which are prima
facie protected. We will discuss the concept of protection
at the end of this chapter, and will see if sense can be
made of this.
Concerning (2). It is somewhat doubtful that the the
concept of will necessary to make this approach work for
legal rights will carry over for moral rights. The ordinary
concept of moral agency will not do, for that concept
denies trees, animals, and incompetent persons moral
rights. Perhaps this issue will turn on whether we can view
persons as being moral agents, or representatives, of non-
agents. Let us assume that we can.
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It is aLso doubtful that moral rights involve
protection. If Bill promises to cut my lawn, and I have a
right to expect him to do so, how is protection involved?
Getting dear on this may require clarification of the
concept of protection. We will discuss this at the end of
this chapter.
We will now turn to a a popuLar alternative theory:
interest theory.
3 . I n teres t Theory
According to this popular approach, to have a legal
right to a thing is to have an interest in that thing which
is protected by law. Paton suggests:
An interest is a claim or want of an individual
or a group of individuals which that individual or
group wishes to satisfy. [10]
The nature of the theory will, I think, become clearer as
we consider some objections to it.
Kelsen criticized the interest theory. Interests are
mental attitudes, he says,
that somebody is interested in a certain course
of behavior by somebody else means that he desires
this behavior because he thinks it useful to
himself
.
[ 11 ]
If so, he argues, there may be protected interests with no
corresponding right, and rights with no corresponding
protected interests.
The first problem results from the fact that one may
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take an interest in behavior which the Law requires of
another, but which is not your right. Suppose Dick is
LegaiLy required to do jury duty. You may have an interest
in his doing so, because it wiii provide you with
opportunity to steal his girL. Though you have a protected
interest, you have no right.
On the other hand, you may have a right to something
in which you have no interest, e.g., the right to state
sponsored hang-gliding Lessons.
The theory KeLsen refutes in this way is, perhaps,
unrepresentative of interest theories. Such theories need
not read "interests" as occurrent desires or wants, as
KeLsen does. Notice, for example, that Paton used "claim or
want", (though he does take this back by going on, "...
which that individual of group wishes to sat isfy .") (under-
lining mine). Other interpretations of "interests" are
avai Lable
.
People often have interests in which they are not
interested. In this sense, interests are things from which
one wouLd benefit, and peopLe may not be interested in
what is best for them, i.e., what is in their best
interest. Children and animals often have interests in
things which they do not desire, and which, in fact, tney
desire not to nave (or do) (eg., trips to the doctor or the
vet). The same is true for aduLts, who often choose their
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short term interests over their best interests. Such
misdirected wants may arise, for example, from ignorance,
laziness, or imprudence.
We might try to characterize what is in a person's
interest as what they would want, were they fuLLy rational,
and in full knowledge of their circumstances. But this will
not account for the best interests of the insane
(irrational). They may need treatment, but if they were
fully rational, they would not want help, because they
would not need it. Perhaps what is in a person's best
interest is what a fully rational, knowledgeable, third
person wanting what is best for that person would want for
them. Whether or not this is adequate, it is clear that
there is a concept here to be analyzed. The employment of
this concept by the interests theory would seem to improve
the theory. Yet this will not do either, for people may
have legal rights to things not in their best interest.
Another move the interest theorist could make is to
employ the concept of a potential interest (in either of
the above senses of "interest"). A potential interest of an
individual is something which could come to be an interest
of that individual. This fits well with what (I suspect)
legislators usually take themselves to be doing when they
legal rights. Legislators are aware that citizenscreate
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may, in the future, come to have interests in things which
they have no interest in at present. They may create rights
to allow citizens to satisfy such interests, should they
come to have them.
While this last modification may block Kelsen's second
objection (free hang-gliding lessons are potentially in
one's best interest; indeed, almost anything is potentially
in one's interest, including freedoms), it does not block
the first.
Perhaps this account can be saved from this objection
by making the theory partially intentional: rather than
making rights a function of whose potential interest would
be protected, rights would be a function of whose potential
interests the right was created to (intended to) protect.
This theory is similar to Lyon's intended beneficiary
theory. We will discuss this approach later in this
dissertation (Ch.5). Two difficulties for such intentional
approaches will suffice for now. First, it is hard to see
how this concept could be extended to account for moral
rights. Such rights (except contractual rights) seem to
exist independently of anyone's intent, or creative acts.
Second, loopholes in law often create rights which were not
intended by the creators of that law.
A difficult problem for almost any version of the
interests approach arises from the fact that objects which
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do not have interests can be right-holders. By creating
agents who can sue in the names of, for exampLe, trees,
corporations
,
ships, and the dead, rights can be created
(and, indeed, have been) for such objects. These things do
not have desires, or potentiai desires; any concept of
interest, or potentiai interest which appLies to them will
be independent of psychological properties. But what
concept could be invoked here? I do not see how the
interest approach can account for such rights. [12]
Nonetheless, a case can be made that the interest
approach is correct, the previous discussion not-
withstanding. To make such a case, a further sense of
"legal interest" is invoked.
I think that, in law, the term "interest" is often
used in a sense divorced from anything psychological. To
have a legal interest in something is for the law to
recognize the interest. For the law to recognize an
interest in a thing is for the law to specify that the
individual having the interest has a right to that thing.
That is, a legal interest in a thing is just a right to
it. [13] Legal interest is not a species of psychological
interes t
.
Hohfeld was doubly aware of this. First, he warned
against confusing abs tract jural relations with non-
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abstract relations, distinguishing the physicaL or mental
ablLity (power) to do a thing from legal power, and warning
against confusing legal liberty with physical liberty, and
legal property in land with the land itself (the "property"
in anotner sense)
. Hohfeld is at least correct in warning
us that care must be taken to avoid mistakenly reading
jural terms as having their non-legal connotations. Second,
he defines interests as aggregates of abstract legal
relations (presumably the Hohfeldian basics).
Since all legal interests are "incorporial"
consisting, as they do, of more of less limited
aggregates of abstract legal relations ...[14]
"property"... with far greater discrimination
and accuracy - the word is used to denote the legal
interest (or aggregate of legal relations)
appertaining to such physical objects. [15]
Legal interests are transferable.
It is clear that only legal interests as such
can be inher ited
; [ 16 ]
Thus, the possession of legal interests, in this
sense, does not require a psychology, and animals, trees,
corporations, and other non-psychological entities may have
legal interests. (Whether or not any corresponding concept
of moral interest can be made out, and linked to moral
rights, I do not know.)
It is interesting to notice that if this concept of
legal interest is linked to rights as suggested above, this
link may help us to understand the concept of rights,
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especially legal rights. However, it will not help us in
the strong way it would if the psychological concept of
interest were employed. Whereas linking rights with
psychological interests would take us out of the realm of
purely legal concepts, and into a class of concepts which
could be grasped independently, the concept of legal
interest involved must itself be understood in terms of
rights, and thus does not give us an independent way of
understanding rights.
4 . Combined Will and Interest Theory
Paton and others believe that the concept of rights
involves both will and interest. Paton states:
And the law grants rights not to the human will
as an end in itself, but to a human will that is
pursuing ends of which the legal system approves
.[ 1 7
]
He also cites C.K. Allen, and G.Jellinak,
The essence of a legal right seems to me to be
not legally guaranteed power by itself, nor legally
protected interest by itself, but the legally
guaranteed power to realize an interest .[ 18 , 19]
A right is the will-power of a man applied to a
utility or interest recognized and protected by a
legal system. [20]
As we found with will theories, this approach can be
interpreted in two different ways: (1) Following the Kelsen
approach to will theory, to have a right is to have tne
protection of the state at one's will. Mixed theories
propose that what where a right exists, it is an interest
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of trie right-holder that that state will protect. This (as
did Kelsen's) falls into the category of claims theory, and
our discussion of claims theory in the next chapter should
make at least some of the failings of this approach clear.
(2) Following the second approach to will theory, to have a
right is to have a protected freedom. Mixing this with
interest theory suggests that rights are legally protected
freedoms to act to satisfy certain interests. We will
discuss this second approach here.
The benefits of unifying the will and interest
approaches along these lines are somewhat obscure to me. If
we employ the concept of legal interest just proposed, it
is hard to see why will is brought in at all, for legal
interests will themselves be rights.
Perhaps this unification will allow us to employ the
psychological concept of potential interest, rather than
the purely legal concept of legal interest, thus escaping
the circle of purely legal relations. We can formulate this
approach fairly clearly:
A has a legal right to z iff (i) the law affords A
protection in A's freely and efficaciously
willing z, & ( i i ) z i s a potential interest of
A's.
I do not see how this is an improvement upon the will
theory. It must employ the somewhat dubious idea that one
acts through others where, for example, welfare rights and
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good Samaritan rights are concerned. Also, since almost
everything is of potential interest to A, I do not see how
clause (ii) does much to change the will theory. The one
thing it does do is carry with it one of the major
difficulties of the psychological version of the interest
theory, that is, that things incapable of having interests
cannot (contrary to fact), have rights.
5 . Protection
Both the interest and will approaches rely on the
concept of protection. A brief discussion of this concept
will put them in interesting perspective.
The concept of protection may seem fairly clear.
Ordinarily, when we say that A's interest in, or freedom
to, z is protected by B, we mean something like: B will act
to insure that A can perform z, or that z is done for A.
This concept of active protection, however, will not do the
job for either of the analyses of rights we nave been
discussing
.
States and their agents are often corrupt. Such
corruption sometimes causes citizens to be unable to get
the state to protect their legal rights. Even decent states
will often fail to act to protect legal rights, for states
are neither omniscient, nor omnipotent, and they are
generally large bureaucracies with limited resources, and
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subject to the problems these features carry with them.
That moral rights are not actively protected interests or
freedoms is even clearer; just who is doing the protecting?
The concept of protection invoked by these theories
must contain within it a normative element. The idea is
that, where a legal right exists, the state has a legal
obligation to protect the right-holder
.[ 21 ] With moral
rights, the person against whom the right holds will be
obligated to protect the interest or freedom of the person
naving the right.
Thus, such "protection" theories of rights turn out to
be analyses of rights in terms of obligation: obligations
(perhaps prima facie and/or all-in) to protect others in
certain ways. Further evaluation of such theories will be
reserved for our discussion of attempts to analyze rights
in terms of obligation (Ch.5-8).
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CHAPTER II
THEORIES OF RIGHTS AS CLAIMS
1. Nearly all writers maintain that there is some
intimate connection between having a claim and having
a right. Some identify right and claim without
qualifications; some define "right" as justified or
justifiable claim, or recognized claim, or valid
claim. My own preference is for the last
definition. [ 1 ]
The common thread which runs through such analyses is
that rights essentially or necessarily involve claims. But
the specifics of this connection are unclear. In this
chapter we will investigate some of the links between
rights and claims.
One plausible connection:
(Cl) x has a right against y to z => x has a claim
against y to z.
If I have a right to life, I have a claim to it (which
others should respect). If you promised to meet me at 6 at
the bus stop, then I have a right and a claim to your being
there. If I have a legal right to your not trespassing on
my land, I have a legal claim to your keeping out which I
can cash in by taking you to court. If I have a right to
speak freely, I have a claim against the government that it
refrain from preventing my speaking freely.
Another possible link:
( C2 ) x has a right against y to z => x has a
claim against y to x's right against y to z.
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Legal rights are generally claimable. If Joan has a legal
right to her car, which her neighbor has borrowed and
failed to return, then Joan can go to court, claim her
right, and the court will enforce it against her neighbor.
If our privacy is invaded by the police, we can go to court
claiming that we have a right to privacy, and demanding
enforcement. The court should protect that right. If I am
being killed, I have a claim against the aggressor that he
respect my right to life. Generally, it seems tnat if we
have a right, we are in a position to claim respect for
that right. [2]
2. There are many reasons to expect a close link
between rights and claims. This section discusses several.
2.1 Feinberg suggests that the most important feature of
rights is that they are claimable, they are things one "can
stand on."
Feinberg believes it is the claiming aspect of rights
which make them valuable.
The activity of claiming, finally, as much as any
other thing, makes for self-respect and respect for
others, gives a sense to tne notion of personal
dignity . .
.
[
3
]
When Feinberg sketches a society, Nowheresville,
lacking rights, a main missing element is people s
awareness of being in a position to claim things as their
due
. [ 4 ]
2.2 He also states:
The legal power to claim ( perf ormatively ) one's
right or the things to which one has a right seems to
be essential to the very notion of a right. [5]
A legal right to which one could not make claim
(i.e., not even for recognition) would be a very
"imperfect" right indeed. [6]
He holds a closely related principle:
It is my contention that for every right there
is a furthe^ right to claim, in aopropriate
circumstances, that one has that right. [7]
14. ... A list of "appropriate circumstances"
would include occasions where one is challanged, when
his rights are explicitly denied, when he must make
applications for them, where his possession seems
insufficiently acknowledged or appreciated, etc.
. • .[ 8 ]
Interpreting
:
(RR) x has a right against y to z => (Ey')(x has a
right against y' to claim x's right against y to z,
if infringement takes place or is threatened)
(y' will usually be y, but with legal rights it might,
perhaps, be the state.)
Usually, if x has a right against y to z, and y is
violating that right, then x is in a position to warn off
y, even to make a public scene, in order to assert his
right (to lay claim to that which is his).
2.3 "Rights" and "claims" are often used
interchangeably. In discussing rights, the question, "What
claim does he have to it?" often seems to ask the same
thing as, "What right does he have to it?" To deny that
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someone has a right to something, it might be said. "He has
no claim to that. "[9]
2.4 There is a suggestive parallel in logicaL structure
between rights and claims. Rights are held by things,
against things, to things. So are claims. Generally, rights
and claims are held by sentient things, against moral or
legal agents, to events.
2.5 Species of rights and claims are similarly demarcated,
usually by the practices or institutions under which they
arise. Legal rights and claims arise within legal systems,
moral rights and claims from moral considerations, and some
rights and claims are created by the rules of games and
sporting contests. Moreover, rights and claims are
individuated by their grounds in similar ways. x may have
more than one claim against y to z, having several
independent grounds for claims against y to z. These
distinct grounds ground different claims. Similarly for
rights. In fact, the very elements of these practices and
institutions which create particular rights seem to create,
together, both the right and the parallel claims suggested
by (Cl ) and (C2 )
.
2.6 There is a similarity between the logic of rights
and claims. Claims can conflict and be defeated in a manner
mirrored by (prima facie) rights. Also, one fairly
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plausible principle about claims is: if x has a claim
(against y) to z^, and that claim cannot be honored unless
z
2
occurs, then x has a claim (against y) to z ? . So, if
Banker has a claim against Debtor to Debtor's paying him
100 dollars, and the only way Debtor can pay is to sell his
car, then Banker has a claim against Debtor to Debtor's
selling his car. Now, fill in "right" for "claim" in the
above principle and example. The principle remains equally
plausible, and the example equally pointed. Notice, the
truth or falsity of the principle is irrelevant here. What
is relevant is that the rights version and the claims
version seem to succeed, or fail, together. If the
principle is true for rights, then it is true for claims,
and vice versa. Do the principles say different things?
3. There are at least two senses of "claims." Failure to
distinguish between these has, I believe, sometimes led to
confusion concerning the nature of the link between rights
and claims.
3.1 In one sense, to have a claim against someone is,
roughly, to stand in a moral relation to them which places
at least prima facie limits or requirements upon their
actions. [10] This relation is abstract and normative.
Having a claim in this sense is not necessarily related to
the activity: making claim to.
In this abstract sense of "claims", a right against
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someone to something is (or at least grounds) a claim
against that person to the thing. Thus, (Cl) is true.
Also, in so far as it ia plausible that there are no
claims which are not (grounded in) rights, it will be
plausible that
:
x has a right against y to z <=> x has a claim
against y to z
Such analysis is disappointing to some. It may seem
unhelpful because the concept of "claim" is no clearer than
that of "right." It does not show rights to be functions of
other simpler relations. To some, it even seems
circular .[ 1 1 ] They suggest that claims be defined in terms
of rights. Such identity or equivalence would seem, to me
at least, significant and interesting. If rights and claims
are the same relation (or if "rights" and "claims" are
synonymous), circularity of this sort is to be expected.
3.2 In the second sense of "claims", for x to have a
claim to a thing is for that thing to be claimable by x. To
have a claim to a thing is to be in a position to make
claim to it. I suspect there is a tendency to accept (Cl)
for abstract claims, and then to equivocate and accept it
for claims in this second, active sense.
4. Whether or not such equivocation takes place,
philosophers who link rights to claims almost invariably
have something more than abstract claims in mind. fney
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think of rights as claimable, as things one can "stand on"
or demand respect for by claiming; that is, as things we
can take action to protect and raise a fuss about if
necessary. On this view, to have a right is to be able to
act in a certain way: to claim the right or its object. To
have a legal right is, perhaps, to have the law guarantee,
or protect, our claim by, for example, creating courts
which hear claims, courts in which plaintiffs can make a
legal fuss, and which will enforce those claims which are
justified.
This conception of rights is commonplace in the legal
community (especially with positivists). The paradigm legal
right holder is a person who can, at his will, bring to
court (one way of making a claim) a winning case requiring
certain actions on the part of others which the state will
help force. This paradigm is at the core of many
philosophers conceptions of rights as well. Thus, on this
view, if a person or other entity does not have "standing"
(i.e., will not be recognized as a suitor by the courts),
he cannot make any claims, and he has no legal rights. (It
has led some to deny that criminal law generates rights,
for, strictly speaking, in criminal cases harmed citizens
are not claimants, but merely "complaintants.") It also
captures the intuition central to the Kelsen Will Theory,
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on which to have a right is to have the enforcing power of
the state at one's will. One would exert one's will by
actively claiming state enforcement of one's right. [12]
(In the following discussion we should bear in mind
that even if there is a sense of "rights" used by lawyers
which is somehow closely linked to active claiming, it may
be a technical sense not closely related to the sense of
the term in ordinary English, or the relations normally
called "rights.")
5. Joel Feinberg has presented a detailed and
influential discussion of the active claims approach. We
will examine Feinberg's development of the claims theory in
considerable detail.
If we concentrate on the whole activity of
claiming, which is public, familiar, and open to our
observation, rather than on its upshot alone, we may
learn more about the generic nature of rights than we
could ever hope to learn from a formal definition,
even if one were poss ible
.
[ 1 3 ]
Feinberg holds that the concept of rights is an all-in
concept, not a prima facie concept. He defines "rights" as
"valid claims. "[14] As used here, both "validity" and
"claims" require clarification.
5.1 Validity
The difficulties I will raise for claims theories of
rights will be directed against the view that rignts
essentially involve claims, and not towards the view toat
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there is a class of claims (valid claims) which guarantee
or imply rights. Thus it is not be necessary for us to get
completely clear on the concept of "validity" employed by
Feinberg. However, a sketch is called for.
As we will see, having a claim does not require the
existence of a right. Even a strong claim may not be strong
enough
.
"Validity", as I understand it, is justification
of a peculiar and narrow kind, namely, justification
within a system of rules. A man has a legal right
when official recognition of his claim (as valid) ^is
called for by the governing rules.
[
15 ]
I think Feinberg takes the element of "official
recognition" in the above seriously, but is a claim's being
justified really the same thing as official recognition's
being called for?
An alternative conception is this: Claims are t_o the
actions or forbearances of others; they are made by
presenting a case to snow that such actions or forbearances
are required. A claim is valid when the fact that the
action being claimed (or the forbearance being claimed) is
required is implied by the law in conjunction with the
facts developed in the case. I am uncertain whether or not
Feinberg would find this account acceptable.
Such approaches, presumably, can be modified to
account for rights generated by any system with clear-cut
procedures for claiming, and rules specifying requirements.
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Thus we can apply it to rights in many sporting contests,
cLubs and institutions. Feinberg beLieves it applies to
moral right as well:
A man has a moral right when he has a claim, tne
recognition of which is called for - not
(necessarily) by legal rules - but by moral
principles, or the principles of an enlightneed
conscience
.
[ 16 ]
(The species of a right is thus a function of rules
validating claims to it.)
5 . 2 Claims
Feinberg examines the nature of having a claim to in
detail. However his conclusions are not always clear. In
one place he says,
having a claim consists in being in a position to
claim, that is, to make claim to or claim tnat.[l7]
But in another passage [18] he omits the "or claims that".
These two sorts of activity, (1) making claim to, and
(2) claiming that, are explained.
(1) "making claim to" is claiming in the "performative"
sense. It is itself a legal action, an official act having
legal consequences. To make claim to a thing is generally
to exercise a right one already has, or to apply for rights
for which one is qualified. One may make claim to a hat one
has checked by presenting the stub, make claim to one's car
by presenting title or registration, or "stake one's claim
to a goldmine or homestead. Feinberg seems to accentuate a
53
veridical sense of makes claim to" on which one can make
cLaim to a thing only if one has the right to the thing (or
represents someone having the right).
(2) "CLaiming that" is what Feinberg calls
propositional claiming". It is to assert a proposition in
such a way as to demand others listen. "To claim that one
has rights" is to assert that one has them "...in such a
manner as to demand or insist that what is asserted be
recognized. "[19] Things other than rights can be claimed in
this way. "Claiming that" seems to be spirited assertion
with the intent of gaining recognition or admission (of
s ome thing )
.
Thus, making c laim to and claiming tha
t
one has a
right are clear-cut sorts of actions in terms of which we
may be able to understand "having a claim". Not quite.
Unfortunately Feinberg' s complicates things by using the
first in two different senses, a non-ver idica 1 , and a
veridical. He states:
One sort of thing which we may be doing when we
claim is to make claim to something; which means 'to
petition or seek by virtue of supposed right; to
demand as due. '[20]
Of course, one can do this even if the supposed right does
not exist. In this sense, the non-veridica 1 , to make claim
to a thing is to exhibit a certain kind of behavior. In the
veridical sense, one must not only exhibit the behavior,
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but one must 'nave the right as well.
It is not profitable here to argue this in detail, but
I think Feinberg has mixed together two separate proposals
about rights and claims, both of which he believes. The
first is the identification of rights with claims in the
veridical performative sense. The second is the
identification of right with some activity which can be
identified even by those not a 1 ready having the concept of
a right: non-veridica 1 making claim to.
I will examine the latter proposal; I think it is the
more interesting. It also makes more sense of his
insistence that rights are valid claims, that not just any
claim will do. This makes no sense on the veridical "makes
claim to", for that concept does entail the existence of
the right, and the requirement of validity would be
redundant
.
5.21 So, having a right involves having a claim. Having a
claim is being in a position to make claim to in the non-
veridical sense. Feinberg sometimes toys with analysing
non-veridical claiming in terms of "claiming that". To make
claim to a right then, would be to claim (with insistence)
that one has that right, or that the action or forbearance
required by that right be per formed
.
Hut this still does not tell us what it is to be i_n a
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position to claim. Feinberg suggests that it is not simply
being able to claim that, but that it involves having a
case that one really has the right. This is plausible for
legal rights, claiming of which is generally done in courts
by claiming that one has them and offering arguments.
Feinberg clearly has this paradigm in mind.
To have a claim in turn, is to have a case
meriting consideration, that is, to have reason or
grounds that put one in a position to engage in
performative and propositional c laiming. [ 21
]
One might accumulate just enough evidence to
argue with relevance and cogency that one has the
right (or ought to be granted a right), although
one's case might not be overwhelmingly conclusive. In
such a case, one might have a strong enough argument
to be entitled to a hearing and given fair
consideration. When one is in this position it might
be said that one "has a claim" that deserves to be
weighed carefully .[ 22 ]
...having a claim to x ... is not (yet) the same
as having a right to x, but is rather having a case
of at least minimal plausibility that one has a right
to x, a case that does establish a right, not to x,
but to a fair hearing and consideration .[ 23]
At least four distinct ways of understanding "being in
a position to claim" are suggested by things Feinberg says
(I think he prefers the second):
(1) To be in a position to claim is to have a good,
plausible, convincing case that one has the right. For
example, one might be in a position to claim a piece of
property in virtue of having a good case (perhaps a deed
and evidence of its validity) that one has ownership rights
5b
to the property. This seems to be an epistemic notion. If I
am in a position to claim (a right), I must be abLe to
present a plausible defense of my claim that I have it.
( 2 ) To be in a position to claim is to have a case of
some sort which entitles one, or gives one tne right, to
make claim (to have the case heard and fairly considered).
(This would make the analysis ci rcular
.
[ 24 ] Probably this
is way Feinberg refuses to consider his treatment of claims
a formal analysis.)
(3) Another possibility is to interpret "being in a
position to claim", s taight-f orwardly
,
as "having the
ability to effectively claim". That is, as being able to
get one's case heard (eg., in court). (Simply standing
outside of a courthouse making demands will not do here,
for that is not getting a hearing.)
(4) Finally, one may be in a position to claim just in
case it is legally/morally permissible for one to make the
claim.
5.33 These accounts are not equivalent. It is obvious that
(l) and (2) are not equivalent to one another. Also,
neither is equivalent to (3). One may be able to get one s
case heard before a court of law (and even win) even though
one does not have a case good enough to merit
consideration, or entitle one to a hearing. Incompetent and
corrupt courts make this possible. Nor is (4) equivalent to
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(1), (2), or (3). One might have a fine case meriting and
entitling one to a hearing which one can get, but only by
illegally bribing an officer of the court.
Logical operations on these four i n terpre tat ions
create even more readings of ’’being in a position to
claim. However, at this level, claims theories are seldom
precise. (Thus it is sometimes difficult to evaluate all
claims theories as a unit.)
5.5 Nonetheless, a general schema for analytic claims
theories can be produced:
(RC) x has a right (against y) to z <=>
(i) x has a claim (against y) to z [25]
& (ii) the case comprising x's claim is valid.
The schema for the essentialis tic claims theories is:
(EC) x has a right against y to z => x has a claim
against y to z [26]
In what follows, I will propose objections to the view that
rights imply claims. These objections will tell against
(RR), (EC), and (RC), interpreted as involving active
claims. But first, I will discuss several objections others
have proposed to claims theories, and Eeinberg's in
particular
.
6.1 Steven Hudson [27] objects that Feinberg's theory
is, if not inconsistent, at least incomplete. We have
already encountered the first element of Hudson s
objection. Feinberg states:
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(O hay in g a claim consists in being in a position
to claim in the performative sense, that is, to make
claim to. [28]
He also holds that,
(ii) one can make claim to something only if one
has a right to that thing... [29]
Together these statements imply that one can have a claim
to a thing only if one has a right to it. This contradicts
his claim that invalid claims won't do:
(iii) Having a claim to z is not (yet) the same
thing as a right to z, but rather having a case,
consisting of relevant reasons of at least “minima 1
plausibility that one has a right to z.[30]
Hudson suggests that Feinberg misspoke himself in
(ii). This is plausible; the contradiction does not arise
on the non-ver idica 1 sense of "making claim to."
However, Hudson does not find Feinberg's position much
improved by this move. For now, Hudson claims, Feinberg has
given us no analysis of the concept central to his
treatment of rights: making a claim to. He finds,
One sort of thing which we may be doing when we
claim is to make claim to something, which means 'to
petition or seek by virtue of a supposed right; to
demand as due. [31]
unhelpful, suggesting that this tells us no more than
the tautology that one can rightfully make claim
to something only by right - not an analysis of
making claim to some thing .[ 32 ]
But Feinberg has said more than this about "making
claim to. 1
1
And even if Hudson were correct, such
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incomp Leteness would not refute claims theory, but only
suggest the need for its further clarification. On the
other hand, is an analysis" of "making claim to" really
necessary ? Isn t it a sort of activity which we understand
and can identify? Why can't our understanding of that
activity be used to cLarify the concept "rights"? Also, we
have suggested that one may characterize "having a claim
to" (non-veridical) in terms of "claiming that", perhaps an
even more easily identifiable behavior. Hudson's objection
is not, by itself, convincing
.[ 33
]
6.2 Although Feinberg does call "valid claim" his
preferred "definition" of "rights", he explicitly states
tnat he is not attempting a formal analysis of rights in
terms of claims. He gives several apparently interrelated
reasons for this. He cites H. B. Acton, [34] and concurs
with nis fear of the circularity of such analyses. This
seems to lead him to conclude that formal analysis of
"rights" is impossible because rights is a simple concept.
As we shall see, a right is a kind of claim, and
a claim is "an assertion of right," so that a formal
definition of either notion in terms of the other
will not get us very far. Thus if a "formal
definition" of the usual philosophical sort is what
we are after, the game is over before it has begun,
and we can say that the concept of a right is a
"simple, undefinabie, unanalysable pr imi t ive
.
"
[ 35
]
Thus, he recommends only "informal elucidation of rights
in terms of the activity of claiming.
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Such concerns are not unique to Feinberg and Acton.
Hudson states:
Many philosophical writers have simply identified
rights with claims, but this tactic usually is
patently circular: rights are said to be a type of
claim, and a claim is said to be a type of right.
[
36 ]
I think these worries are inflated.
As to simplicity: if Feinberg is correct, and rights
are valid claims, tnen he seems to be suggesting a
genus/species sort of analysis. This seems to me to suggest
that the concept of rights is not simple, but analyzable in
terms of the concepts of claims and validity. Why does
Feinberg suggest it is simple and unanaly zable?
As to circularity, several things should be noted:
First of all, it is unclear that circularity would be
a problem for my limited project of investing the links
between rights and claims, whether rights essentially
involve claims, whether rights are claims, and whether
having a right is equivalent to having a claim. Perhaps
this is why Feinberg thinks that "informal elucidation" is
possible where formal definition is not.
Secondly. Though I will not argue this here, not all
circular analyses are problematical. Recursive definition
seem to be an example of this. It is not obvious, to me at
least, that the sort of circularity which would be involved
in analyzing rights in terms of claims is unacceptable.
Notice, if claims just are rights, on some views of
anaLysis, they are i n terdef inable
. Should the fact that
they are interdefinable militate against the definition of
one in terms of another? But these difficult issues
concerning tne nature of philosophical analysis are beyond
the scope of this work.
Thirdly. I am dubious that many philosophers have
committed the error Hudson ascribes to them, that is, to
hold both: "rights are ... a type of claim," and "a claim
is ... a type of right." (is the "is" here an "is" of
analysis?) It would surely be a mistake to fall into such
error, but few clear-headed philosophers, I think, would do
so. For, unless rights and claims are the same class (in
which case they would not be defined as types of one
another), the two proposals are worse than circular, they
are contradictory. Together they imply that the set of
rights is a proper subset of itself.
At any rate, it seems to me that the general approach
taken by Feinberg (attempting to characterize rights in
terms of the independently identifiable activity: making
claim to) need not incorporate circularity. In fact, of the
four interpretations of "being in a position to make claim
to" presented above, only the second seems to involve an
element of circularity (to be entitled to a thing may be to
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have a right to it). There is an appearance of circularity,
for I suggested treating "making claim to" as "claiming
that one has the rigot" (in the appropriate circumstances).
However, this is only appearance. It is doubtful that I
need to know the full significance of "right" in order to
know the truth of such sentences as, "John claims tha
t
he
has a right to life." (in such sentences, "right" occurs in
an intensional context.) But such are the contexts in which
"rights" appear in our claims analyses, on which to have a
right is to be in a position to claim that one has the
right. It is possible to know whether one is in a position
to claim a right without knowing the precise meaning of
"right" or "rights".
Other such approaches can avoid even this appearance
of circularity. Kelsen [37] has suggested that rights are
1 ega 1 sanctions ( which
,
on his view
,
are the generators of
legal obligations) at the will of the right holder. This
approach, together with attempts to treat rights as
obligations, suggests an integration of the "claims"
approach with the "obligations and protections
approaches: To have a claim is to be in a position to
claim, not that one has a right, but that others have
obligations. Another alternative: To have a claim is to be
in a position to claim that the state ought to sanction
certain actions. Thus:
x has a claim against y to z < = > x is in aposition to claim that y has an obligation to do z
or
,
x has a claim against y to z < = > x is in aposition to claim that the state should enforce y's
obligation to do z.
I see no circularity in (RC) if the above are employed.
(The necessary modifications in clause (ii) should be
obvious.
)
o.3 Another difficulty for the view that rights
essentially involve claims is its questionable
applicability to moral rights.
The treatment of rights as claims seems best suited to
the paradigm legal rights, which are claimable in court.
Legal rights arise in institutions structured by rules
which provide formal channels for performative claiming.
Such rules and proceedures are ephemeral or lacking where
moral rights are concerned. This explains why many believe
that rights are only possible within rule-structured
practices or institutions. If the claim theory requires
institutions and rules not found in the state of nature to
ground rights, it is the claim theory which must be
rejected, not the existence of natural or moral rights.
However, in so far as morality does provide for claims
and their recognition, some account may be possible. I will
pass on to other difficulties.
64
6.4 Inanimate objects, lower animals, and incompetent
persons seem to have rights. However they seem unabLe to
develop a case or claim anything. So, on claims theory,
they have no rights.
The standard response is that such entities can make
cLaims through agents. ihus Stone, [38] in suggesting that
trees and other naturaL objects be granted legal rights,
would do so by creating for them agents who could go to
court in the tree's name. That is, he would grant them
"standing" in court. Feinberg seems happy with this, at
Least for animals:
More exactly, the animal itself claims its right
through the vicarious actions of a human proxy
speaking in its name and its behalf. [39]
Yet he does not think inanimate objects can have rights,
for they have no interests (in the sense of things
conducive to fulfillment of their desires), and "it is
impossible to represent a being that has no interests. "[40]
The latter point is doubtful. Hohfeld long ago warned
against confusing legal relations (eg. legal interests)
with natural relations (eg. psychological interests). Just
as the law can create legal interests for people in things
which are not conducive to the fulfillment of tneir
desires, the law could easily create obligations to
inanimate objects and agents to go to court in their names
to secure fulfillment of these obligations. That seems
sufficient for their possessing legal rights.
As we suggested in Ch
. 1., this stretches the agency,
or will intuition behind the claims approach, but perhaps
not to the breaking point. It creates for inanimate objects
a legal will. Things are done in their names. [41]
6.5 Some types of rights give the appearance of not
involving claimants, and some right-holders seem unable to
claim their rights.
It lias been pointed out that the possessors of many
legal rights do not have the option of waiving these
rights, nor do they have the option of claiming them in
court. We seem to have rights under criminal law not to be
killed, stolen from, beaten, etc.. It has been suggested
that we are not in a position to claim these rights in
court. Under criminal law, the claimant in court is the
state, the victims can be no more than complaintants . Some
legal theorists conclude from tnis that there are no rights
under criminal law.
This objection, however, is not completely persuasive.
The claims theorist can make the plausible response that
complaints are sometimes ways of claiming. When formal
complaints have the force of obligating the legal system to
act to insure tnat a right or obligation is protected, then
that sort of complaint, while it breaks away from toe
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paradigm courtroom claim, is a claim. Where complaints are
merely suggestions, perhaps there is no claim.
6*6 In "Recent Work on the Concept of Rights", [42]
Martin and Nickel discuss Feinberg's theory, [43] and object
to it on grounds issuing from their discussion of
correlativity
. They hold that not all rights entail
correlative duties, that some involve pure disabilities, or
perhaps 1 iabi li ties
.
[ 44 ] They suggest that with such rights
there may be no claims against individuals involving duties
on the part of those individuals.
As I have developed the claims approach, I have kept
it fairly isolated from Feinberg's views on the relations
between rights and duties, and it does not directly require
that claims involve correlative duties. On at least some of
the interpretations presented, the claims involved may be
to the right, irrespective of whether that right is
correlated to a duty, or whether it is a mere disability or
liability
.
[45] At any rate, I will argue (Ch. 5-7) that all
rights do involve correlative duties (obligations). If so,
Martin and Nickel's objection has no force.
7. I will now present some powerful objections to the
view that all rights involve active claims.
7.1 In treating of legal rights, it is not always clear
whether the sense of right being analysed is "Ln law" or
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de facto
. In Law" rights are rights specified by the
Law. "De facto" rights are rights which are in practice
protected by the state. Ideally, perhaps, these would
-oincide. Yet because states may be imperfect or corrupt,
information about who did what to wnom incomplete, and
lawyers incompetent or unavailable, states will often
protect rights which the law does not specify, and fail to
protec t some wnich tne law does specify. For example,
prospectors who have their claims jumped by a big-wheel
with a large legal staff may have an "in law" right to a
mine, but not a "de facto" right to it. It seems to me that
the more interesting concept, and the one most philosophers
have tried to analyze is the "in law" concept. We will
proceed on this assumption.
Ownership of property (a right) is often unprovable.
Lost deeds, cast off receipts, no record of purchase, and
the like may make it impossible to prove ownership, or even
to make a plausible case for it. Suppose real estate
transactions are recorded at the Town Hall, which processes
deeds from its records. A sells B Blackacre for cash and
the transaction is recorded. That evening, the Town Hail
and the witnesses to the transaction are incinerated. B
cannot make the slightest case that A sold him the land.
Doesn't he have a legal right to the land? Perhaps not "de
facto", but surely "in law".
6 3
The rights of citizenship are often just as hard to
prove. Children of United States citizens abandoned abroad
often find that it is impossible to deveLop a case for
their citizenship. it seems reasonable to state that these
people are denied their legal rights when they are
prevented from entering the United States as citizens
.
[45
]
in cases like this, some might suggest that the case
is there
,
that they have it, but but are merely unable to
prove they have it (produce it). This takes us far afield
from the active claims view, for such interpretation would
only require that the legal rules plus the facts of the
situation imply the right (or its recognition). This has
nothing to do with the activity of claiming.
Such examples show that (RR) is false, that "in law"
rights do not essentially involve claims on either of the
first three interpretations of "having a claim".
One may have a right without having a plausible case.
One may have a right without having a case entitling one to
a hearing. One may have a right without having a case at
a 1 L . The claims view suggests that one does not have a
right unless one has, or is presently capable of putting
together a case. Sometimes, at least, one has a right, and
then has someone (perhaps oneself) put together a case that
he has the right. This is impossible if having a right
essentially involves having a case.
It might be suggested that "having a case" is
ambiguous, and that in a weaker sense than the above,
rights do essentially involve having a case. For example, A
may describe his position to a lawyer, and the lawyer may
reply, I think you have a case." The lawyer may in this
context ‘dean only tnat ne thinks that a case can be made,
not tnat A has presented him with a ready-made case. But
how are we to interpret this? Does it mean that a case
could be made by the world's greatest lawyer, given
unlimited resources? If so, then to have a case has little
to do with being in a position to actively claim. Also,
even the worlds best lawyer may not be able to produce
plausible cases in the above sorts of situations. Another
interpretation is that having a case is being in a position
to be able to develop, or have developed for one, a
plausible case, even if one does not at present have such a
case. But this proposal does not handle the in law rights
found in the above situations either. Also, it makes trie in
law rights of those unable to acquire the best legal aid
differ considerably from the in law legal rights of those
who can. While such variation is plausible for de facto
rights, it is not plausible for in law rights. The
preservation of this distinction allows us to say tnat our
system is unjust because it often fails to provide tne
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poor, for example, the access to the Legal assistance
needed to deveLop cases powerfuL enough to enable them to
claim their rights (what is rightfully theirs), that is, to
make their in law rights de facto rights. This distinction
would be blurred by the present account of "having a case,"
for on it persons would have no right where they do not
have access to the aid necessary to develop a case.
One may have a right even though unable to get a
hearing. One may need a lawyer one cannot afford to make
and present the case in order even to get a hearing.
Sometimes one may not be able to afford under the tabLe
payments necessary to get a hearing.
One can imagine legal systems varying the difficulty
of making a claim to rights without thereby varying most of
the rights claimed. That is, judicial, procedural rights
can vary fairly independently of most other rights (more on
this in the next section).
Usually, one is not at liberty to claim, at least in
court, unless one is allowed by the court to do so. In
cases like the above, the court may refuse to hear the case
(claim). It may refuse to hear cases not satisfying
criteria which many with "in law" rights will be unabLe to
satisfy. Those who attempt to force their claim on the
court will be acting illegally. Thus some with rights will
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not have a claim in the fourth sense.
One could nave a right and yet fail to have a claim in
any of the four senses of "having a claim".
7.2 To criticize the claims approach at its foundation,
I wish to show the separability of rights from the activity
of claiming, and to indicate the possibility of rights sans
claims .
7.21 First, consider ( RR)
,
which suggests that to have a
right is to have the right to claim that right.
The possibility of certain promises casts doubt upon
this principle. Suppose John fears courts and uncomfortable
personal confrontations, and wants to borrow money from
Bill. Bill is willing to lend at 3%, but John is afraid he
will default and be taken to court. He is willing to pay 6%
interest in order to have a special proviso on the loan.
The proviso is that should he default, Bill cannot take him
to court, or even bother him about the loan. Bill knows
John is extremely honest, and a very good credit risk, and
so loans John the money under these conditions. Bill has
moral and legal rights to have John pay him back, but he
has no right to claim that right. [47]
Some claims theorists conflate two seperate rights:
the right to x, and the right to claim that right. While
Feinberg does not conflate the two, he thinks the second is
necessary for the first. In some legal systems, perhaps our
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own, this is close to the truth, for the system may grant a
right to claim any right it grants. Yet this is not a
necessary feature of Legal systems, and the rignts are not
necessarily linked.
For example, a LegaL system could limit its courts to
hearing only first and second order claims, e.g.
,
claims to
rights and claims to rights to claim those rights. Such a
system could easily incorporate legal rights, and even
rights to claim rights. Yet (RR) would be violated. Suppose
R is a legal right on this system. There would be a right
to claim R, and the right to claim the right to claim R.
But this system will not provide the right to claim this
last right, which (RR) guarantees. (RR) is false.
Suppose a disaster occurs, a state of emergency
declared, and a moratorium called on all small-claims
rights claims. The emergency may be severe enough that
statutes of limitations run out, and some cases just never
get heard. Under such conditions, you may still have a
Legal right to your neighbor's returning the lawnmower he
borrowed from you, even though you do not nave the right to
claim that right.
7.22 A look at r ights-creating systems simpler than actual-
legal systems can illuminate the separability of rignts
from active claiming.
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Rights in games and sports help. The ruLes of chess,
for example, grant to players certain rights; the right to
castle under specified conditions, the right to make
certain moves, and to take the opponents pieces in specific
ways. The rules of the game, however, provide no procedures
for claiming. Claiming has no place within the game. Thus
eights *_an be created by a set of rules which grant no
formal status to any sort of claiming activity.
Some sports do provide rules for claiming, but such
rules are often unnecessary for the existence of many of
the rights of the game. In fact, sometimes claiming is
forbidden. In basketball, a player has a right not to be
fouled. Yet, it may be that any attempt on tne part of a
fouled player to claim that right is grounds for a
technical foul against the player making the claim.
Claiming the right is forbidden.
7.23 The same point can be made about legal rights. If
essential, the proposed relations between rights and claims
should hold for all conceivable legal systems. They do not.
Suppose information gathering and processing become so
highly advanced that the present judicial system becomes
outmoded. That is, the most accurate and efficient system
for enforcing the law becomes, roughly: Information
gathering is done by electronic devices which saturate the
environment. The information so gathered is processed
automatically so as to determine violations of the law.
Where violations are found, the violators are punished
appropriately. This system becomes so highly developed over
the years that it assures almost complete enforcement of
the law, or at any rate, better enforcement than the system
that it has replaced (much like our own judicial system).
Tne laws it enforces are much the same as ours, excepting
the laws related the the operation of the judiciary and
claiming behavior. The law creates no loci for
claiming. [43 ] (Here, even de facto rights are not
claimable)
.
This may sound much like Big Brother of 1984
,
and some
might suggest that within sucn a system there could be no
rights. This is a mistake. The loss of rights in 1934 was
due to the peculiar and restrictive uses made of the
information gathering and conditioning potential of the
technology, not the uses I have suggested. Of course, under
such a system, there would be perhaps no right to privacy,
but that would not imply the exclusion of other rights.
(Perhaps one could nave a right to privacy against other
persons. If the system was completely automatic, there
might be laws preventing people from having access to
gathered information. One might have a greater right to
privacy than in our present system: the access of otner
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people to information about our private Lives couLd be
severely restricted.)
I am not suggesting that this system is ideal, only
tnat it allows for rights. The system may enforce roughly
tne same laws as are in force in our own system today,
including most of the constitution, and the rules for
making laws can be as democratic as you like. Laws can be
set up to protect the freedoms of citizens from
interference by others, to assure property rights, to
assure rights to freedom of speech, to assure equality of
opportunity, etc. Under such a system we would have roughly
the same rights as we now nave excepting those rights
involved in procedural justice, eg., the right to trial by
peers, to take others to court, t_o claim our rights .
If this is correct, then legal rights, even de facto
rights, do not essentially involve active claims of any
sort. The possibility of such systems suggests that rights
are more closely linked with protections of freedom or
interest than with claims, and that designing a judicial
system built around legal claiming may just be one way of
creating a right (by creating a technique for acquiring
protection) .
8. That there is a strong tendency to associate rights
with claims results, in part, from generalization on tne
paradigm rights we encounter witnin our own judicial
7 6
system. Under our system most rights seem claimable. Yet we
have seen that, in practice, not ail "in law" rights are
claimable. Given the doubts expressed about the
genera 1 i zabi li ty of claims theory to moral rights, and its
failure for legal rights, it is very doubtful that moral
rights essentially involve active claims either.
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than I do, with claims having less to do with active
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.
46. Apparently this is the case with many children in
Korea whose fathers, American soldiers once stationed in
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47. At least we can Imagine possible legal systems in
which ne would not have that right. Also, he does not seem
to have a moral right to claim repayment.
48. Making claims might even be illegal. For it may be
found that such a small percentage of claims are valid that
the expense of allowing claims (cost of the system, and
cost in social discontent, and error) does not justify
allowing them. This situation finds an echo in sports. The
cost of allowing claims to be pursued during games may be
great (disruption of the game, expense, wasted time, less
accurate calls due to intimidation of the referees) enough
to justify giving the officials compete authority and
disallowing claiming.
I I ICHAPTER
DWORKIN'S THEORY
1. Dworkin's Two Accounts
In Taking Rights Serious ly , [ 1 ] Ronald Dworkin presents
a theory of the nature and justification of Law which
highlights the centrality of rights to these issues. He
discusses the concept of a right (focusing on tne concepts
of legal and political rights) at length, and favors a
conception of rights as '’trumps".
I argue that claims of political right must be
understood functionally, as claims to trump some
background justification that is normally
decisive
.
[ 2 ]
This account is not, Dworkin claims, an attempt to
analyze the ordinary concept "exactly or completely" ;[ 3 ] it
is stipulative.
My account is in that sense a stipulation. ...
But it is a stipulation (or so I think) that
isolates a distinctly important idea in political
theory, which is the idea of an individual trump
over decisions justified collectively. It is also a
stipulation that captures the idea of individual
rights used in American constitutional practice. [4]
At other times he speaks as though it is very closely
linked to the ordinary concept.
In most cases when we say that someone has a
'right' to something, we imply that it would be
wrong to interfere with his doing it, or at least
that some special grounds are needed for justifying
such interference. [ 5]
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In fact, several seemingly distinct characterizations
of this "trumps" concept of rights can be found in
Dworkin's work. We will investigate two: a theory-relative
(functional), and a normative. Precisely what relationship
Dworkin supposes these two conceptions to have to one
anotner is unclear (perhaps ne takes them to be equivalent,
or perhaps lie intends that the normative account
characterize the o rdinary- language concept). I will sketch
and criticize the normative approach first. I will then
present and evaluate whether tne functional conception
provides an adequate general account of the concept of a
right
.
2. The Normative Account
Dworkin's most general account of rights characterizes
rights by their relation to right and wrong. This sort of
account is given by many philosophers, and seems closely
linked to the common prima-facie-obligation account. As
applied to the state:
I shall rely ... on a low-keyed theory of moral
rights against the state which I develop in cnaptec
7. Under that theory, a man has a moral right
against the state if for some reason the state would
do wrong to treat him in a certain way, even though
it would be in the general interest to do so.[6J
For active rights (z is an action of x s), this
suggests :
x has a right against the state to z iff unless
84
the state has special justification for doing so, it
would be wrong for the state to interfere with z.
For positive rights (z is an action of the state's),
this seems to corne to:
x has a right against the state to z iff unless
the state has special justification for doing so,
it would be wrong for the state not to do z.
More generally:
In most cases when we say that someone has a
'right' to something, we imply that it would be
wrong to interfere with his doing it, or at least
that some special grounds are needed for justifying
such interference
.
[ 7 , 8
]
This ties together nicely with Dworkin's account of
citizen's rights in adjudication, a correlativi ty view:
If the plaintiff has a right against the
defendant, then the defendant has a corresponding
duty ... [9]
If such duties are prima facie, and priina facie duties are
sucn that it would be wrong not to fulfill them unless some
special justification for doing so exists, then it seams
that Dworkin's characterization of rights against the state
is a special case of a general conception of rights, and
"the state" in the above proposals may be replaced with
"y". [ 10]
What comprises "special justification"? For political
rights, special justification is justification stronger
than "some collective justification that normally provides
a full justification for [political] decision ."[ 11 ] We
will discuss this concept in the next section. It may be
that this minimal trumping power is different for other
sorts of rights, hut Dworkin holds that rights generally
have force against non- individuated (see next section),
particularly utilitarian, moral concerns. He often calls
his "trumps" approach an "anti-utilitarian" conception.
There are a number of problems for this treatment of
rights. Perhaps most telling is that it does not
distinguish those rights that involve individuals in a
special way not fully accounted for by non-interference
from other prima facie moral concerns, eg., obligations
unrelated to rights. Specifically: (a) the definiens does
not fully characterize who has the right in question, (b)
moral concerns which are not rights count as rights on this
account, (c) normative theories which imply that there are
wrongful actions, but which deny the existence of rights
are (i) incoherent, and (ii) proliferate rights. (d) it
exhibits implausible logical features.
Concerning (a): The analysis does not distinguish
between Bill's right (against y) to pay Mary $5, and Mary s
right (against y) that y not interfere with Bill's paying
Mary $5. Both are equivalent, on the analysis, to: unless y
has special justification for doing so, it would be wrong
for y to interfere with Bill's paying Mary $5.
Concerning (b): Suppose John owns some Land, nates
others crossing it, and posts it "No Trespassing."
Intuitively, it seems that Bill may have no right to cross
John's property, even if he needs to do so in order to help
some people who have tipped over in a canoe, and are naving
some difficulty getting the canoe to shore before it gets
caught up in the rapids and destroyed. Yet it may still be
wrong for John to interfere with his doing so unless he has
some special j us ti f icat ion
.
[ 12
]
Concerning (c): Not only does this account make it
incorrect for an act utilitarian theorist to deny that
there are rights on act utilitarianism, but on this account
the theory would imply that everyone has a right against y
to z (for anyone's action z) if it would not be optimific
for y to interfere with z. This results in a great
proliferation of rights. But it would not have the result
tha t people have a right to do wha t they are moral ly
required to do, for act utilitarianism will sometimes
require others to interfere with people doing what they are
required to do, if such interference maximizes utility.
Concerning (d): On this analysis, if x has a rignt
against y to z, and z will cause an event e, and the only
way y can interfere with e is to interfere with z,
then x
(or anyone else for that matter) has a right against y to
e. This is unacceptable. For example. Suppose dill s
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singing the blues would depress Mary, but that Bill has a
right (against y) to sing the blues. Tnen it would be wrong
for y to interfere with Bill s singing the blues without
special justification. But further suppose that the only
way y can interfere with Mary's getting depressed is to
interfere with Bill's singing the blues. It would, then, be
wrong for y to interfere with Mary's getting depressed
without special justification. On the analysis, then, Bill
has a right against y to Mary's getting depressed.
Dworkin's other approach avoids some of these
dif f iculties .
3. The Functional Approach
Dworkin characterizes rights according to how they
function as justifications within a political theory. Some
background is necessary to clarify this conception.
Dworkin distinguishes between arguments of principle
and arguments of policy.
Arguments of principle are arguments intended
to establish an individual right; arguments of
policy are arguments intended to establish a
collective goal. Principles are propositions that
describe rights, policies are propositions that
describe goals. [13]
Dworkin's concepts of principle and policy are theory
relative. A political theory will identify certain
political aims, that is, concerns which the theory holds to
be important to take into account in arguing for and making
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political decisions.
I begin with the idea of a political aim as a
generic political justification. A political theory
takes a state of affairs as a political aim if, for
that theory, it counts in favor of any political
decision that the decision is likely to advance, or
protect, that state of affairs, and counts against
the decision that it will retard or endanger it. [14]
Arguments of principle and policy rest upon distinct
types of political aim. [15] Arguments of principle are
arguments based on rights, arguments of policy are
arguments based on (collective) goals. Political rights are
distinguished from political goals by their justificatory
force and distributional characteristics: Rights are
individuated political aims; goals are not distributional
in their direct requirements. Rights trump at least some
goals:
A political right [within a theory] is an
individuated political aim. An individual has a
right to some opportunity or resourse or liberty if
it counts in favor of a political decision that the
decision is likely to advance or protect the state
of affairs in which he enjoys the right, even when
some other political aim is served and some
political aim is disserved thereby, and counts
against that decision that it will retard or
endanger that state of affairs, even when some other
political aim is thereby served. [16]
He continues:
A goal is a nonindividuated political aim, that
is, a state of affairs whose specification does not
in this way call for any particular opportunity or
resource or liberty for particular individua Is . [ 1 7
]
A political theory will identify specific political
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aims. Some of these (goals) wiLL not directy involve
restrictions on how particular individuals are to be
treated - they will be non-dis tr ibutiona 1 . Others (rignts)
will be that certain individuals are to be treated in
specified ways - they will be distributional. Utilitarian
political aims generally fall into the goal-policy
category. For example, if a theory specifies as a political
aim the maximization of the average wealth of citizens, it
is specifying a goal. This aim says nothing directly about
how individuals are to be treated to attain this goal. If
the theory also specifies (the aim) that each citizen be
guaranteed an adequate income on which to survive,
[
18 ] a
right is involved; such an aim concerns directly the status
and treatment of specific individuals (eacn citizen).
A political theory will specify how important each of
its aims are, i.e., assign them weights. To be a right, an
individuated political aim must have sufficient weight to
outweigh at least some collective goai. Thus, Dworkin
sometimes writes of rights as being "trumps" over goals,
and at others calls his approach an "anti-utilitarian"
conception. The weight of a right within a theory may oe
measured by how much competition in the form of collective
goals it can withstand (according to the theory).
Afraid of trivializing rights, Dworkin sometimes
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suggests a stronger weight requirement, but seems flexible
on this issue.
It follows from the definition of a right that
it cannot be outweighed by all social goals. We
might, for simplicity, stipulate not to call any
political aim a right unless it has a certain
threshold weight against collective goals in
general; unless, for example, it cannot be defeated
by appeal to any of the ordinary routine goals of
political administration, but only by a goal of
special urgency. [19]
His standard position seems to be:
No one has a political right (on my account)
unless the reasons for giving him what he asks are
stronger than some collective justification that
normally provides a full political justification for
a decision
.[ 20]
Let us call this weight , "minima 1 weight".
We can summarize this conception:
(DCl) x has a political right to z on theory T
iff on theory T, x's security in z is an
individuated political aim of minimal weight.
This can be generalized to cover several distinct types of
rights: background rights, and institutional rights of
various sorts, eg., legislative, and legal rights. A
complete political theory would recognize and distinguish
between these types of rights.
As I understand it, background rights are rights which
are in some sense prior to particular political
institutions. We might think of these as rights which exist
under some general moral theory. (Some) such rights will
nave bearing on the justification and criticism
9 L
(evaluation) of political institutions and their decisions;
tnese are background political rights. Some might be purely
moral, and have no bearing on political decision at all,
they would have (anti-utilitarian) relevance to non-
political personal decisions.
Institutional rights are rights which arise within
theories justifying the existence and nature of particular
institutions. Some institutional rights may be background
rights, some not. Though Dworkin believes his view applies
to rights arising within non-political institutions (he
sometimes uses chess as an example), he is especially
interested in political institutions, especially the
courts. Other political institutions include the state as a
wnole, the legislature, the executive branch, and, I
suppose, its agencies. A theory (justifying and explaining
the nature) of any of these political institutions will
specify aims the institution is to act on. Some of these
will be individuated aims of minimal weight. On that
theory, then, these aims specify the rights which apply
within that institution. Thus, the individuated aims of
minimal strength which (according to a theory) bear on the
political decisions of the state in general are (on that
theory) our institutional political rights. Those which
bear on the decisions of the legislature are legislative
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rights, and those which bear on the decisions of our legal
institution, tne courts, are legal rights. We may include
this in our previous analysis:
( DC2 ) x has a I-type right to z on theory T iff
on theory T, x's security in z is an individuated
aim of minimal weight for institution I.
Still, this analysis does not provide a treatment of
the "against" aspect of rights. It might seem that
institutional rights are rights against their respective
institutions. This is not so.
A complete political theory must also recognize
two other distinctions that I use implicitly in this
chapter. The first is the distinction between rights
against the state and rights against fellow
citizens. The former justify a political decision
that requires some agency of the government to act;
the latter justify a decision to coerce particular
individuals. The right to minimum housing, if
accepted at all, is accepted as a right against the
state. The rignt to recover damages for a breach of
contract, or to be saved from great danger at
minimum risk of a rescuer, is a right against fellow
citizens. The right to free speech is, ordinarily,
both. It seems strange to define the rights that
citizens have against one another as political
rights at all; but we are now concerned with such
rights only insofar as they justify political
decisions of different sorts. The present
destine ti on [against state, against individuals]
cuts across the distinction between background and
institutional rights; the latter distinguishes among
persons or institutions that must make a political
decision, the former between persons or institutions
whom that decision directs to act or forbear. [21]
What I-type a right is depends on what institution must
take it into account in making its decisions. Often,
institutions must take into account r igh t s which hold, not
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against the institution, but against other institutions, or
private citizens. Dworkin' s proposal that the against
relation can be analyzed in terms of coercion suggests:
x
^
has an I-type_ right against y to z on T iff on
1, x s security in z, even at the cost of the
coercion of y, is an individuated aim of minimal
strength for institution I.
By "x's security in z" 1 will mean, roughly, x's being in a
position to do z (if z is an action of x's), or have z done
for him/her (if z is an action of the state or others). I
will pass over whether this provides an adequate account of
the against relation. I will investigate what I take to be
more fundamental and interesting features and difficulties
of the theory.
Dworkin worries that some individuated aims within a
theory are more accurately thought of as reflecting duties
than rights. For example, where a theory provides as a
political aim the improvement of the moral fiber of each
member of the communi ty , [ 22 ] Dworkin suggests a distinction
between duty-based theories and rights-based theories.
Duty-based theories are concerned with the
moral quality of his act, because they suppose that
it is wrong, without more, for an individual to fail
to meet certain standards of behavior. ... Right-
based theories are, in contrast, concerned with the
independence rather than the conformity of
individual action. They presuppose and protect the
value of individuals thought and choice. [23]
Perhaps this worry can be handled, on our interpretation of
Dworkin by getting clearer on just what is meant by "x's
security in z". Substitution of something like, "That x's
choice of z be efficacious" might be tried. My evaluation
of Dworkin's approach will not turn on such subtitles,
however, and we will now turn to other issues.
4. Criticism of Dworkin's Functional Approach.
The functional conception raises a number of
interesting issues, but involves some difficulties.
Two particularly interesting, and problematic, aspects
of this approach are: (1) it is theory relative (sect. 5),
(2) it applies only to rights within institutions (sect. 6).
Concerning (l): We are interested in the concept of a
right, simpliciter, and not necessarily in a concept which
merely isolates, within some theory, what rights that
theory invokes. Can this theory relative conception be
modified to supply such a conception? Concerning (2): Many
moral rights seem to arise independently of any
institutions. Does this conception, or can it be modified
to, account for such rights? Can the concept of individual
aim be made clear outside of an institutional context? We
will consider these, and some related issues, one at a
time
.
5. Theory Relativity Eliminated
On Dworkin's theory, many legal rights are determined
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by the hard materials of Law. These are not merely rights
"on a theory", they are truely legal rights, simpliciter.
In addition, it is central to Dworkin's theory of law that
even where the hard materials of law are vague or
indecisive (he calls such cases "hard cases") there are
specific rights which determine the correct decisions for
the court (there are specific rights upon which the court
must make its decision). Even in hard cases both plaintiff
and defendent have rights to a specific decision (the
correct one). That is, Dworkin holds that there is a truth
about what rights fill in the gaps left after the direct
implications of the hard materials of law are exhausted.
These, too, are real rights (simpliciter), not merely
rights "on a theory." On Dworkin's essentially theory-
relative analysis it is difficult to make sense of such
theory-independent rights.
Dworkin seems to make a pragrnatist-like move
concerning truth to handle this. He adopts the position:
x has an I-type right to z iff on the best
theory, T, of the institution I, x has an I-type
right to z.
And he attempts to clarify the concept of the best theory
of an institution.
Any institution will have certain "hard" materials
which largely determine its nature and behavior. These hard
materials are generally rules or practices which specify
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tn.s agreed upon procedures and aims of tne institution. For
legal institutions:
Suppose we were to gather together all the
rules that are plainly valid rules of law in, for
example, a particular American State, and add to
tnese all the explicit rules about institutional
competence that we relied on in saying that tne
first set of rules were indeed valid rules of that
jurisdiction. We would now have an imposing set of
legal materials
.[ 24
]
ihese hard materials will leave gaps: areas where it
is unclear just how the institution is to operate or
behave. One job of a theory of an institution is to fill in
these gaps. In the case of legal institutions, these gaps
are filled by the "community morality" in a specific sense:
the political morality presupposed by the laws
and institutions of the communi ty
.
[ 25
]
(This is not to be confused with "community morality" in
the sense of prevailing moral attitudes or beliefs of the
community.) Such political morality is expressed in the
best theory accounting for and justifying the institution.
Such a theory will account as well as possible for the hard
materials of the institution.
This conception makes institutional practice
and history of each jurisdiction relevant to the
truth of propositions about legal rights, though not
necessarily decisive
.
[26
]
They are not decisive because the quality of a theory also
depends on a normative element.
... I suppose that the process of 'drawing'principles from institutional history is the process
of judging justification of that history, wherejustification is distinguished from explanation
.[ 27 ]
The best theory of an institution will also be its best
justification. It is not merely a psycho-socio-his torica
l
account of tne institution, but must include principles
about the legitimate aims of the institution as well.
Dworkin is clearest about this as it applies to legal
institutions :
We might formulate the test for law that this
story suggests in this way: a principle is a
principle of law if it figures in the soundest
theory of law that can be provided as a
justification for the explicit subs tan t i ve and
institutional rules of the jurisdiction in
question. [28]
We might ask what set of principles taken
together would be necessary to justify the adoption
of the explicit rules of law and institutional rules
we had listed [the hard mater ials ].[ 29
]
With certain sorts of institution, this "best theory"
approach to truth carries with it special plausibility.
Some institutions seem to have their own built-in criterion
of truth. For example, our own legal institution provides a
court system to determine the truth or falsity of
controversial claims about rights. I think that Dworkin
might argue that the institution itself provides rules or
principles by which the courts must proceed in determining
truth, including the rule that they must base their
decisions upon the best theory of the institution. [ am
uncertain that Dworkin would take this approach, but I
think he does. He says,
Suppose the judges of a particular jurisdiction
met in convention and determined each to follow the
rights thesis, and otherwise decide cases as
Hercules did in Chapter 4. They therefore agree to
act as participants in an enterprise which
stipulates certain truth conditions for propositions
of law, 77
. [30]
This approach also fits well with two other points he
stresses: (l) The doctrine of political responsibility, the
doctrine that those who make political decisions must be
able to give a principled defence of them consistent with
other decisions they have made. [31] (2) That to understand
the issue of truth involved here, one must put oneself in
the position of a practicing lawyer or judge, and notice
that the way our legal institutions operate and the way its
participants think as they operate within it, presuppose
(just such a concept of) truth. [32]
Dworkin discusses at length the process of developing
such a legal theory. Much of this is done by example;
Dworkin postulates a being, Hercules, possessing superhuman
legal and logical powers, and traces some of tne (very
human) reasoning by which he would work out at least parts
of such a theory.
5.1 Criticism
Commentators have challanged this approa^n
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Dworkin's by objecting that it implies that there can be no
truth about legal rights in (at least some) hard cases.
Oworkin characterizes such objections as arguing from the
claim, which he admits, that his position offers no (and,
indeed, tnat tnere may be no) completely adequate decision
procedure for determining Law (the best theory) in hard
cases, to the claim that there is no truth about such
controversial rights. Granting the premise, Dworkin denies
that the conclusion follows. I agree with him here. In
general, the truth of a claim does not require the
existence of, or even the possibility of, procedures for
discovering that truth. Even less does truth require
decision procedures for discovering that truth which will
satisfy everyone, or produce agreement. Let us call these
"proceduralis t fallacies".
One can, however, challange Dworkin's claim that his
theory allows for truth on these matters without committing
a proceduralist fallacy. On his theory, truth requires that
there be a best theory of the ins ti tution
.
[ 33 ] but it is
doubtful that there is a unique best theory of every
institution. Not only is it doubtful that the concept of
best theory is clear enough to pick out a unique theory,
but it is doubtful that improving the precision of the
concept will help.
too
I do not see that Dworkin has presented a sufficiently
clear concept of best theory, or of comparative quality of
theories (or made a case that such a concept exists), to
fiLter out all but a single justificatory theory for each
institution. Even in the natural sciences the concept of
best theory is imprecise; where the concept of "best
theory" involves, as it does here, a normative
justificatory element, I do not see how we can be confident
that any clear concept (property of theories) is there to
be invoked. If not, then Dworkin's account will not provide
truth about rights.
Firstly, it is doubtful that our ordinary concept of
what it is to justify an institution, vague as it is, even
applies here.
Ordinarily, I suppose, we would justify an institution
by showing that its behavior is in accord to some
background truths about morality. For example, we might
justify an institution by showing that its existence and
behavior maximizes utility, or protects important rights,
or makes it the case that justice is done. On this
conception, however, many institutions, and parts of
institutions (we may be able to justify some elements of an
institution, but not all) cannot be justified. Dworkin,
however, is invoking a concept on which even unjustifiable
institutions have a justification, a justification which,
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in fact, defines the nature of the institution.
Admittedly, we do have a concept of justification
which allows of degrees: better or worse. But this
distinction is not the one inwhich Dworkin is interested.
Our concept is one which expresses the difference in the
moral stature of an institution (or action): some are
better justified than others. The things which are said to
be (better or more poorly) justified are the institutions
or actions themselves. Dworkin' s concept distinguishes
between theories, not institutions. The best justification,
in this sense, for an evi L institution may rest upon absurd
moral principles; for, on true moral principles, the hard
materials of such an institution may be inexplicable, and
only on the assumption of the truth of (actually false)
moral principles can unified sense be made of the
institution. Dworkin says,
It follows that in some jurisdictions legal
rights are sharpely at variance with any defensible
back-ground political morality. They hold, in spite
of this variance, by institutional fiat. This is
not, however, because positivism provides a good
conception of legal rights for these jurisdictions,
but because the right conception yields that
conclusion here. [34]
Dworkin's approach to truth makes it especially
difficult to get clear on justification. Ordinarily, even
if we cannot agree on how to tell good justifications ft on
bad, we can agree that the distinction between good and bad
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justifications rests finally upon t'neir evidential value:
the likelihood that they generate truth. But this concept
is not available to Dworkin, for he has turned
institutional truth on its head by defining truth in terns
of justification. What he seems left with is some formal
concept involving theoretical fit, simplicity,
completeness, and so on. Discussions of such concepts by
philosophers of science leave grave doubts as to their
precision. Also, Dworkin seems to include within his
concept of best justification a normative element. Given
two justificatory theories of equal fit, that which is
closest to true background morality is the better theory.
This concept of closeness to true background morality
seems vague as well.
Even supposing these other concepts to be precise,
Dworkin' s concept of best justification remains vague. His
concept of best justification has at least two dimensions:
closeness of theoretical fit to the hard materials (which
itself has several dimensions), and similarity to true
political/moral principles. But how are they to De
ballanced when they come into conflict? I see no clear
concept here for Dworkin to employ.
Dworkin might object tnat I am committing a
procedur a 1 i s t fallacy here. 1 am not. My point is not Loat
we nave no criterion for best justification, but tnat ,ne>e
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is no such concept sufficiently precise to pick out a
single best theory
.[ 35 ]
Even supposing precision does not solve the problem.
There are no guarantees, so far as I can tell, that a
unique best theory will exist. Could there not be ties?
Could there not be distinct theories equally well fitted to
an institution, and equally close to true moral/politicai
principles? Or two theories, one of hwich is better in one
dimension of comparison, but equally worse in another?
Dworkin has supplied no reason to believe that there could
not be.
If the above is correct, then Dworkin* s functional
approach does not clearly provide for the existence of
legal rights, for if there is no unique best theory of our
legal institutions, there will be no rights.
Can this problem be gotten around?
Some of this difficulty may be overcome by a
modification in the analysis. Rather than defining trutn as
what accords with the best theory, Dworkin could instead
define rights, simpliciter, as rights existing on all of
the powerful theories of the institution (some level of
plausibility loosely specified). This would provide a three
tiered heirarchy of priniples (rights): (1) those directly
included in the hard materials of the institution, (2)
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tnose included in aLl powerful theories of the institution,
and (3) those on whicn powerful theories of the institution
disagree. (l) and (2) will be true principles (rights) of
the institution. (3) will not.
Modification of this portion of Dworkin's theory will
require adjustments in other places. In particular, Dworkin
will have to give up tne principle that individuals before
the bar always have rights to particular decisions by the
court, a principle in which Dworkin puts much store.
Judges, he holds (in opposition to the positivists), do not
have discression in the sense of areas where the law allows
them to base their decisions on things other than the
materials of law, such as tneir own personal moral
convictions. But on the modified theory there may well be
areas of indeterminate legal status, areas where the
powerful theories diverge as to what principles hold, and
thus cases which judges must decide using discretion.
I think Dworkin's observation that judges should and
do not really employ this sort of discretion in deciding
cases can be reconciled with the above modifications in tne
theory as follows: One should deny that there is a right to
a particular decision held against judges by plaintiffs and
defendants, and point out that there is a procedural right
against judges on the part of plaintiff and defendant whirl
carries with it the implication that judges do not nave
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discression : the right that judges base their decisions on
the best justificatory theory of the institution of which
they are aware (other principles will require them to make
serious, responsible, and unbiased attempts to develop such
a theory, or at least the portions of it related to the
cases on which they must decide). This is, I think, very
close to what Dworkin had in mind when he proposed the
doctrine of political responsibility. This explains why
judges are required to act as though there is really a
truth about (3)-type rights, and to construct theories
using the sort of techniques Dworkin recommends . It will
require that judges do their best to discover this "truth",
and that they rule on their best judgments of it. They will
not have discression in the full sense in such situations,
for they must always rule on the basis of those principles
which, to the best of their knowledge, are incorporated
into the best justificatory theory.
It may seem odd to propose that it is proper for
judges to decide cases on the basis of supposed legal
rights which we know to be controversial enough
guarantee that they are (3)-type principles, and thus not
true rights at all. I do not see any problem here.
Institutions are man-made, and I see no reason wny an
institution could not encorporate such a feature. tne
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requirement that those playing certain roles within the
institution pretend that certain things are true (which
tney may know are not true) when deciding how to act.
Wnetner or not such use of illusion is proper will depend,
I suppose, on now well, the institution employing it works.
I tnink this approach offers a nopeful alternative to
Dworkin's. I do not take concerns about the indeterminacy
of (o)-type principles to be a powerful objection to the
modified approach.
5. Moral Rights
As a general account of our concept of rights,
Dworkin's account runs into difficulties. It is clearly an
institution relative account, but for many moral rights,
there seems to be no relevant institution. Thus no sense
can be made of moral rights.
Some modifications may save the approach. Here we are
concerned with what individuated aims justify the actions
of moral agents. Thus, rather than relativizing to
institutions, the account of moral rights will be
relativized to moral agents. On this coneption, moral
rights are rights on moral theories. We may define true
rights relative to the best moral theory, or we may avoid
tne sort of difficulties we just discussed by defining true
rights as those incorporated into the true moral theory.
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Opting for the latter, we get:
x has a moral right to z for i on T iff On
moral theory T, x's security in z is an individuated
aim of minimal weight for i.
x has a moral right to z for i iff On the true
moral theory, x's security in z is an individuated
aim of minimal weight for i.
To say that x has a moral right to z, simpliciter, would be
to say that there is some moral agent for whom x has a
right to z
.
This lays bare some difficulties for such functional
accounts which we passed over in the previous discussions.
An individuated aim is a moral (or political) concern of
some sort. But there are two considerably different
concepts of moral concern which might be invoked here: [36]
(1) morally relevant features, i.e., properties of the act
or decision which bear on its being right or wrong, (2)
concerns which must be taken into account in deciding how
to act. But does "x's security in z is an individuated aim
for i" mean (per (1)) that x's security in z bears on tne
rightness of i's decisions and actions, or that (per (2)) i
must take into account the importance of x's security in z
(when relevant) in deciding how to behave?
Dworkin often speaks as though he opts for the second
conception
:
All that is meant, when we say that a
particular principle is a principle of our law,
that the principle is one which officials must take
i 0 8
into account, if it is relevant, as a considerationinclining in one direction of another. [37J
It is unclear what force this "must" has. however, if it is
anything much stronger than a weak "should", or an "ideally
would", the resulting theory, both of moral and of
political rights, is implausible: it is too strongly
in ten tionalis t
.
For example, Dworkin holds that individuals with cases
before a court have a right against the court to a
particular decision (the correct one). It seems to me,
however, that there is no reason to think that the best
political theory will include the principle that judges
must actively take this into account in making their
decisions. If a judge does not believe that such a right
(individuated aim) exists, but does believe that ne should
always judge in accord with his best judgment of the law
because it is his duty
,
and always does so, never taking
into account this supposed right, has he done less than he
must? Has he done something wrong? I think not. Or, with
other legal rights, if a judge employs Dworkin-like
techniques to determine the best tneory and act on his
determination, but makes honest mistakes about precisely
what rights exist (perhaps in hard cases, where rights are
controversial), has he done something less toan what ne is
required (must) do? I think not. There may be certain
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minimum Levels of competence required of a judge, but
political theories which require that judges never make
even theoretical mistakes (mistakes about what concerns
tney should be taking into account) are too strong. A more
p Lausible approach is tnat political rights bear primarily,
not on the reasonings motivating political action, but on
tne correctness of the action itself. Sometimes the
correctness of the action will depend upon the reasons for
which it was undertaken, but sometimes it will depend on
other considerations. Even if we agree with Dworkin that a
judge must always rule in a certain way, the way the
plaintiff and defendant have a right that he rule (I have
doubts that such a right exists), we need not grant that
they must rule that way for specific reasons.
The implaus ibi 1 i t y of this approach is clearer in the
case of legislative rights. The constitution specifies
certain legislative rights which bear on the correctness of
legislative decisions. Legislators may not make certain
sorts of decisions, eg., decisions which abridge the right
to free speach, press, association, etc.. But even a
legislator who thinks the constitution, and all the rights
it specifies, theoretical hocum, or otherwise unbinding,
may act perfectly correctly (so far as tae law goes) , so
long as he, when legislation which would violate such
rights comes up, votes against it. lie may be motivated by
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tne desire to be re-elected, by some non-rights-based
political/moral theory, or any number of other things. The
Law does not require that he act on the basis of these
rignts, out only that by his actions he not abridge
them
.
[ 38 ]
This suggests that a non-intentionalist ((l)-type)
approach to political rights is more plausible than the
i n ten t ionalis t approach.
As an account of moral rights, it is pretty clear that
the in tentionalis t approach will not work. Whether one
violates the rights of others is often independent of
whether or not one has taken their rights into account in
deciding how to act. Moral theories which are strongly
intentionalis t in this way are almost invariably too
strong. At any rate, it seems to me that a moral theory
could incorporate cetain rights, but not imply that in
order to act rightly (do as one must) one must always act
upon these rights (take them into account). If the
intentionalis t conception we are discussing is correct,
then such a theory would be incoherent, for to be a right
is to be an aim which must be taken into account in
deciding how to act. It seems to me that there are any
number of reasons a person could have for not harming
another, or for helping them, on which they could, with
complete moral correctness, act. Such action could accord
others their rights, and at the same time not be the result
of taking the right into account.
Since, then, rights may bear upon the rightness of
wrongness of actions independently of motivation, or the
decision process behind the action, the non-intentionalis
t
((l)-type) conception is to be preferred.
Before evaluating this, we should to fill in the
theory to account for the against relation. We can employ
Dworkin's coercion approach, and get:
x has a moral right against y to z for i iff on
the true moral theory, x's security in z, even at
the cost of coercion of y, is an individuated aim of
minimal weight for i.
For the purposes of evaluating this approach, we can
dispense with the "theory” aspect. Also, for simplicity, we
will consider only the special cases where the right in
question is a right for the same individual against whom it
holds. Thus we can discuss the simplified:
x has a moral right against y to z iff x's
security in z is an individuated aim of minimal
weight for y.
(We also assume that an individuated aim of minimal weight
for an individual will justify that individuals coercion of
himself to fulfill that aim.)
On this non-intentionalist conception, however, *-he
concept of individuated aim becomes very difficult. Tne
intentionalis t account allowed us to think of aims as
concerns in which we (must) actively take into account
specific ways in which our decisions would affect specific
other people. But outside of the context of decision
procedure the idea of' an aim seems to have little
application. If we cannot understand an aim as something
which we do or should take into account, we seem left only
with tne idea of a feature of actions or decisions which
has direct bearing on their rightness or wrongness. But
then what is an "individuated" aim?
It is very difficult to define this concept, and at
this crucial point, Dworkin does little to help.
We might try the obvious formal criterion: an
individuated aim is a moral concern of weight which
involves (how?) a specific individual. But moral concerns
of such weight may involve individuals where those
individuals do not have the appropriate rights. Such
situations may arise contractually. Eg., x promises y to
take y's watch to z to be repaired. x must, then, take the
watch to z. z is intimately involved in the aim. But z has
no right to receive the watch. T'ne obligation is owed to y,
and y has the right. Such situations may arise non-
contractually. Suppose, for example, that we nave an
obligtion of gratitude, an obligation to do good to those
who have helped us in the past. If y has helped x, then x
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has an obligation to help y in return. This obligation
involves a specific individual, yet it is doubtful that in
ordinary cases y has a right to expect x to help. I do not
t n i n k Dworkin would want to count such concerns as
individuated aims.
The lack of a clear analysis of individuated aim may
be the most disappointing aspect of Dworkin' s theory, but
is not unexpected. This is just the point on which most
theories of rights turn. That is, it is exceedingly
difficult to capture the nature of the special link the
right-holder has to the obligations rights place on others.
Other theorists have explicitly tried to capture it (in
terms, for example, of just whose actions or freedom the
right protects (will theories), whose interests are
protected (interests theories), or in terms of who is
supposed to benefit from the protection the right provides
(beneficiary theory)). We will examine some of the
difficulties this involves in chapter 5.
Even if Dworkin could clarify this concept, I have my
doubts that it would provide an adequate analysis of
rights. For some (of what I suspect are) individuated aims
do not seem to provide rights. We may imagine political
systems which take some very odd things as political aims.
Suppose, for example, a political system placed disvalue on
personal excellence. Such a system might adopt principles
requiring that each person with special talents be
handicapped so as to bring that person's abilities down
to, say, the norm. Suppose that this individuated aim is
not at the option of the talented individual, nor is it
thought to be for their benefit. If rights to equal
opportunity express individuated aims, I think this will as
well. It is doubtful that such an individuated aim is a
right. Other political theories may incorporate principles
requiring that all witches be put to death, or that all
racially impure individuals be put to death. Surely these
do not reflect rights. If a political theory were to
incorporate the individuated aim of protecting each
individual from the temptations of drink, would that create
a right? Do criminals have the right to be punished under a
political system which takes as one of its aims that eacn
person who breaks the law be punished? [ 39 ]
From Dworkin's perspective, the non-intentionalist
approach carries with it another weakness. Tnis approach
seems to suppose that there are distinct, weighty,
raoral/legal entities which are rights. Dworkin cLaims time
and again that his view avoids such "spooky" things. He
seems to think that he accomplishes this by (a) invoking
the concept of aims, which is not at all spooxy, and (b)
presenting the normative conception. It seems, nowever
,
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tnaL tae invocation of aims will not in tie end help, for
in order to produce a plausible theory, we must adopt the
view tnat they are somehow themselves moral weights. V,
e
have seen that the normative conception will not do as an
analysis of the concept of rights, though it may contain an
element of t r u t n about the implications of tneir existence.
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fit simplicity morality
A
B
C
1
2
2
3
3
1
2
A is better than B, B is better than C, thus, if the
relation is transitive, A is better than C. But by pairwise
comparison, C is better than A. Also, taken as a whole, the
ordering does not seem to indicate than any of the theories
are superior to the others.
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to have little weight. Compare theories A, B, and C.
(Numbers indicate how good on a ratio scare they are in the
dimension specified (and thus how they compare in tnat
L 2 i
dimension)
.
)
( 1 ) ( 2 )
A
B
C
8
&
7
1
10
1.1
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in tine moral dimension are small. But A is not better than
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Even if theories are ranked pairwise by the better
theory relation, this gives no guarantee that the relation
determines a best theory.
36. Only on a very limited class of moral theories do
these turn out to be equivalent.
37. Dworkin, TRS, p.26
38. This is not to say that legislators or judges are
free to act for any reasons whatsoever. The law does place
limits on acceptable motivations. Citizens have legal
rights that their representatives not be corrupt in certain
ways, eg., vote on the basis of proferred bribes, or make
decisions where certain sorts of conflicts of interest are
involved. but these are, I t link, distinct rights on the
part of the citizenry, and are not as far reaching as the
doctrine under discussion.
39 . In places, Dworkin seems aware of such difficulties,
and falls back on an account that isolates a subclass of
individuated aims, those of providing opportunities,
resources, or liberties for specific individuals. But the
examples I have produced do involve such aims (although the
opportunities, resources, and liberties they provide may
not be ones ordinarily sought after). Sometimes, Dworkin
seems to have in mind restricting rights to those
individuated aims which are grounded (on a theory) in the
value of such opportunities, resources, and liberties.
However, this approach fails to account for the many rights
which are grounded in other values, eg., efficiency, or the
maximization of the economic output (rights under the
traffic code, and rights against monopolistic practices may
be examples). In discussing rights, Dworkin often seems to
move back and forth between these two different approaches.
Neither seems adequate, and they conflict. Perhaps Dworkin
can provide some middle ground, but this approac :i needs
more development.
CHAPTER IV
BENDITT'S THEORY
!• Any adequate theory of the nature of rights must
account for three features of rights: (1) their
justificatory function, (2) their ability to conflict with
other moral concerns, (3) their conclusory function.
Concerning these features:
1.1 Features of Rights to be accounted for.
(l) The Justificatory Function of Rights
Rights often serve the function of justifying demands
we make on others. We cite rights to show that others
should allow us to do certain things, and to show that
others should do certain things for us. That is, rights
claims serve as premises of arguments to establish the
normative status of specific actions. Several examples
indicate this:
Bill wishes to make an anti-government speech. The
police move in to prevent him. He claims he has a right to
make the speech, and that this right is guaranteed by the
right to free speech instituted by the Bill of Rights. He
cites this general right of free speech and argues that his
speech is covered by it in order to show that the police
are legally required to let him speak. It is because Bill
has the constitutional right that he has the right to make
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the speech he is making in the circumstances.
Peeping Tom looks in Mary's window. She discovers him,
and tells him to leave. He asks why. She declares that she
has a right to privacy, and that his peeping is invading
that right, therefore, she concludes, she has a right that
he not peep at her, and that he leave.
Susan is kidnapped. She demands of her captor that she
be released, defending her demand with the assertion that
she has the right to liberty.
A religious community uses public taxes to support
evangelism. The community is taken to court by unhappy tax-
payers (the minority in the community). The community
defends itself by citing the constitutional right to
freedom of religion which, they say, allows them to
practice their evangelism. Where they have a political
majority, they contend, a legitimate way to do this is by
using public funds to do so. Thus they have a right to use
public funds as they do.
A contracts with B to do z, but fails to. B goes to
court, arguing that because A so contracted, and because
people have a right to have contracts to which they are
party fulfilled, B has a right to have A do z.
Teacher promises Student to meet Student in his office
at 3 PM. On the way to the office, teacher decides to sit
in the sun instead. Student can argue that there is a
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general right to have promises fulfilled, and thus, that he
has a right against Teacher that Teacher show up for the
appointment, and not sit in the sun.
In such typical examples, rights to particular
actions, or claims about the normative status of specific
actions, are defended by citing general rights. The
particular judgments seem justified by the general rights.
In some cases, we can say that individuals have the more
particular rights, or that their actions have the normative
status they do, because of the more general right.
(2) Conflicts
The relation between rights which serve as
justifications and the all-in normative judgments they
justify is complicated by the existence of conflicts
between rights, and between rights and other moral
concerns. Some rights seem more important than others, and
override them. Also, other moral considerations sometimes
compete with and override rights. The weight of rights must
be taken into account when such conflicts occur. For
example:
Bill's speech includes instructions for constructing
an atomic bomb. His making the speech will endanger the
security of others sufficiently so that their right to
security is more important that Bill's right to speak his
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mind. Bill does not have an all-in right to make the
speech.
Peeping Tom is spying on Mary because he knows she is
plotting to kill him. His right to protect himself
overrides her right to privacy, and he need not leave.
Susan's accomplices are holding others hostage. Her
kidnapping is a method for accomplishing a trade for her
hostages. She has no all-in right to be released (untill
her hostages are released).
The rights of the minority in the community to
practice the religion of their choice, and their right that
the state not establish a religion combine to override the
right of the majority to practice religion by using public
funds to evangalize their beliefs.
Suppose A has also contracted to perform services for
others, and he cannot fulfill all of his contracts. B's
contractual right may lose out in its conflict with these
other rights, and B may not have an all-in right to A's
doing z.
Suppose Teacher was late for his meeting with Student
because he stopped to give first aid to the victim of an
automobile accident. Student has a right to Teacher's
ariving on time, but that right is overridden by Teacher s
obligation to help the victim. Thus Student does not have
an all-in right to Teacher's being on time.
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Tha t the possibility of conflicts between rights is
central to our ordinary conception of them is indicated by
the fact that we have a vocabulary for dealing with such
conflicts which includes such terms as, "weight",
"conflict", "defeat", "overriding", and "absolute". Such
conflicts seem to be real, and the normative status of the
actions in question seem to depend upon the weights given
to the rights involved, and the relative importance of
other moral concerns. Rights which cannot be overridden by
other moral considerations are termed, "absolute." Most
philosophers have had doubts whether any (general) rights
are truly absolute.
(3) All-in rights
In the previous discussion, we spoke of all-in rights.
There seems to be a concept of rights which is conclusory,
or all-in. This concept is employed when, at the conclusion
of weighing the various rights and other moral/legal
concerns which bear on a moral/legal judgment, a conclusory
ascription of rights is made. There seems to be some
difference between the things called "rights" in such
contexts, and the rights cited as justifications for such
judgments. For example, all-in rights would seem to be, in
a sense, absolute, for they are rights which cannot be
overridden (they are rights cited after potentially
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overriding factors have been eliminated). They do not seem
capable of conflict.
1.2 These three features of rights, on the ordinary
conception, seem to me to be about as close to basic data
about rights as one can come . Generally speaking
,
an
adequate theory of the nature of rights should provide the
basis for an account of these features of rights. The
presumption, it seems to me, weighs heavily against
theories which cannot do this. Certainly, any theory which
is incompatible with these features of rights must justify
this failure.
Most philosophers interested in the nature and concept
of rights have taken these features of rights as data to be
accounted for, or explained away, by any adequate theory of
rights. A wide variety of approaches and distinctions have
been employed to accomplish this.
Feinberg,[l] for example, seems to hold that legal
claim-rights cannot conflict. (They seem to be all-in
rights.) He also holds that general rights can serve a
justificatory function, but that (at least a main class of)
general legal rights do not conflict with one another.
To account for the sorts of features of rights we have
been discussing, Feinberg makes several proposals. He
distinguishes between mere claims and rights (valid
claims). He distinguishes rights packages (what we have
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called "general" rights in Appendix A) from simple claims-
rights. He distinguishes between the recognition and the
enforcement of rights. He suggests that one may have a
right which one is not morally justified in exercising. And
he points to another sense of "rights" in which there may
be true conflicts between rights.
For Feinberg, many general rights do justify more
particular assertions of rights, but these general rights
do not conflict with one another. He sees that he must
explain why there is at least the appearance of conflict,
and what courts are doing when they appear to be resolving
such conflicts. To do this, he can distinguish between
claims and valid claims. The former have varying degrees of
weight, the latter do not. The latter are rights, but the
former are not, though they look a bit like rights in
argument, and some might think of them as rights. Thus
there is a tendency to think of rights as having weight. He
also holds that many general rights are really bundles of
legal relations, involving many specific rights, and other
legal relations (see appendix A, on general rights). Such
rights can serve a justificatory purdpose. He accounts for
the resolution of apparent conflicts between such general
rights as being attempts to determine the precise content
of these packages. Where rights appear to conflict, the job
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of the courts is to clarify and define the complex
boundaries of these rights so as to show which really apply
in specific circumstances. Since many disputes require the
specification of previously undrawn boundaries for general
rights, we often cannot tell beforehand how these apparent
conflicts will be resolved. Thus, Feinberg suggests, there
is a limit to how much we may reasonably count on rights,
for their boundaries are often not fully defined.
Feinberg rejects an alternative account of such
features of rights (the prima facie approach), but states:
Yet, for all these misgivings based on the
utility of ordinary distinctions, there remains the
fact upon which the theory of prima-facie rights is
based, namely, the apparent impossibility in a world
full of conflict of treating
unconditional guarantee .[ 2
]
any right as an
He toys with two explanations of this . One invo Ives
distinguishing between the recognition of a right by the
state, and its enforcement.
The state's promise of enforcement to any given
rightholder cannot be totally unconditional, but
perhaps its recognition of the validity of right-
holder's claims can be totally unconditional (or at
least much closer to being so than the promise of
enforcement )
.
[ 3 ]
The other involves pointing out that:
... a person can maintain a right to X even whens
he is not morally justified in its exercise, or
others are justified in not according it to him. Lack
of moral justification for exercising a right does
not entail (even temporary) nonpossession. Moreover,
it is possible to have a duty but, because of
conflicting duties and other moral considerations,
132
also to have a moral justification for not acting in
accordance with it. There is no contradiction insaying of a person that he ought not to perform onehis duties. The right correlated with that dutyo f
remains a right, even when honored in the breech. [4]
(To me, this looks like a re-introduction of the prima
facie approach)
.
Even this is not enough. Feinberg also explains
'-•Si'tciin sorts of conflict in another way, as involving a
distinct sense of "rights".
It should be no surprise that general rights in
the sense of "ideal directives" are in chronic
conflict both internally and with each other.
He continues:
"The right to life" is in internal conflict when
soldiers must die so that their buddies may live, or
when a famine overwhelms food supplies. "The right to
liberty" conflicts with itself when demand for
passage exceeds transportation facilities and some
must wait in order that others may go, ...
Recognition of "the right to property" does not help
resolve the conflict between a factory owner's right
to use property for his own benefit and a neighbor's
right to the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of his
land. Similarly the right to life conflicts with the
right to liberty when authorities must decide whether
to quarantine whole neighborhoods to prevent the
spread of a plague. In all these cases, the
conflicting principles referred to by the right-names
are so usefully vague and flexible that conflict is
easily tolerated. If the "rights" in question are
merely directives to adjudicators to do their best
for certain kinds of human interests, they may be
satisfied by a give and take of intelligent
adjustments and mutual accommodations. ... [5]
Feinberg has even more to say about these issues, but
I do not wish to evaluate here either his position, or his
criticism of alternatives. What I want to point out is how
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important it is, and to what great lengths some
philosophers have gone, to give an account of the three
features of rights mentioned above.
Dworkin found conflicts of rights and their
justificatory function so central to their use in the legal
sphere that his theory of rights as aims focuses almost
entirely upon it. One can argue for the correctness of
actions on the grounds of accepted aims. Aims can conflict.
Some are more important than others, and their importance
for particular decisions can vary greatly for any number of
reasons. One could account for all-in rights as final
judgments as to which aims dominate in particular
circumstances .
1.3 Some have thought that rights exhibit a prima facie/
all-in distinction much like that which seems to hold for
obligations. In general, such prima facie theories of
rights seem well suited to account for the three features
of rights we have been discussing. As with prima facie
obligations, prima facie rights would carry weight for all-
in normative judgments. Sometimes there would be conflicts
between prima facie rights and other legal/moral concerns,
including other prima facie rights. When this occurs, the
all-in normative status of the actions at issue will rest
on the bal lance of these prima facie concerns. Some all-in
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normative judgments would invoke the existence of all-in
rights
.
In the case of the prima facie/ all-in obligation
distinction, there are a wide variety of theories
attempting to characterize the nature of prima facie and
all-in obligations. So, too, for prima facie rights. Such
theories are difficult to develop, and have been the
subject of much criticism. I have not found that such
criticism refutes either the view that on the ordinary
conceptions of rights and obligations there is a prima
facie/ all-in distinction, or the view that that
distinction is coherent. Though I will not investigate such
theories in any depth here, it is notable that there are at
least two distinct approaches which might be taken. Let us
call these the "epis temic"
,
and the "realist" approaches.
The realist approach provides that prima facie moral
properties and relations are real features of actions which
are part of what "makes" them right or wrong. Such an
approach fits well with certain pluralist normative
theories on which there are several irreducible features of
actions in virtue of which (given how these features
ballance out, i.e., their comparative weights) actions
possess their all-in normative status. It also seems
consistent with the reducibility of prima facie rights and
more basic, morally relevantobligations to other,
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features. On this approach,
_if the prima facie features and
their comparative weights are known, then they can be used
to calculate the all-in normative status of actions.
The epistemic approach holds that prima facie moral
properties and relations are part of some systems for
"figuring out" the all-in normative status of actions. On
this approach, it need not be held that such features of
actions are the properties of actions in virtue of which
they have their normative status. Here, prima facie
features are like practical principles, or principles of
evidence. They serve as guides to judgment and decision.
They express features of actions which provide good
evidence concerning the all-in normative status of actions.
Where no other prima facie features apply, a single prima
facie feature of an action may provide conclusive evidence
that the action is right or wrong (or is an all-in right,
or an all-in obligation). Sometimes, where prima facie
concerns conflict, weights can be assigned to these
features, allowing the calculation of the all-in normative
status of an action as a function of its prima facie
features .
In the forthcoming chapters of this dissertation, I
will defend the view that rights are, if not themselves
obligations, then at least intimately linked logically to
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obligations. I think that there is an ambiguity in
"obligations" between a prima facie concept, and an all-in
concept. This suggests, I propose, that "rights" will
exhibit a parallel ambiguity, and that a prima facie rights
relation, and an all-in one will be consistent with, and
generated by my treatment of rights, grounded in that
distinction for obligations.
2. In his book, Rights
, [6] Benditt presents a theory of
rights in which he combines the claims approach with the
rejection of the the view that rights are moral
considerations or forces. The idea that having a right
makes certain action permissible, or that having a right
limits the way others may treat you goes by the wayside.
Assertions of rights, on Benditt's view, either summarize
the particular moral status of a person or persons at a
time, or make generalizations about what rights people
usually have.
Benditt holds that there are are three basic sorts of
rights assertions: assertions of "liberty" rights,
assertions of "claims" rights, and assertions of social
and economic" rights. He seems to hold that the latter type
do not generally signify genuine rights.
Assertions of liberty rights take the form 'N has a
right to do X', and say no more than that N is at liberty
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to do X, i.e., N is not morally required not to do X, or,
for Benditt, the equivalent: N has no obligation not to do
X. [ 7 ]
Claim rights are rights which one can insist upon or
demand .
M has a claim right to N's doing (or not doing) X =
(a) N has an obligation (is required) to do
(or not do) X
& (b) M has a liberty right to insist on the
performance of X (or not-X)
But further, the truth of (a) and (b) must be connected in
a certain way: the source of the obligation, (a), must not
be different from the source of the liberty right. He adds:
& (c) the reasons for (a) also establish (b)
.
Benditt also speaks of the obligation (a) being "owed" to
M. (b) by itself, or perhaps (b) and (c) taken together
seem to be Bendett's account of the "owed" relation. As we
will see (Ch.5), this is a difficult concept to analyze.
Social or economic rights are asserted: "N has a right
to X". However, such rights do not hold against any
designatable person.
Such rights are often asserted as a basis for
arguing that there ought to be some sort of
restructuring of social institutions, perhaps merely
the creation of a special office, which will bring it
about that people get what they have a right to. [8]
Notice that such rights perhaps do serve as justification
for action or as a moral consideration, contrary to
Benditt's general thesis. However, Benditt seems to hold
138
that only where they signify claim rights to the
restructuring of institutions do they express genuine
rights
.
Benditt abjures rights as moral considerations. How
does he account for what we have called "general" rights,
their apparent conflicts, and the apparently justificatory
use we make of them? He makes little effort to do so. His
summary account of general rights will not do. On this
account, statements of general rights become mere summaries
of, or generalizations (more or less accurate) about what
rights people have. That is, they specify rights people
usually have (in certain circumstances). Such statements do
not specify moral forces, but merely summarize the bearing
of other "real" moral considerations (not rights) on
particular situations. To say, for example, that people
have a (general) right to privacy is to say no more than
that usually moral considerations applied to people in
various circumstances justify a right to privacy for the
person in those circumstances. The discovery that in some
circumstances individuals have no right to privacy would
not, then, falsify the claim that people have a (general)
right to privacy. Non-general assertions of rights are only
appropriate as the conclusions of moral argument. [9] Such
summary rights seem inadequate to account for the conflict,
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and the justificatory characteristics, of rights.
2.1 Benditt s view, I think, is largely the result of
dissatisfaction with theories of rights which attempt to
account for the conflicts of rights, and their
justificatory role.
Benditt proposes four "conditions of adequacy for an
account of the role of rights in moral reasoning."
The first condition of adequacy is that it must
be the case that if a person has a right at a time t,
then he is within his rights in acting, or insisting,
on his right. And that means that if the right exists
at t, then it cannot be overridden, or non-accorded
,
or in any way made inoperative except as the right-
holder wishes not to act, or insist, on it ... . And
this means, I think, that a right that one has t time
t is absolute.
Second, the having of a right at a time t must
be compatible with the idea that it might be the case
that one ought not to exercise, or insist on, his
right. Third, rights must make a distinctive
contribution to moral reasoning, in the sense that
the question of whether a person has a right at a
time t cannot (or at least cannot always) be entirely
determined by whether, based on the circumstances at
t, his having that right at t is for the best.
Finally, if actual, concrete, or final rights are
derived from general (perhaps prima facie) rights, it
must be the case that people can actually figure out
what their concrete rights are by thinking about,
weighing, and balancing where necessary, their
general (prima facie) rights. [ 1 0
]
Benditt, then, holds that rights do not conflict, and
do not serve as justifications in the manner suggested, and
his resulting theory of rights is limited to all-in rights,
supplemented by the special summary conception on which
general rights are merely generalizations specifying sorts
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of rights peopLe usually have.
Concerning conflicts: Benditt's first criteria rules
out conflicts between rights. His main justification for
this condition of adequacy, I think, rests on a sort of
legal/moral example:[ll] A terrorist holds a hostage in
Bill's house. The police will not let Bill enter. The
policeman bars the door, admitting that Bill has a right to
enter but not letting him. Benditt believes that there is
something incoherent in the policeman's position, that
rights cannot conflict in this way.
Needless to say, it seems to me to be
extraordinary to maintain that I have a right, then
and there, to enter my house. ... It's a
contradiction to maintain both that I have a right,
then and there, to enter and that I am, then and
there, morally required not to enter. [12]
He also says,
There is at least one common linguistic
expression that to my ear suggests this idea
namely, the notion of being "within one's rights" in
doing something. If I were to ask whether I would be
within my rights in entering my house in the
circumstances, the quite proper answer would be that
I would not, and this seems to me to be just another
way of saying that I do not have the right to enter
in the circums tances . [ 13
]
But these arguments do not establish Benditt's first
criterion. We can admit that there is an all-in sense of
"rights" which yeilds the above contradiction, and that the
linguistic expression "within one's rights concerns the
all-in status of one's actions. Yet we need not admitt that
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there is not another sense of "rights" which expresses a
prima facie concept on which it is not contradictory to say
that one has a right to enter one's house here and now, but
that it is overridden, here and now, by the danger to
others of so doing.
I know of no adequate support for this first
criterion
.
Concerning the justificatory nature of rights:
Benditt rejects the following sort of reasoning involving
rights
:
Let us think of the question of whether a person
has the right to do some particular act A on a given
occasion (or, in the case of claim-rights, whether N
has the right to someone else doing a particular act
A). We will call the assertion that N has the right
to do a particular act A a particular right-assertion
- previously we have spoken of actual, or concrete,
or final rights. Such assertions are defended, within
the framework we have been looking at, by pointing to
one of the general rights that N has: N has the right
to do A because doing A is a case of, say, speaking
freely, and one of N's rights is the right to speak
freely. In this bit of moral reasoning rights come in
in two ways - in the conclusion (the conclusory role)
and as reasons, or premises (the justificatory role).
Now given the problems that this sort of reasoning
has with the conditions of adequacy, it seems to me
that it is a mistake to invoke rights in a
justificatory role - that is, to think that we have a
(general) right to speak freely in the sense that it
is because we have this right that we have the right
actually to do a given particular act.
He concludes from this:
Perhaps we should instead regard a right like
the (general) right to speak freely as derivative
from particular right-assertions. Nonparticular
right-assertions might be regarded as being backed up
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or justified by nonparticular right-assertions. This
is not to say that thera are no r 63sons siiDoort i noparticular right-assertions. There Ire P?ertai§important and morally relevant considerations that
constitute reasons for particular right-assertions,
and whose relevance in supporting such right-
assertions is independent of their character as
rights - which they have only in a summary way, in
that they summarize kinds of acts that we often have
the actual right to do.
This proposal is not, however, a rejection of
rights. Rights do exist - as the conclusions, but not
the premises, of certain arguments. What the point of
rights is, if they do not serve as ultimate reasons,
will be taken up in section 5
.
[
14 ]
But what are the problems of the justificatory
argument cited with the conditions of adequacy? The
conditions are supposed to be conditions of adequacy for
theories of rights, not for a type of argument.
The difficulty Benditt has in mind, I think, is that
on theories which generate the sort of reasoning criticized
(eg. prima facie rights theories), the fourth condition
will not be satisfied. In many places in his book, Benditt
criticizes theories along these lines. He usually argues
further that if such a theory can supply a way of actually
figuring out what concrete rights are, then the third
criterion will be unsatisfied, for then general rights will
be eliminable from the moral theory (they can be replaced
by the direct employment of the system used to ballance
them) .
There are difficulties for this criticism.
First. The third criterion is doubtful. I fail to see
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why an adequate theory of the nature of rights must make
them non-e 1 iminable
,
in the sense of ultimate, or not
derivable from or reducible to other moral concerns.
Benditt sems to think that if rights are reducible, they
could do no work in a normative theory. But why? This is
not a general feature of reductions. The reducibi lity
,
say,
of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics does not show
either that thermodynamics is false, or that it is not
theoretically or practically useful. If, in fact, rights
can be reduced to other moral concerns, that would not
count against their existence, nor would it show that they
cannot comprise an important element in normative theory.
Second. The fourth condition is irrelevant to the
issues we have been investigating in this dissertation: the
nature of those legal/moral relations we call "rights". For
example, the realist version of the prima facie approach
proposes several things: There are a number of distinct
features actions may have which bear on their normative
status, some of which are (prima facie) rights. Such prima
facie rights have a dimension of weight, and the same sort
of right may have different weights in different
circumstances. The all-in normative status of actions is a
function of which morally relevant features it has, and
their relative strengths; often some of these features will
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be prima facie rights. Sometimes, a prima facie right will
exist which is not outweighed by conflicting concerns. When
this is so, there will be an all-in right as well. A theory
characterizing the nature of rights along such lines could
be completely correct, I think, even if the weights of the
individual prima facie r i gh t s varied in such a complex way
that human minds were unable to grasp precisely the nature
of the variation. If this were so, Benditt's fourth
criteria would not be satisfied. I think this would cast no
doubt on the accuracy of the theory as an account of the
nature of rights.
Suppose a scientist proposed that the motion of a free
object in space is a function of its initial velocity, and
the gravitational forces exerted upon it, and that the
gravitational forces exerted upon it are a function of the
gravitational mass of that object and the other objects in
the universe. One could hardly object to the claim that
there are objects having gravitational mass, or the claim
that the gravitational mass of objects determines the
motion of such bodies free in space, on the grounds that we
cannot always calculate the motion of such objects because
we cannot know the gravitational masses of all of the
objects in the universe, nor even on the grounds that we
have no explanation of why certain material objects have
the gravitational masses which they have (i.e., we have no
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comprehensible model explaining what determines
gravitational mass). Nor, if there were a reduction of the
physical property gravitational mass to some property in a
more basic physical theory, would that show that the
account of motion as a function of gravitational mass was
either false or useless.
Benditt's criticisms strike more directly at the
epistemic approach. But even here they have limited force.
One may hold the epistemic approach, but admit that it does
not provide a (complete) method for determining the
normative status of every action. The approach, it could be
held, works when there are no conflicts of prima facie
concerns. It also works when we can be sure that reasonable
assignment of weights to conflicting concerns will all
yield the same result. Also, principles may be proposed for
determining the (varying) weights of some prima facie
concerns in various circumstances, or intuitions might be
appealed to. Thus the system may be useful in determining
the normative status of many actions, even if it is not
precise enough to help in every situation. But this is no
refutation of prima facie theories. Indeed, such a limited
theory will not satisfy Benditt's fourth criterion, and it
may not satisfy his third. But what are the aims of prima
facie theory on this epistemic conception? Presumably, to
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offer an accurate and useful (ease and speed of application
are important here) system for figuring out how people
should behave. Even if the system is incomplete, it may be
the best available for these purposes. After all, what
accurate complete system could human minds effectively
employ? Act Utilitarianism, for example, is complete, but
it certainly cannot be employed, given the importance it
gives to the unpredictable long-term concequences or acts.
I see no reason to demand completeness of such systems.
Benditt has tried to make out a case that an
alternative approach to a practical system is better than
such a prima facie approach. However, even if his arguments
show this, they are irrelevant to the issues we have been
investigating in this dissertation: What are rights on the
ordinary conception? If the prima facie approach is
correct, then his argument, if sound, would show that
rights
,
on the ordinary cone eption
,
do not come into play
in the best system for dete:rmining the all-in normative
status o f actions.
I think it is best to interpre t Benditt as having a
di f feren t project in mind than do I . It is best to
interpre: t him as attempting, not to c haracter ize the nature
of those: things which are ordinarily thought of a s rights,
but as attempting to clarify a conce•pt of rights which can
serve a useful role in an adequate moral theory. His
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arguments are, I think, best read as attempts to show that
the prima facie and a number of other common conceptions of
rights are useless for the purposes of developing an
accurate and useful normative theory. (For Benditt,
normative theories must be useful in practice.) Thus, if
Benditt rejects the prima facie analysis of rights, we may
read him as simply saying that this conception of rights
cannot be useful in developing an adequate normative
theory. Read in this way his arguments become more powerful
and interesting, but do not have direct bearing on the
project of this dissertation .[ 15 ]
3. If we treat Benditt's view that rights are either
liberties or claim-rights as he has defined them as an
analytical theory of the nature of rights, it encounters a
number of difficulties, to which I now turn. Some of these
should be clear from the above discussion.
3.1 It is doubtful that mere liberties are rights. I
consider this issue in Ch. 7, and discuss some of Benditt s
examples of such rights. Let us move on to the issue of
claim rights.
3.2 It is difficult to see how conflicts and the
justificatory nature of rights is to be accounted for on
Benditt's theory. Suppose A1 and Mary are discussing
whether or not to take strong action to prevent John s
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drinking himself into the grave. Al points out, " I guess
there's nothing we can do, he has a right to, after all."
This citing of a right is the citing of strong evidence
that Al and Mary should not take strong action to stop
John. But it may be that other moral considerations
override this right, eg., the value of human life, or
John's importance to the well-being of his family or
society. Suppose John had this right against Al and Mary
because they had promised him not to interfere. Surely that
right can be overridden, and Al and Mary's interference
justified, while at the same time continuing to be a right
of some weight. But what can Benditt say of this?
Benditt's liberty sense will not do, for the fact that
a person is at liberty, in the sense of its being
permissible for them to do something, does not imply that
others cannot interfere.
It must be a claim-right. But what claim right? In
order to fit the analysis, it must be interpreted as a
right to some sort of action on the part of others (i.e.,
N's doing or not doing X). Some candidates are: the right
that others not stop him, the right that others not
interfere with him, and the right that others not
intentionally interfere with him. Thus, John's right comes
to (something like): John has a claim right to Mary s not
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interfering with his drinking himself into the grave. Which
is, on Benditt's analysis:
(a) Mary is required not to interfere with John so
doing
.
(b) John has a liberty right to insist on Mary's not
interfering
.
(c) The reasons for (a) also establish (b).
But this analysis does not allow for other moral
considerations to override the right, for it requires Mary
not to interfere.
3.3 The above example also illuminates some difficulties
with Benditt's analysis, even if treated as an analysis of
all-in rights.
First. We have argued, in considering claims theories
of rights, that active rights do not always imply the right
to insist, as this analysis suggests (clause (b)).
Second. It is very difficult to see how clause (c) is
to work here. What sort of reasons are likely to justify
(a) and (b)? Intuitively, it seems to me, we would cite, as
did Al above, John's right to drink himself into the grave.
Since he has such a right, Mary may not, at least prima
facie, prevent him from so doing, and if she does, he may,
at least prima facie, insist that she cease her
interference. The same moral concern, John s right, ties
together (a) and (b). The right may be said to imply , or
"justify" both.
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But Benditt's approach does not allow this, for: (l)
rights cannot, on his view, serve as justifications of this
sort, and (2) the active right which we would cite as the
ground of (a) and (b) just is (a) and (b) (and (c)).
Benditt needs to supply an account of how (a) and (b) could
be grounded, and have the same ground, which can plausibly
replace the suggested account.
Indeed, such an account is unlikely to be forthcoming,
for justifications of (a) will generally be quite different
from justifications of (b). Perhaps this is clearest for
legal rights, where justifications are fairly easily
pinpointed. In legal systems like ours, most legal
requirements have little to do with the justification of
the liberty to insist on their satisfaction. Just what is
meant by "the liberty to insist" is not clear, but one
plausible interpretation is that it is the liberty to go to
court, or take other legal actions to gain enforcement of a
legal requirement. But the rules which ground the
requirement are almost always distinct from the rules which
create the liberty to go to court, or take other legal
action. Suppose, for example, that A contracts with C to
repair his television. C has a legal right that A do so.
But the law of contract which grounds that right is not the
ground of C's liberty to insist. What grounds C's liberty
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to insist are the procedural rules by which the courts
operate, perhaps combined with the evidence C can produce
for the validity of the contract.
The point is that, in our legal system (or, if this is
doubted, at least in some possible legal systems), the
liberty to insist that an obligation be fulfilled need not
share its grounds with the obligation. (Indeed, the liberty
to insist need not even be grounded in the right insisted
upon
. )
3.4 As we have seen, Benditt is aware that his
treatment of rights does not account for such commonplace
features of rights as is exhibited in the above example.
In the end, he simply does not take such rights seriously
enough. The result is that, though Benditt may be analyzing
interesting and important moral concepts, they are not
those most of us have in mind when we think of rights. He
is aware of Dworkin's work on rights, but oddly does not
even countanence as rights the things Dworkin is most
interested in. And, while he admitts that, "MacCormick is
of course correct in saying that there are some rights-
assertions in the law that are not conclusions," he goes
on
:
These do not, however, occur frequently, and
most rights-assertions are in fact conclusions drawn
from various elements of law. We should notice, in
further support of this, that where a court must mesh
different legal provisions, some of which are
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expressed in the language of rights and others of
which are not, there is no presumption that they are
entitled togreater weight, which is just another way
of underlining the point that a legal rule can confer
a right or support the ascription of a right without
saying that that is what it does. In sum, in
practices and institutions the main function of
r ights-asser tions is to draw conclusions to the
effect that within the framework of the practice or
institution a given individual is justified in doing
something or insisting on another person's doing
something
.
[
16 ]
But this response will not do. It does nothing to
support his view that rights are solely (or primarily)
conclusory to show that they can be conferred by rules. Few
have doubted that rights can appear as the conclusions of
legal/moral argument, but that will not support an analysis
of rights which leaves no room for other uses.
It is notable that some of what Benditt says in the
above passage tells against his position. Benditt speaks of
rights having weight. "The weight" of a right, however,
only makes sense insofar as rights are moral concerns which
compete with other moral concerns, and which can serve as
justifications, or grounds for legal decision. Benditt's
analysis of claim-right can make no sense out of weight,
for it employs only all-in moral concepts (liberty,
requirement )
.
If non-conclusory uses of rights occur at all, even if
infrequently, an analysis of the concept must account for
them, and Benditt admitts that they do occur. Moreover,
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Benditt does little to demonstrate that they seldom occur.
In fact, they often occur. They even occur in cases on
which Benditt himself focuses.
For example, Benditt discusses a class of rights in a
section of his book entit led , "Lega 1 Rights in Government
"Largess". "[ 17 ] One discussion centers on whether the 5th
Ammendment right to due process, the right not to be
deprived of property by the Federal or State Government
without due process, applies to cases where employees have
been dismissed. The reasoning in these cases turns on
whether the employee has property (a right) in his job, and
the extent of that right. If he has such a right, he also
has a right to due process. If not, he does not (unless
other rights apply). This is a clear example of a case
where rights are cited by premises in legal argument.
The importance of rights as premises within our legal
system is hard to miss. [18] Our constitution refers to
rights (using the term "right") in six of the first ten
ammendments. These are often cited in legal and political
discussion as premises, and perhaps seldom as conclusions.
Nor are they mere generalizations. They have weight, and
their truth conditions are different from those of
generalizations. Even if it were found that the statutes
and the behavior of the government had denied such a right
consistently to most citizens (i.e., the generalization
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turned out to be false), citizens would have the right, and
the right would carry weight and would justify modification
of the statutes and governmental behavior which caused that
denial of rights. Were they generalizations, their
existence would not be checked by examining the
constitution, the intent of its writers, and political
theory, but by doing empirical studies to see if citizens
actually have, in practice, the rights they suggest, on
Benditt's analysis, they will generally have. [19]
3.5 Finally, the concept of a rights-based normative
theory, such as, perhaps, Nozick's, in which (general)
rights are important moral forces bearing upon the all-in
normative status of actions, makes perfect sense on our
normal concept of rights (howevermuch we may find such
theories faulty on other grounds). Such theories make no
sense on Benditt's analysis. Moral concerns of the sort
postulated by these theories do not satisfy the analysis of
"rights", on Benditt's analysis.
In sum, many of the major conceptual jobs the concept
of rights does for us, Benditt's analysis does not allow it
to do. The analysis, therefore, is not an adequate account
of the concept of rights.
How concerned Benditt should be with this problem is
unclear. His interest is not, I think, in analyzing the
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ordinary concept of rights, or the relation as ordinarily
conceived. His interest is two-fold. First, he wishes to
isolate some rights-like concepts which are, he thinks,
needed to develop an adequate normative theory. For this
purpose, even purely stipulative concepts might be useful.
At the same time he wishes to avoid invoking concepts and
relations too vague to play a role in an such a theory.
Thus, much of his argument for his conception or rights is
an argument against the coherence, or at least theoretical
usefulness, of alternative conceptions. We both may be
correct: I, in arguing that the ordinary conception of
rights signifies relations which are ignored by Benditt's
theory, Benditt, in arguing that such relations are not of
use for normative theory.
I do not think that Benditt's arguments against the
usefulness of a justificatory concept of rights which
allows conflict are conclusive, but I will not go into them
here. My point is merely that, even were they to show that
our ordinary concept of rights is inadequate to the
theoretical tasks required of them by philosophers who take
them to be central to normative theory, no support would
thereby accrue to his analysis treated as an account of
rights. In fact, if the ordinary concept carries with it
such difficulties, an adequate analysis of it would help to
expose and clarify them. Benditt's analysis ignores the
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elements of the ordinary concept which leads to such
difficulties, and thus fails.
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CHAPTER V
THE ANALYSIS OF CLAIM-RIGHTS
Hoh f e Id suggests that the characteristic which
distinguishes claim rights from other rights is their
relationship to duties or obligations. For a person to have
a claim right, someone must have a duty or obligation [l]
which is related in certain ways to that right, i.e., which
is its correlative. I will discuss correlativity in the
next chapter. In this chapter, I will discuss attempts to
analyze claims-rights by exploiting their intimate
relationship to obligations. Many philosophers have taken
this path (although it is not always clear whether it is
the claim-right concept specifically, or some broader
concept of rights, which they are attempting to anaLyze).
I will investigate several failed attempts to do so, and I
will suggest that their failure has much to do with their
combining two distinct projects, the analysis of rights in
terms of owed obigations, and the analysis of owed
obligations in terms of obligations, into one. I will
suggest how the first might be accomplished.
The first analyses we will investigate attempt to
define rights in terms of (non-owed) obligations and other
(generally non-moral) concepts. Peter Markie [2] has
investigated a number of such proposals. He found none to
158
159
be adequate. More recently, In a published series of
proposals and objections between Postow [ 3 1 and Markie,
this approach has been developed even further. Since we
wish to get as clear a grasp as possible on the claim-right
concept, we will now investigate some of these proposals,
l.l Lyons' Beneficiary Theory.
Markie ascribes to Lyons:
05: S has a moral right against R to its being
the case that p =df. (l) it is prima facie obligatory
that R refrain from acts that wouLd prevent the
occurrence of p, and (2) S is an intended beneficiary
of R's prima facie obligation
.[ 4
]
He then characterizes Lyons' concept of intended
beneficiary. He quotes Lyons:
A complete specification of [Spade's] obligation
includes essential reference to the mother, who is
supposed to benefit by its performance. Her loss in
case the promise is broken would not be a remote
accidental consequence of [Spade's] behavior; it
would be the predictable and relevant consequence of
a dereliction. The fact that she was not cared for
wouLd be the chief ground for saying [Spade] had
failed to discharge his obligation. Her receipt of
the services wouLd be the chief reason for saying he
had discharged his obligation .[ 5
]
and summarizes this:
S is an intended beneficiary of R's prima facie
obligation if
(1) a compLete specification of R's prima facie
obligation incLudes reference to S;
(2) S wouLd obtain some benefit from R's keeping
his prima facie obligation;
(3) if R faiLs to keep his prima facie
obligation, S faiLs to receive that benefit;
(4) S's faiLure to receive that benefit is
grounds for saying R has faiLed to keep his prima
facie obligation;
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(5) S's receipt of that benefit is grounds for
saying R has kept his prima facie obligation
.[ 6
]
He then proposes a counterexample to this approach.
Suppose that Marlow owns a car. Gunn wouLd be
happy if Marlow wouLd refrain from acts that would
prevent Gunn from possessing the car, and Gunn
desires that Marlow refrain from such acts. These
assumptions do not imply that Gunn has a moral right
against Marlow to possess Marlow's car. Yet, D5
awards Gunn such a right. [7]
Rut this does not refute Lyons' approach. His account
of Lyons' concept of intended beneficiary is inadequate. It
is too weak in at least two ways. Lyons states, "A complete
specification of [Spade's] obligation includes essential
reference to the mother, who is supposed to benefit by its
performance. "[8 ] Markie's (1) and (2) do not capture this.
That (l) a complete specification of R's prima facie
obligation involves S does not imply that it does so
essentially. The fact that (2) S would benefit from the
keeping of an obligation does not imply (nor is it implied
by) the fact that S is supposed to so benefit.
The concepts Lyons invokes here are obscure, and Lyons
certainly does not do enough to clarify them for us, but
Markie, it seems to me, ignores the core of Lyons' insight.
What does essential involvement mean here? Surely not that
the object of the obligation invoLves a specific individual
(which seems to be Markie's interpretation). It must be
some more intimate way in which an individual may be
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associated with an obligation. For exampLe, the sort of
reLation found with owed obligations: an obligation to hill
to help BilL involves Bi L l in a more intimate way
(essentially?) than the mere obligation to help Bill
(grounded, say, in a general obligation to heLp those in
need ) .
The concept of intent, reflected by the "supposed" in
the above quotation, is also important here, but Markie
makes quick shrift of it: he waters it down to actua l
beneficiary. Lyons clearly has more than this in mind. He
say s ,
This is not to say that the conferring of
certain benefits or the avoidance of specific losses
or injuries is guaranteed to him. For, aside from the
fact that obligations can be breached, the specific
performance of the relevant obligations might
actually fail, for various reasons, to serve his
interests. [9]
This account is perhaps clearest where obligations
arise contractually, out of intentional action. Suppose
that y gets x to promise to care for y's incompetent
relation, z, and extracts this promise in order to secure
for z that benefit. x is, then, under a prima facie
obligation to care for z. The promise was extracted iji
order to benefit z. (y i n tended to benefit z by getting x
to so promise. y supposed that promise would benefit z.)
Here, z is clearly supposed to benefit from the fulfillment
of this obligation. In this situation, z has a right
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against y to y's care. On the other hand, if BilL thinks
that Jim is a good watch repairman, and gets me to promise
to deliver his watch to Jim to repair, Jim does not thereby
get a right against me to my delivering the watch to him.
Jim was not intended to benefit from the promise; Bill just
wanted his watch competently repaired.
Lyons' intends the concept to extend beyond
contractual rights. He suggests that we look to the grounds
of an obligation to determine its intent. The intent, he
suggests, is closely linked to the reasons for the
existence of the obligation. He says,
But I am suggesting that, on the basis of our
understanding of the relation or transaction or rule
that grounds the obligation, we can say in some cases
that someone's interests are to be served. And,
according to the qualified beneficiary theory, such
persons and only such persons have rights. [ 1 0 J
(I think Lyons would say that if our understanding of the
grounds of an obligation involves an individual in this
way, the individual will be essentially involved in the
nature of the right, as well as its beneficiary.)
Interpreted in this way, whether or not the intended
beneficiary actually would benefit from the keeping of an
obligation has little bearing on whether that person is an
intended beneficiary of the obligation. Lyons' account
seems, in this respect, to involve substantially the same
insight Dworkin attempts to exploit with the concept of an
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individuated aim (Lyons adds to this the idea that the aim
be intended to be a benefit to the involved individual).
Markie's counterexample misses the mark. On Markie's
account, Gunn is an intended beneficiary of Marlow's prima
facie obligation. Rut I see no reason to think that the
Lyons' approach would count Gunn as an intended beneficiary
of that obligation. It would be a mistake to think that our
understanding of the general obligation on which it rests,
the obligation of beneficence, suggests that the interests
of Gunn in particular, or indeed those of any specific
individual, are to be served. As it is normally understood,
the obligation rests on the importance of, in general,
doing good. This is reflected in the fact that Marlow's
obligation is not an obligation _to Gunn; it does not
involve Gunn essentially.
It is far from clear that this concept of intended
beneficiary can be made clear for rights which are not
created by intentional actions. But it is this difficulty,
not that proposed by Markie, which tells forcefully against
Lyons' analysis.
Does Lyons' account work for the limited class of
rights to which it seems best suited, those which are
created with specific intent by the actions of persons?
There are difficulties even here.
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Beint* an intended beneficiary is not a necessary
condition for having a right. Individuals are often granted
rights by others who have no interest in benefitting them,
whose intent is, rather, to grant them certain ranges of
action which wi L L allow them to accomplish important tasks.
Within institutions this is commonplace. Various agencies
within an institution are often granted rights within that
institution not in order to benefit the individual or
agency to whom the right is granted, but in order to attain
some other chosen end. For example, police, justices,
congressmen, and presidents are not (generally) granted the
special rights they have in order that they themselves
benefit; they are granted those rights in order that the
government govern effectively.
Even with simple promises, we can imagine situations
where a third person promise creates a right in a person
who is not intended to benefit from it. Suppose x hates y,
and seeks to harm y by destroying y's moral integrity. x
knows that y can be corrupted by giving him access to large
ammounts of ready cash. x suppLies z with unlimited funds,
and gets z to promise him to supply y with whatever cash y
requests (z agrees, on the condition that x give up his
right to cancel the agreement). x then informs y what he
has done, and that y now has the right that z supply him
with as much cash as he requests. z has a right to such
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cash. But y is not an intended beneficiary; on the
contrary, he is intended to be harmed by the creation the
right (z's obligation)
.[ 11
]
Is being the intended beneficiary of another's
obligation a sufficient condition for having a right? Not
by itself. Suppose legislators give coLlege graduates the
right to two votes in every election because they believe
that such a policy will benefit all citizens. I do not see
that citizens without higher education have, thereby, been
granted any right. However, if we combine this with the
requirement that the obligation essentially involve the
individual (which is not the case in the above example), a
sufficient condition for the existence of a right may
result. However, the vagueness of the concept of essential
involvement makes it difficult to fully evaluate this
proposal, and I will proceed to other approaches.
The above, however, indicates that rights do not
necessarily exist for the benefit of those who have them,
thus the Lyons approach will not work. In addition, the
same difficulties will arise for attempts to analyze owed
obligations in a parallel manner. That is:
x's obligation to y to do z =df x has an
obligation to do z, and y is the intended beneficiary
of this obligation.
will not do
.
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1.2 Tooley's Account
A different approach is taken by Tooley.[l2] He
analyzes rights as prima facia obligations which are
conditional on desires. Markie rejects some interpretations
of Tooley
,
and then proposes one which I think comes very
close to Tooley's intent:
D7: S has a moral right against R at t that p
obtain at t* =df. (l) S at t is the type of object
capable of desiring that p obtain at t*; (2) S's
circumstances at t are such that his desiring that p
obtain at t* would make it prima facie obligatory
that R refrain from acts that would prevent the
occurrence of p at t*.[l3]
Markie refutes this proposal with an appropriate
counterexample
:
Suppose, once again, that Marlow has a new car.
Suppose also that if Gunn were to desire that he
possess Marlow's car, his doing so would put him in a
position to obtain happiness from Marlow's refraining
from acts that would prevent him from possessing the
car and, thereby, make it prima facie obligatory that
Marlow refrain from such acts. [14]
Gunn has no right to possess Marlow's car, but Tooley's
analysis grants him this right.
Again, what is lacking here is the essential link
between Marlow and Gunn which exists where there are
rights. Marlow does not have an obligation _to Gunn to let
him have the car.
1.3 Brandt's Account
Markie formulates a good account of Brandt's [15]
proposal
:
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D8 : S has a moral right against R to its being
the case that p =df. it is prima facie moraLLy
obligatory that if S wishes R to secure S in its
being the case that p, then R does so. [16]
This proposal differs from Tooley's primarily in its
employment of obligations the content of which are
conditionals (In Tooley's analysis, the obligations were
themselves conditional on desires). For our purposes,
nothing rests on the distinction between wishes and
desires
.
As he did with the Tooley anaLysis, Markie attacks the
weakness of the link between R and S required by D8 . His
counterexample:
Suppose, once again, that Gunn takes a liking to
Marlow's new car. This time Diamond takes a very
strong interest in Gunn's welfare, and diamond
desires that if Gunn wants MarLow to refrain from
acts that would prevent Gunn from using Marlow's car,
then Marlow will do so. The satisfaction of this
desire - Marlow's refraining from acts that would
prevent Gunn from using the car, if Gunn wants Marlow
to do so - will make Diamond very happy. [17]
D8 incorrectly awards Gunn a right against Marlow to use
Marlow's car. Again this right rests on the prima facie
obligation of benef icience
,
one which does not involve an
essential moral link between the person under the
obligation, and the person to benefit from it. Here again,
it would be incorrect to say that Marlow has an obligation
to Gunn to let him use the car.
Markie's counterexamples to Tooley's and Brandt s
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proposals, however, skirt an interesting issue: Is the
intuition that rights are linked essentially to the
satisfaction of desires correct? I think the answer i s no
.
Ulysses protected himself and his ship against the
sirens, whose song mortals could not resist, by plugging
the ears of his men, having himself tied to the mast of his
ship, and ordering his men not to release him untill the
sirens were far astern. Ulysses's right that his men not
release him holds independently of his desires. In fact,
the whole point of creating the right was to protect him
against his desires. Such rights are common. When we ask a
friend to make sure we don't drive home from a party drunk,
and the friend agrees to stop us, such a right is created.
Often the aid we ask of others is restrictive; we seek it
in order to protect ourselves against our own desires.
Nor will it do to argue that rights are related only
to rational desires, or good desires, and to point out that
the desires involved in the above examples are not of this
sort. Even if the sirens song had the effect of granting to
Ulysses greater understanding of the world and his place in
it, and of making his desires more rational and appropriate
then his normal ones, he would still have the right that
his men ignore those desires, and not release him. A
gangster who knows he is easily swayed by sermons might
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extract from his men the promise to get him out of church
quickly if he looks like he is starting to desire to stay
and go straight. He would have a right that they do so
(though it might be overridden in such a situation).
Of course some rights are closely linked to desires or
wishes. One obvious example would be the right arising out
of a promise to y to do z if y desires or wishes it done.
But this is no surprise, and does not evidence any general
essential link between rights and wishes or desires.
1.4 General Difficulties with Such Approaches.
In general, attempts to capture the essential link
between the prima facie obligation and the two individuals
involved in a right as some sort of conditional involving
the desires, wishes, claims, demands, waivability, and so
on are somewhat unlikely to succeed. A general strategy can
be developed which seems likely to produce counterexamples
for any such proposals.
This strategy devolves from our ability to create
highly conditional, and strange, rights by making complex
promises or contracts. Such promises can create rights and
obligations which cease to exist under just the conditions
the analysis proposes. Suppose, for example, an analysis
proposes that a right to x exists when another nas an
obligation to supply the right-holder x when (if) the
right-holder asks for (or desires, or demands, or claims)
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x. Then we can imagine a promise to the right holder to
supply him with x unless he asks for (or desires, or
demands, or claims) x. If waivability is at issue, we can
imagine contracts which include the provision that no
rights under the contract can be waived.
There may, of course, be limits to this strategy, and
we cannot automatically rule out, on its basis, every
proposal of this sort. However, the technique gives us some
reason to think that counterexamples will be forthcomming
for any such proposal, and should make us skeptical about
such analyses.
1.5 Postow's Account
Postow has attempted to analyze the concept of a right
in terms of prima facie obligation and wa ivabi 1 i ty . [ 1 8
]
Markie criticized this attempt, [19] and Postow modified her
approach to accommodate his objections .[ 20 ] Her final
proposal is complex, and employs a concept of prima facie
obligation _to. She suggests:
A*'* has a prima facie obligation to A to do X
=df. (1) there is some relation R such that if A
stands in R to A* and X, then A* has a prima facie
obligation to do X; and (2) A does stand in R to A*
and X
.
[ 21 ]
(Postow intends the "if..., then..." to be the ordinary
sense", not the truth functional sense. [22]) We should
note, before proceeding, that this is not the ordinary
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concept of an owed obligation. According to this analysis,
A* has a prima facie obligation to A to do X if A* stands
in the relation to A of being a person whose doing X would
be an act of beneficience to A. For if A* stands in this
relation to A, A* will have a prima facie obligation to do
X. But, in the ordinary sense of the expression, this would
not create in A* a prima facie to A to do X.
Postow then proposes:
A has a prima facie right [against A ] [ 2 3 ] that A* do X
iff
(a) A* has a prima facie obligation to A to do X.
& (b) Either (i) or (ii) below is satisfied.
(i) One or both of the following subconditions
(l) and (2) is satisfied.
(1) A can, by freely making a conventional
sign, either sever R or bring it
aboutthat it is no longer the case that
if A stands in R to A* and X then A* has
a prima facie duty to do X.
(2) A* ' s doing X would be non-harmful to A,
and if A were of age, of sound and
competent intellect, and fully informed,
then subcondition (1) above would be
satisfied
.
(ii) A* would not be under this prima facie
obligation if A*'s doing X would be harmful to
A, and there exists no other agent B such that
if A*'s doing X would be harmful to B, then A*
would not be under this prima facie obigation to
A to do X.
& (c) There is a presumption that it would not be
wrong of A to demand that A* do X, and to take some
measures to secure such action even against the
will of A*
.
[ 2 4 , 2 5 ]
(a) and (c) are fairly clear. (b) may need some
explanation: (i) is supposed to capture those rights which
involve waivable obligations. (ii) handles those rights
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which involve obligations which cannot be waived. They
supposedly involve obligations which do not apply when
their fulfillment would harm the person having the right,
and which, in addition, apply whether or not their
fulfillment would harm others.
I find this proposal difficult to evaluate. For one
thing, it is based on what seems to me a misunderstanding
of obligations. The proposal talks about specific
obligations, and is intended to avoid the problems Markie
raised to Postow's earlier proposals: Postow's original
intent was to treat rights as abilities to waive prima
facie obligations. She concludes from Markie's criticism,
"that waiving a moral right does not always remove a prima
facie obligation because there may be several sources of
that prima facie obligation ."[ 26 ] She wishes to modify her
proposal to accommodate this by treating rights, rather, as
abilities to sever or neutralize the ground of other's
prima facie obligations:
I would be surprised if any difficulties which
may be discovered in this suggestion [her analysis]
were to discredit the insight that in waiving a prima
facie right, an agent severs or neutralzes a relation
which is one source of another agent's prima facie
obligation. By bringing it to our attention that the
ability to sever or neutralize such a relation may be
an essential part of having a waivable right, Markie
has contributed to our sophistication about the
concept of a right. [27]
But I have argued that individual obligations are
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individuated by their grounds (appendix C). If this is
correct, then the approach taken here is based on a
con f us ion
.
[ 28 ] But let us try to look beyond this
difficulty to see if the general approach will work.
It fails. The same sort of counterexamples we just
discussed apply here. When Ulysses had himself tied to the
mast, and gave his sailors specific orders not to release
him, and to ignore him until! they were away from the
sirens, he, as captain, not only created certain rights for
himself (the right that he would not be released while in
hearing range of the sirens), but he also gave up his
powers to act as captain for a limited time: he made it
impossible that he waive those rights. Clause (i) in (b) is
therefore unsatisfied. Since his crew would be under a
prima facie obligation not to release him even if not doing
so would be, on balance, harmful to him (suppose the sirens
really gave all their guests a good party and then sent
them on their way, but being tied to the mast was painful),
clause (ii) in (b) will not be satisfied. Thus the analysis
does not provide Ulysses with his right to be left tied.
The suggested strategy could generate other
counterexamples. Imagine a contract between A and B which
requires B to do z, an act which will harm A (A may even
know this). Suppose the contract also includes a clause
specifying that under no conditions can the obligations
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acquired under the contract be waived. Such a contract
would award A a right against B that B do z. But because
B's obligation to A to do z is not waivable, clause (i) of
(b) will not be satisfied, and because its fulfillment will
harm A, clause (ii) of (b) will not be satisfied. Thus, the
analysis will not provide A with his right.
Suppose, for example, a tontine is formed. Twenty
people contribute one hundred dollars each to the pot,
which is to be invested until only one tontine member is
left alive. One condition of the tontine is that it cannot
be broken. No member can voluntarily opt out. That is,
every member has a right to no other member's opting out, a
right which cannot be waived. Suppose that twenty years
later, the tontine's funds have grown. There are two
members left alive, A and B. A is rich. B is poor. So poor,
in fact that he is suffering greatly from his lack of funds
(he needs medical treatment he cannot afford, etc.). A
knows this, and wishes to opt out of the tontine, making B
the last living member, and thereby supplying him with the
money he so desperately needs. Nonetheless, B has a right
that A not opt out, a right, in fact, which the is unable
to waive, and which is doing him harm. Postow's analysis
does not grant him that right. In fact, even if he is so
proud that he does not want to waive the right and accept
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the charity of his friend, and actively tells A so,
Postow's approach does not grant him that right. [29]
2
- The above attempts try to analyze the concept of a
claim-right in terms of obligations simpliciter, not owed
obligations .
2.1 Owed obligations exhibit structural, logical,
foundational, and other similarities to rights to actions.
These similarities suggest a close link betseen the two.
The structural similarities are clear. Rights are 3-
place relations holding between a right-holder, an ower,
and an action. Similarly, owed obligations seem to be 3-
place relations between the person to whom it is owed, the
ower of the obligation, and an action. Much the same
concerns arise in both cases as to what sorts of things can
occupy these three roles. This makes proposals such as:
x has a right against y to z = y has an obligation to
x to z
very tempting. (There are difficulties with this proposal,
yet it seems to be correct for at least one class of rights
and obligations: rights and obligations in which z is an
action of y . )
Rights and obligations both exhibit a similar prima
facie/all-in ambiguity.
In appendix C, I argue that obligations are
individuated by their grounds. Rights seem to be, too. I
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believe that the arguments produced there concerning
obligations can be reproduced for rights. In fact, if the
arguments fail to work for obligations, I suspect they will
also fail for rights, and for the same reasons.
The conditions of release from rights and owed
obigations are very similar. Obligations to individuals are
waived by those individuals in much the same way that
rights are waived by right-holders, and where rights and
obligations are clearly linked, as in the promises above,
the waiving of the right releases the obligation as well.
It seems clear that the grounds of certain rights and
obligations are identical: A promises B to pay him $5.
Grounded in the promise is B's right against A to A's
paying B $5, and A's obligation to B to pay B $5. Further,
it is at least initially plausible that where there is a
ground for a right, that same ground will generate an owed
obligation
.
In fact, the intuitive link between rights and
obligations is so tight that our judgments concerning
whether or not rights and owed obligations exist often rise
and fall together. This occurs, for example, where promises
give rise to rights of, and obligations to, persons not
party to the promise. Some examples will help.
Suppose A promises B to deliver A's watch to C. Four
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ways this promise might arise are: (1) B extracts this
promise from A because the watch needs repair, and he knows
of no other repairman in the area. (2) The promise was
extracted because B knows that C needs the watch, and wants
to provide C free access to it (and A knows this). (3)
The promise was extracted because B's watch needs repair,
and B thinks C is a good repairman, likes him and wants to
give local businessmen like him his business. (4) The
promise was extracted because B's watch needs repair, and B
thinks C is as good repairman, likes C, and wants to do
something for him by giving him his business.
In all of the above cases, it is clear that B has a
right against A that A deliver the watch to C, and that,
correspondingly, A has an obligation to B to do so.
However, whether or not C has, as a result of such
promises, a right to (possess) the watch varies from case
to case, and depends on aspects of the promise which are
hard to define.
In the first case, it would seem that, if B extracted
the promise from A merely in order that the watch get
repaired by a competent repairman (and A knows this), then
the promise does not grant C a right to the watch. Nor does
A have an obligation to C to give him the watch. In the
second case, C seems to have a right to the watch. If, for
example, A shows the watch to C, but refuses to give it to
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him when he needs it, C would be perfectly correct in
making a scene, and demanding it by right.
In the last two cases, things are less clear. I do not
know how confident one can be in judging this aspect of
situations (3) and (4). My intuitions are that in example
(3), C has no right to the watch, and that in (4) he does.
Also, my intuitions are that in example (4) A has an
obligation to C to give him the watch, but not in (3). Not
only do judgments about owed obligation parallel, in this
way, judgments about rights, but in these cases they seem
to rest on the same considerations, and even to temper one
another. If, for example, I were to modify my judgment
about the right in (3), I would also modify my judgment
about the obligation, and vice versa. Also, my degree of
confidence in the two sorts of judgment coincide. Where I
am confident in the the obligation judgment, I am equally
confident in the rights judgment. Where I have doubts about
the rights judgment, I have equally powerful doubts about
the obligation judgment.
A logical parallel between owed obigations and rights
is suggested by two plausible principles:
If A has an obligation to B do z and e is an
action which A can perform which is necessary in
order that A do z, then A has an obligation to B to
do e
.
If B has a right against A that A do z, and e is
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an action which a can perform which is necessary in
order that A do z, then B has a right against A that
A do e
.
(The rights principle is formulated for active rights. In
chapter 8 I will suggest that aLL simple rights can be
treated as active rights.)
I propose that these two principles are equally
plausible, and that any difficulties which may be found for
one wiLl also raise difficulties for the other.
3. Given the structural and logical parallels between
rights and owed obligations, the most obvious candidates
for correlatives are owed obligations. Given this, and the
fact that it is not obvious the concept of an owed
obligation can be analyzed in terms of the concept of an
obligation ( s impl ici ter ) and other (perhaps non-moral)
concepts, it would be advantageous to attempt the more
limited project of analyzing rights in terms of owed
obligations, and then, if we choose, to attempt the further
reduction to obligations simpliciter. Even if the latter
project is impossible, the former may not be.
In fact, I believe that the difficulty of the latter
project is greater than that of the former, and that by
combining these two projects, the problems of analyzing the
concept of rights have been distorted, misplaced, and
exaggerated. Many of the elements of and objections to such
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proposals reflect more the problems of analyzing owed
obligations in terms of obligations than the problems of
analyzing rights in terms of obligations.
Specifically. Perhaps the toughest problem for the
attempt to define rights in terms of obligations
simpLiciter is the identification of the characteristic of
obligations which determines just who the bearer of the
correlative right (the right-holder) is. The variety of
theories we have just encountered seem to be dictated by
different solutions to this difficulty. is the identity of
the right-holder determined by who can cancel or excuse the
(correlative) obligation? Or is it a function of who is (or
is intended, or supposed) to benefit from the existence (or
fulfillment) of the obligation? Is it a function of whose
wish, or desire or claim the obligation is conditional
upon? Or are other characteristics of the obligation
invo Ived?
This, however, is not best identified as a problem for
understanding rights in terms of obligations. lhe same
problem arises if we try to define owed obligations in
terms of obligations simpLiciter. Here the difficulty is in
identifying the characteristic of obligations which
determines to whom the obligation is owed. lhe proposed
solutions are equaLLy plausibLe (or implausible) as
solutions to either this problem, or the one about rights.
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No similar problem arises for the direct analysis of
rights as owed obligations. For the right-holder is easily
identified as the individual to whom the correlative
obligation is owed. I propose to concentrate on the first
project
.
4. This proposal has been dealt with somewhat
offhandedly by some. In an early draft of his published
paper, Markie does consider an analysis of rights as owed
obligations, but he rejects it, and indeed, any analysis
involving owed obligations, on the grounds that our concept
of owed obligations is as vague as our concept of claim-
rights
. [ 30 ]
I find this a poor reason to reject this approach.
Even were it true that the two concepts are of equal
vagueness, it would not follow that the one cannot be used
to analyze the other. In fact, if the analysans and
analysandum of an analysis differ in degree of vaguenss,
there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the analysis.
What is at issue here? Two distinctions will help make
this clear. First, we can distinguish between the accuracy
of a proposed analysis, and its usefulness. Second, we can
distinguish between vagueness in a concept, and a person's
having a vague understanding of a concept.
There are at least threeConcerning the first.
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distinct types of analysis; we may distinguish them roughly
by their goaLs: (l) conceptual analysis aimed at
identifying the concepts out of which the concept under
anaLysis is composed, and exhibiting how it is composed out
of them, (2) analyses aimed at supplying necessary and
sufficient conditions for the application of the concept
under analysis, (3) analyses intended to supply another way
of referring to the relation signified by the concept under
analysis. Let us call analyses which fulfill their intended
aim "accurate". Then accurate analyses are adequate
analyses. An adequate analysis may not be useful in helping
to clarify the concept, or in helping someone not
previously in command of the concept to grasp it clearly.
An adequate analysis may be stated in terms which few can
understand, or the complexity of the concept might be so
great that the concept, as well as the analysis, are beyond
our power to grasp. Or, if the concept is simple, the
analysis would merely point to the concept itself. If we
did not already grasp the concept, this might well be of
little help.
Concerning the second. It may be that some concepts
are themselves vague, that they have fuzzy boundaries. In
fact, a case could be made that most of the concepts we use
are of this sort. For example, the concept rain: Is drizzle
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rain? Where does rain blend into mist? Whether or not any
concepts really do have fuzzy boundaries, there is a
difference between asserting that a concept is vague and
asserting that someone has a vague understanding of a
concept. A person may not quite grasp (vaguely grasp) a
perfectly clear concept.
Suppose the concept claim-right is vague. It will not
do to object to the accuracy of a proposed analysis on the
grounds that it involves a vague concept. For, if the
concept to be analyzed is vague, then an equal vagueness
must be found in its analysis. In fact, if the analysis of
a vague concept were not vague, then it would not be an
accurate analysis. Thus, if Markie is objecting that the
concept of an owed obligation is as vague as the concept of
claim-right, a strength of the proposed analysis will have
been cited, not a weakness.
Perhaps Markie is challenging the usefulness of such
an analysis. But surely success at any of the three
analytical tasks mentioned above would be useful. For
example, carefully laying out the composition and limits of
clarity of a vague concept can aid our grasp of that
concept
.
More likely, Markie is concerned not with the vaguenes
of the concept, but with the vagueness of our grasp of it,
and is suggesting that since our grasp of owed obligations
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is as weak as our grasp of claim-rights, the anaLysis is
inadequate. We have already seen that the accuracy or truth
of an analysis may be independent of our ability to grasp
that concept. Thus this objection will not hold.
4.1 What must be happening is that Markie, like many
others, believes that accuracy is not enough for adequacy
of an analysis, that an adequate analysis must also be
helpful. The argument, then, would be that analyzing a
concept in terms of a vaguely grasped concept such as the
concept of an owed obligation cannot be adequate because it
cannot be helpful. In response to this, several points can
be made.
First, this is not an objection to the accuracy of the
proposed analysis. The discovery of an accurate analysis
of, say, rights, would surely be of significant
philosophical import even if not particularly useful for
helping those unfamiliar with the concept to grasp it
clearly
.
Second, the statement of such an analysis could be
useful in identifying new ways of referring to or
identifying the same concept. For example, suppose someone
has normal, vague grasp of the concept of an owed
obligation, but has no idea what a right is. A (l)-type
terms of owed obligations, ifanalysis of rights in
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accurate, could enable that person to get an (admittedly
vague) grasp on the concept of rights, and to understand at
least a little of what people are talking about when they
speak of rights (as much as he previously understood of
owed obligations, and as much as others understand the
concept of rights)
Third, an analysis involving vaguely understood
concepts may be useful in another way. Suppose an analysis
of rights in terms of owed obligations is accurate, but
that we have only a vague grasp of each concept. Could not
the extra information contained in the knowledge that the
concepts are the same allow us to clarify our grasp of the
concept? It seems to me very likely that this is the case.
For example: Suppose that I have a vague grasp of these
concepts, and that the vagueness is at certain points of
which I am aware, say I'm not sure whether rights are prima
facie, or all-in, but I know that owed obligations are
prima facie. Also suppose that I am unclear as to whether
the person to whom an obligation is owed can excuse that
obligation, but I know that the bearer of a right against
another can always cancel the right. Now, if I know that x
has a right against y to z iff y has an obligation to x to
z, then I can use my grasp of owed obligations to eliminate
the area of vagueness in my grasp of rights, and vice
versa. The analysis plus my grasp of owed obligations will
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tell me that rights are prima facie. The analysis plus my
(previously) vague grasp of rights will allow me to
conclude that owed obligations can always be excused by the
person to which they are owed. Under such conditions an
analysis out of vaguely grasped concepts could allow
clarification of both the concept being analyzed, and the
analyzing concept.
Understanding the relationship between claim-rights
and owed obligations is the key to understanding claim-
rights, and thus to understanding rights in general. An
accurate analysis of claim-rights in terms of owed
obligations could be helpful, and would be philosophically
impor tan t
.
5. Claim-rights as Owed obligations
5 . 1 The simple :
x has a (moral/legal) claim-right against y to z
=
^
y has a (moral/legal) obligation to x to z
will not do. It may be adequate for positive claim-rights.
It may be, for example, that John has a right against Bill
that Bill cut his lawn today just in case Bill has an
obligation to John to cut his lawn today. However, it does
not handle active claim-rights. For instance, John s right
(against Bill) to speak before the assembled masses today
does not seem equivalent to Bill's obligation to John to
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John's giving his speech to the assembled masses today.
Wha t obligation is t hat ? Owed obligations seem to be
obligations to act or forbear from acting in certain ways,
but "John's giving his speech to the assembled masses"
signifies neither a possible action nor a possible
forbearance on the part of Bill.
5.2 The proposal Markie rejected was:[31]
S has a moral right against R to X =
,
r
R has a
moral obligation to S to secure S in X.
He combines this with an analysis of "secures": "When X is
a physical object, securing S in X amounts to refraining
from acts that would deprive S of X. When X is a state of
affairs, securing S in X amounts to refraining from acts
that would prevent the occurrence of X."[32] In the
published version of his paper, Markie drops his concern
for rights to things, and defines:
D2: R secures S in its being the case that p =,^
R refrains from acts that would prevent the
occurrence of p . [33]
The proposal comes down to:
x has a (moral) right against y to z = df y has a
(moral) obligation to x to refrain from acts that
would prevent z (from occurring).
This does better with such rights as John's right
against Bill too speak before the assembled masses,
suggesting that it is equivalent to Bill's obligation to
John to refrain from acts that would prevent John from so
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doing. But it is questionable whether it can account for
positive claim-rights. Is John's right against Bill that
Bill cut John's lawn equivalent to Bill's obligation to
John to refrain from acts that would prevent Bill's mowing
John's lawn? Perhaps, if Bill's refraining from mowing
John's lawn is an action which would prevent Bill's mowing
John's lawn. This is not terribly implausible, for if it
takes place, Bill's mowing John's lawn does not (in fact,
it does not because Bill refrained).
But even if this is correct, problems remain. If the
correlativi ty of obligations with rights is correct, then
to fail to fulfill the obligation is to violate, or at
least infringe, the correlated right. And to violate the
right would be to fail to fulfill the obligation. But Bill
may violate John's right to give his speech without
preventing him from doing so. If Bill makes it very
difficult for John to do so, say by heckling him with a
loudspeaker, or if Bill grapples with John to prevent him
from reaching the podium, John's right will have been
violated, even if he succeeds in giving his speech.
John's right protects him, not just from being
prevented from speaking, but from certain sorts of
interference with his speechifying as well. As it stands,
the Markie proposal does not imply this.
5.3 For now, we will try:
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x has a claim-right against y to z = . c y has an
obligation to x not to interfere with z. r
For active claim-rights such as John's right against Bill
that John speak at the rally, this suggests that the
correlative obligation is Bill's obligation to John not to
interfere with John's speaking at the rally. For positive
claim-rights, such as John's right against Bill that Bill
mow John's lawn, the suggested correlative is Bill's
obligation to John not to interfere with Bill's mowing
John's lawn. This obligation may sound odd, but if we read
"interf erring" broadly enough, it is plausible that one way
people have of interferring with an action of their own is
by failing to perform it. [34] Thus Bill's refraining from
cutting (or even forgetting to cut) John's lawn is one way
that Bill could interfere with Bill's cutting the lawn, and
something his obligation not to interfere would (at least
prima facie) forbid.
We will see later that there are difficulties with
this analysis; but for our purposes now, this will be
adequate
.
NOTES
1. Hohfeld speaks of duties as the correlatives. It is
plausible that duties are a subclass of obligations
190
(perhaps the important ones). If so, I see no need to
restrict the correlatives of rights to duties rather than
obligations
.
2. While Markie does not specify that he is interested
in the claims-right concept in particular, and seems
interested in more general attempts to define rights in
terms of obligation, his arguments and examples are
relevant to the more Limited project.
3* B.C. Postow's original paper, "Rights and
Obligation," Phil. Stud., 40 No.l (1977) (henceforth, R0)
was criticized by Peter Markie in, "The Rights-Obligation
Proposal," Phil. Stud., 40 (1981) p.293-301 (henceforth,
ROP). Postow replied to this by modifying her proposal in,
"Response to Markie: Rights and Relations," Phil. Stud., 40
(1981) p.303-305 (henseforth, RR).
4. Peter Markie, "Moral Rights and Moral Obligations," The
Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1980), No. 1.,
p.136 (henceforth, MRMO) . I will also refer to a draft
version of this paper, MRMO.d).
5. David Lyons, "Rights, Claimants and Beneficiaries," in
RIGHTS, ed . David Lyons (Wadsworth: Belmont, Calif. 1979),
p.72 (henseforth, RCB).
6. Markie, MRMO, p.137
7. Markie, MRMO, p.138
8 . Lyons
,
RCB
,
p . 7 2
9. Lyons, RCB, p.64
10. Lyons, RCB, p.64
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11. If sense could be made out of "intended beneficiary"
for rights not created by the intentional actions of
persons, the proposal would still have difficulties.
Suppose, for example, that parents have rights to the
obedience of their children. It is doubtful that such a
right could be treated as intended to benefit the parents.
Rather, it would be more plausible that such right would be
treated as a benefit to the children. At least, the latter
approach seems consistent with the attribution to parents
of such a right.
12. Michael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," in THE
PROBLEM OF ABORTION, ed
. ,
Joel Feinberg (Belmont, Calif.;
Wadsworth, 1973).
13. Markie, MRMO, p.139
14. Markie, MRMO, p.140
15. Richard Brandt, ETHICAL THEORY, (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.; Prentice Hall, 1959)
16. Markie, MRMO, p.140
17. Markie, MRMO, p.141
18. B.C. Postow, "Rights and Obligation," Phil. Stud., 32
(1977), N.l
19. Peter Markie, "The Rights-Obligation Proposal," Phil.
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Stud., 40 (1981), pp. 293-301
20. B.C. Postow, "Response to Markie: Rights and
Relations," Phil. Stud., 40 (1981) pp . 303-305
21. Postow, RR, p.303
22. Postow, RR
,
fn.l, p.305
23. The brackets are mine. A can have a prima facie
right that A* do X even if Postow' s condition (a) is not
satisfied. For example, if my head mechanic promises to put
his best mechanic, George, on may car, I have a right that
George work on my car. Suppose that my car is in such bad
shape the even George could not fix it. George has no prima
facie obligation to me to fix my car. (On either Postow's
analysis, or the ordinary conception.)
24. Postow, RR, p.303-4
25. There is a technical problem with this analysis
which I pass over here. In clause (b) there is reference to
R. However, it is not clear to what "R" refers. The
plausible candidate would seem to be to the (?) R which
grounds (a). But that makes no sense. In A, "R" is a
variable bound by an existential quantifier, the scope of
which does not extend to (b).
26. Postow, RR, p.303
27. Postow, RR, p.303
28. In fact, I think that Postow could have made use of
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this point to defuse a number of Markie' s counterexamples
to her original theory.
29. This is suggested by a similar tontine from an
episode of Barney Miller (a television program).
30. Markie, MRMO.d, pp.3-4. It is not obvious to me that
my (everyone's?) concept of obligation simpliciter is
significantly clearer than that of owed obligation.
31. Markie MRMO.d, p. 2
32. Markie MRMO.d, p. 2
33. Markie MRMO, p. 134
34. Other methods of interferring with one's own actions
are also possible. Ulysses interferred with his (potential)
action of giving in to the sirens by ordering others to
prevent him by tying him to the mast of his ship.
CHAPTER VI
THE CORRELATI V ITY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
1* it is often claimed that rights can be correlated
with duties or obligations. There have been many different
conceptions of this correlation, such as: that rights impLy
obligations, that obligations imply rights, that there is
mutuaL implication between a right and its correlated
obligation ,[ 1 ] and that rights just are obligations "viewed
from different perspectives." As we have seen, many
philospohers have attempted to define rights in terms of
obligations. If this is possible, then rights are reLated
to obligations in some important and specifiable way. In
any case, understanding of the relations between rights and
obligations seems essential to the understanding of rights.
1.1 Three sorts of corre lat ivi ty claims seem of special
interest. Two of these are:
(NC) For every right there is an obligation implied
by that right.
(C) For every right there is an obligation implied
by it which, in turn, implies the right.
If such principles hold, the implication reLation will
determine pairs of "correlative ' rights and obligations.
1.2 It is difficult to characterize precisely the
concept of implication employed in these principles, though
some guidance can be given. The concept seems to be neither
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material implication nor logical implication. Material
implication would correlate, on such principles, all
existing obligations to every existing right. Logical
implication would correlate any necessary rights to every
necessary obligation (if there are necessary rights and
obligations). It would also correlate (NC) any rignt with
every necessary obligation, eg., the right to read
pornography would correlate with the necessary obligation
to improve oneself.
The proposed link seems to involve at least two
elements: a conceptual, and a moral. Both are somewhat
vague, but tentatively:
The conceptual element. The implication relation
involved would seem to be necessary and cognizable. Perhaps
this means that the implication relation is sufficiently
conceptual to be transparent (and, perhaps, a priori),
i.e., such that by knowing the right (and perhaps the facts
of the situation in which it arises), one who understands
rights and obligations could know (deduce) the correlative
obligation. While some may have something weaker in mind,
this makes for expecially interesting correlativi ty
principles
.
The moral element. Again, it is difficult to pin down
the precise nature of this link, and on different normative
theories, the proposed link may differ. Many of the
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intuitions underlying the cor re Lativei ty thesis suggest
such a Link: the idea that to have a right is to be in a
moraL relationship in which others are bound to one by
obligations, the suspicion that the non-moral relations in
the world which give rise to, or ground, rights also ground
obligations ,[ 2 ] and the popular idea that rights just are
duties or obligations, that they are just "two sides of the
same coin." I trust that the reader will have clear enough
intuitions as to what is required here to continue.
This intuition that rights and obligations are just
two sides of the same coin suggests a claim likely to be
attractive to corre lationis ts : that rights and their
correlative obligations are linked such that, where the
right is A's and holds against B, the correlative
obligation is B's, and is owed to A. The results of the
last chapter also suggest we should look to owed
obligations for correlatives. I will argue that the concept
of violation can be used to show that rights correlate to
owed obligations in much the way the analysis of the last
chapter would suggest.
1.3 While (NC) and (C) have, traditionally, been fairly
well received, a third principle has been generally (though
not universally) discounted:
Every obligation implies a right.
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Most philosophers would now agree that not all obligations
imply rights. Counterexamples commonly taken as conclusive
derive from duties of beneficence: we often have an
obligation to help (some of) those in need when no one has
a right to our doing so.
Still, it may be possible to isolate a natural class
of obligations, 0, such that:
(SC) Every obligation of class 0 implies a right.
Much of the discussion in this chapter will center on (NC),
(SC) and ( C )
.
[ 3 , 4
]
1.4 Often the nature of the correlativity relation is
characterized by example rather than by precise analysis.
Positive rights serve as the paradigm. Most philosophers
find at least some sort of correlativity for these rights
unexceptionable. Other rights do not, however, fit this
pattern well, and have led philosophers to hold that
correlativity is not a general feature of rights.
The paradigm: A promises B to buy roses from B. This
promise gives rise to an obligation on A's part to buy
roses from B, and a right on B's part that A buy roses from
him. The right is said to be correlative to the obligation.
They have as their source the same even t
,
the promise
.
The
existence o f such a right on the part of B implies the
existence 0 f such an obligation on the part of A
.
The
exis tence 0 f this obligation on the part o f A implies the
198
right on the part of B. With such rights, the content of
the right is simply related to the content of the
obligation, "as the passive is related to the active
voice. "[5] Or so it is claimed. Such rights seem to exhibit
all three correlations under discussion.
This paradigm is often misunderstood. In fact, as
described above the paradigm is not an example of either
(C) or (SC). The fact that A has an obligation to buy roses
from B does not imply that B has a right to A’s doing so.
Such an obligation could arise in any number of ways.
Suppose that no promise was made. Further suppose that A is
wealthy and that by far the best way A could help the needy
would be by buying roses from B. Or suppose B's son was A's
best friend, that B needed money to put his son through
school, and that the only way A could assure his friends
education was to give B his business. Or suppose A promised
a third party, C, to buy A’s roses (and deliver them to
C).[6] In all three cases, it is plausible that A has an
obligation to buy roses from B, but that B has no right to
A's doing so. Thus, the paradigm does not exemplify either
(C)
,
or (SC)
.
The problem here results not from the example, but
from the analysis of it. A more fine-grained analysis of
the paradigm would reveal that we have not completely
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specified the right arising from the promise: B has a right
against A that A buy roses from R. This right does not
correlate with the general obligation that A buy B's roses,
but with A's obligation t_o B to buy roses from B. This
obligation may well imply a right on B's part that A buy
roses from B. Notice: where obligations do not imply
rights, eg., the obligations of beneficence, the
obligations are not "owed" obligations, they are not
obligations _to anyone. In the cases just sketched: In the
first case the obligation to buy roses from A is owed to no
one in particular, thus no right is implied. In the second
case, it is not owed to B; there is no obligation to B to
buy roses from B. It may, however, be owed (on the grounds
of the nature of friendship) to B's son. If so, then it is
probably correct to say that B's son has a right (against
his friend A) that A buy roses from B. In the third case,
it is fairly clear that A has an obligation to C to buy
roses from B, and that C has a right against A that A buy
roses from B. Yet, since A has no obligation t
o
B to buv
his roses, B has no right that he do so.
Thus, the correlation the paradigm offers us is
between a right against an individual to an action of that
individual, and an obligation owed by that individual to
the possessor of the right that that individual perform the
action. To fit all active rights into this pattern it could
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be proposed that alL such rights hold against
individuals ,[ 7 ] and that class 0 is the class of
obligations _to individuals (owed obligations). The pattern
of correlativi ty exemplified by the paradigm would be:
A's right against B to B's doing x
correlates ((NC), (SC), (C)) to
B's obligation to A that B do x.
1.5 While this model may hold for positive rights, it
does not seem to carry over well to other sorts of rights,
especially certain sorts of active rights. Perhaps the most
obvious problem is with the relation between the content of
the right and its proposed correlative. An example: On the
proposed pattern, John's right against Mary to (his)
speak(ing) at the convention tomorrow would correlate to
Mary's obligation to John to John's speaking at the
convention tomorrow. But John's speaking at the convention
tomorrow is not an action of Mary's, and "Mary's obligation
Perhaps, however, positive rights exhibit a
correlativity differing from the paradigm only in the
relation between the content of the right and the content
of its correlative obligation. An initially plausible
proposal concerning the nature of this relation is that for
positive rights, A's right to do z, the content of the
correlative is: non-interference with A's doing z. Ihis
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fits well with the intuition that we should not interfere
with someone doing what it is his right to do, and the
results of the last chapter.
1.6 The popular "Common View"[8] suggests a slightly
modified picture of correlativity for positive rights. On
this view positive rights are protected liberties: to have
a right to do z is to be at liberty to do z, and to have
others have obligations not to interfere. Let us call the
following the "Common View".
(CV) A has a right against B to do z =
A is at liberty to do z,
& B has an obligation to A not to interfere
with A ' s doing z
.
[ 9
]
This theory implies (NC), and suggests limited versions of
(SC) and (C):
(SC lim) B's having an obligation to A not to
interfere with A's doing z and A's being at liberty
to do so, implies that A has as right against 6 to do
z .
(C lim) Every right to perform an act implies an
obligation which, together with the permissibility of
the act, imply the right.
These are powerful relations which suggest a sufficiently
direct link between right and obligations to satisfy most
correlativity theorists.
2. Correlations
2.1 There is a sense of "rights", I maintain, on which
all rights can be correlated with obligations. There may be
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other senses as well, but they are used much less
frequently than has recently come to be supposed (see the
next chapter). Usually, when rights are asserted, there is
an implication of obligation. In fact, contrary to recent
investigations of corre lativi ty , the major difficulty
confronting correlationists is not finding correlative
obligations, but sorting out the different ways in which
the many candidates for correlatives actually correlate.
I will use the remainder of this chapter to uncover just
some of these correlations. These correlations will confirm
the results of the last chapter.
2.2 Violation Correlativity
It seems to me intuitively clear, perhaps axiomatic,
that rights are, at least theoretically ,[ 10 ] violable. I do
not know how to defend this in any general way, except to
point out the difficulty of finding counter-instances. If I
am correct about this, it has implications as to the
correlations between rights and obligations. I will proceed
upon this assumption.
Contrary to Lyons' position, every right holds against
at least one individua 1 : [ 1 1 ] that (or those) individua 1 ( s
)
who could theoretically violate it. Thus, that individual
has an obligation (to the right-holder) not to violate that
right. Therefore, the existence of a right implies the
existence of an obligation; the obligation (to the right-
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holder) not to violate that right.
The reasoning in the other direction is even more
obvious: if someone has an obligation not to violate A's
right r, then A has that right.
So, the existence of a right implies the existence of
an obligation not to violate that right, which obligation,
in turn, implies the existence of that right. A's right r
(A's right against B to z) correlates with B's obligation
to A not to violate r. Such correlatives satisfy (NC),
(SC), [12] and (C).
Violation correlativi ty is interesting and important,
yet it is perhaps not quite what philosophers have had in
mind when asserting that rights correlate with obligations.
They may seek correlations in which the content of the
obligation does not directly involve the right, or
correlations guaranteeing that if the content if the right
is not normative, neither will the content of the
obligation be normative. Violation correlativity may,
however, serve as a guide in the search for such
correlations .
2.3 A weak correlation
Since all rights are theoretically violable, for any
right there will be at least one (usually many) specific
action(s) z the performance of which would violate the
204
right. Since the person who could perform z^ would violate
the right by doing so, that person has an olbigation to the
right-holder not to perform z. This obligation might be
said to correlate to the right. This correlation is weaker
than (NC), however, for it is not transparent. The precise
nature of this action is not inferrable from the right, one
must also know the facts about the situation; one must know
just how the right can be violated. Still, the existence of
a right can be seen to imply the existence of at least one
obligation with respect to a specific action. Usually,
since most rights can be violated in many ways, many
obligatins will correlate with it in this way.
2.4 An (SC) Correlation
Obligations are owed to, or due to, others just in
case those to whom they are owed have a right to their
fulfillment. That right would be violated by failure to
fulfill the obigation. Thus, if B has an obligation to A to
do (or not do) z, then A has a right against B that B
fulfill that obligation. But failure to do (or not do) z
would comprise failure to fulfill the obligation. Thus A
has a right against B that B do (or not do) z. So, we have
an (SC) correlation which is transparent. B's obligation to
A to do (or not do) z implies A's right against B tnat B do
(or not do) z. The class of obligations 0 is the class of
obligations owed to individuals.
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2.5 Active Rights and (C)
For positive rights, (C) hoLds. Suppose that A has a
right against R that B do (or not do) z. B's failure to do
(or not do) z wouLd vioLate that right, thus B has an
obligation to A to do (or not do) z. A's right against B
that B do (or not do) z implies B's obligation to A to do
(or not do) z. The discussion in the previous paragraph
shows that the reverse implication holds as well.
For active rights no such argument can be made. A's
right against B to do z implies, as we have seen, that
there are specific obligations on the part of B (not to
perform actions which would violate that right). However,
we have no purely conceptual way (at least at this point)
to pick out those obligations, and there is no guarantee,
at this point, that any of those obligations would imply
A's right.
2.6 Correlations for Active Rights.
The concept of violation can help us discover
corre lativies for active rights. If we can discover sorts
of actions which, when there is an owed obligation to do
them, always violate a certain specifiable sort of right,
we will have discovered an (SC) correlation. Also, if we
can discover a systematic relation which would, given the
content of any active right, specify a sort of action which
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wouLd vioilate that right, we can state an (NC) correlation
for such rights. Even (C) correlations might be discovered.
2.7 Active Rights. An (NC) Correlation.
Suppose A has a right against B to z. Is there a (sort
of) action S systematically and conceptually linked to z
such that B has an obligation to A to do S? The concept of
violation helps here. Is there a (sort of) action B might
perform which, whenever A has said right, wouLd violate the
right? If so, B will have an obligation not to perform that
action. A proposal: the action interference with z. It
seems that, if A has a right against B to z, then B's
interfering with A's z-ing would violate that right. If so,
an (NC) correlation holds: A has a right against B to z
implies B has an obligation to A not to interfere with A's
z-ing
.
2.8 Active Rights, (SC) and (C)
(SC) seems to hold between these rights as well. [13]
That is, B has an obligation to A not to interfere with A's
z-ing implies A has a right against B to z. If so, then (C)
will hold between these rights as well. Reasoning for this
might go: (1) If B has an obligation to A not to interfere
with A's z-ing, then A has a right against B that B not
interfere with A's z-ing. (2) The latter right is
equivalent to A's right agianst B to do z. Thus, (3) B has
an obligation not to interfere with A's z-ing implies A has
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a right against B to do z.
Since both (SC) and (NC) hold for such pairs of rights
and obligations, (C) does as welL. This resuLt meshes with
the analysis of rights developed in the last chapter.
2.9 The Common View
If the above is correct, (SC lim) and (C lim) will
hold as well. Nonetheless, the Common View will be too
strong. The Common View implies that the above (C) and (SC)
correlations are incorrect, for besides an obligation not
to interfere, a right will involve a liberty to do. The
above suggests that the obligation itself is sufficient;
the liberty is not required.
Though this may seem counterintuitive, I think it is
correct. Not all active rights involve a liberty to act.
For example. Suppose Sue loans me her car, thus granting me
a right to drive it to the movies. Suppose, however, I have
promised Mary not to go to the movies. I am not at liberty
to drive the car to the movies, though I have a right to.
Even where promises are not involved, it is common in
the moral realm for one to have a right to do something
which one is not morally at liberty to do. A parent may
have a right to set his child on his own at age 18, but it
may also be that the parent should not, and would act
wrongly in so doing. The child may have special problems
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which deserve more support. One may have a right to quiet
the noisy party upstairs, and at the same time it be wrong
to do do so (if it is not very bothersome and they are
having great fun up there). At the same time, the child may
have an obligation to leave when you ask him to, and the
party may have an obligation to quiet down when you request
it. Such rights correlate to obligations, but do not
involve liberties.
3. Adjustments
3 . 1 Interference
I have been playing a bit fast and loose with the
concept of interference. Some concepts (or perhaps kinds)
of interference generate the proposed (NC) correlation, but
fail to generate plausible (SC) or (C) correlations. Others
produce the proposed (SC) correlation, but dissolve the
(NC) and (C) correlations. Such difficulties will create
problems for the analysis of the previous chapter as well.
It would be desirable to hone the notion (or specify the
kind) of interference so as to generate both the (NC) and
(SC) correlations necessary for a (C) correlation, and to
work in the analysis of the previous chapter.
Initially it might be thought that B interferes with
A's doing z just in case B makes difficult, or prevents,
A's doing z. But this cannot be the concept we are
interested in. Suppose A has a right to paddle his canoe
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across the lake. B's airplane breaks down and crashes into
A s canoe, sinking it. By flying and (accidentally)
crashing into A's canoe, B has prevented A from paddling
his canoe across the lake. This is interference in the
sense proposed. B has not, however, violated A’s right to
paddle his canoe across the lake.
3.2 Intent seems relevant:
(11) B interferes with A's z-ing just in case B
intentionally prevents or makes difficult A's z-ing.
But "intent" is too strong. Suppose B takes A's canoe
for a joy ride, preventing A from paddling his canoe,
knowing that that might be the result of his action, but
not much caring. His intent is not to prevent or make
difficult A's paddling. Yet he has violated A's right.
Nor will the following work:
(12) B interferes with A's z-ing just in case B
knowingly prevents or makes difficult A's z-ing.
In the above example, B might not have known that he would
prevent or make difficult A's z-ing, he might have had
reason to beleive that A was out of town and unlikely to
use the canoe. Nor (the normative):
( 13 ) B interferes with A's z-ing just in case B
prevents or makes difficult A's z-ing, and B ought to
have known that he would (or might) prevent or make
difficult by his actions A's z-ing.
For there is not reason to think that B ought to know much
about A's activities at all.
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3.3 Perhaps it would be useful at this point to employ
the concept of responsibility. A person is usually
responsible for the acts he does intentionally, but he may
also be responsible for those which he does knowingly, even
if not intentionally. Also, a person may be responsible for
events he does not know will occur as a result of his
behavior, but which he ought to have known might occur, and
could have avoided. Precise definition of this concept is
difficult, but we will assume sufficient clarity to employ
it here.
(14) B interferes with A's z-ing just in case B is
responsible for B's successfully preventing or making
difficult A's z-ing.
This account seems to produce the (SC), but not the (NC)
and (C) correlations. Suppose A has a right against B to
speak out at the Agora. B thinks A should not speak, and
tries to prevent him from doing so by persuading him not
to. He tells A of how A's dead father would disapprove, how
A will merely embarrass himself, endanger his friends, and
hurt his cause. B might even warn A that if A speaks, B
will have to withdraw his support from A's cause. Such
persuasive techniques do not violate A's right, even though
they may interfere in the sense defined by (14).
3.4 Perhaps it is the use of non-persuasive techniques to
influence us that rights protect us against. If so, then
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(15) is promising.
(15) B interferes with A's z-ing just in case B is
responsible for B's successfully preventing or making
more difficult by non-persuasive means, A's z-ing.
This proposal is not ad hoc. Roughly, where a person
has a right to act, others have an obligation not to
forcefully ( non-persuas ive ly ) influence him in the
direction of not performing it. Also, where A has such an
obligation to B, B has a right against A to so act.
The distinction between persuasive and forceful
methods of influencing people is clear enough for our
purposes. Generally, non- threatening talk is persuasive, at
least when used to sway a person through reason or emotion.
Talk can be used non-persuasively as well, for example,
when someone nags another person into acting, or when talk
is used to batter a person into submission, as in coersive
interrogation. The use of physical force to make someone
act is, generally, non-persuasive. The admissibility of a
confession in a court case may depend upon whether it was
extracted by persuasive, or by non-persuasive (coersive)
techniques. When warning are replaced by threats,
persuasion ceases and coersion begins. Thus it is a
violation of a right to act to threaten reprisal, but not
to warn of dangers accompanying the act.
Full analysis of "persuasion" may be interesting, but
the point here is that such a concept exists to be
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anaLyzed, and that we can use it to specify pairs of active
rights and owed obligations which correlate with one
another on (NC), (SC), and (C). We also may analyze rights
in terms of owed obligations.
4. Thus, active rights may be analyzed:
A has a right against B to do z = B has an obligation
to A not to interfere (15) with A's z-ing.
Positive rights may be analyzed:
A has a right against B to B's z-ing (or not z-ing) =
B has an obligation to A to do z (or not do z)
Combined, these analyses assign all rights and owed
obligations correlatives on (NC)
,
(SC), and (C).
NOTES
1. The sort of implication involved is often left to
the imagination of the reader.
2. It is not clear to me that there is such a priority
of rights to obligations. Yet it is tempting to follow
either this line or the line that both rights and
obligations arise conjointly from the same non-moral states
of affairs.
3. Other principles of correlativity might be of
interest, for example:
(Cvar) For every obligation of class 0 there is a
right implied by it which implies the obligation.
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and
( SCvar ) For every right, there is an obligation which
implies it.
But progress can be best made by avoiding detailed
discussion of the multitude of such principles.
4. What might be called "essentialis t correlativi ty" is
of some interest. It derives from the fact that individual
rights and obligations had by a person at particular times
(rights tokens) are often thought of as things. As such,
they may have essential properties, or be related to other
things essentially; perhaps to specific obligations. One
might even argue for this on the basis of other
essentialis tic intuitions:
1. Specific rights and obligations both have their
grounds essentially. (in any possible world in which
the right occurs, the very events which give rise to
the right also exist).
2. Any event which grounds a right or obligation does
so essentially and necessarily.
3. Any event grounding a right also grounds an
obligation .
therefore
,
4. Every right is essentially (or at any rate,
necessarily) linked to some obligation which is
likewise essentially linked to it.
Since it is doubtful that, where x and y are actions, and
x is not identical to y, a right or obligation to do x
could be identical to a right or obligation to do y in
214
another possible world, and since the essential links
between rights
,
obligations and their grounds are
cognizable (I assume here that essentialism involves
cognizable links between a thing and its essential
properties and relations), essentialist correlativi ty would
seem to entail (C) and (NC). Also, since it is reasonable
to assume the class of obligations essentially related to
rights will be isolatable, (SC) should follow. Thus, if any
of the three principles we are examining fail, so will
essentialist correlativity . Though this sort of
correlativity may at times surface in discussions of
correlativity, I will not discuss it in depth here.
5. David Lyons, "The Correlativity of Rights and Duties,"
Nous 4 (1970) p.48
6. Suppose the promise was not extracted so as to
benefit B.
7. We need not limit ourselves to persons here.
Organizations, for example, may have rights held against
them
.
8. Lyons, and the "common view"
9. For moral rights, to be at liberty is for the action
to be morally permissible. For legal rights, legally
permissible. And so on.
10. "Theoretically" is difficult to define. It does not
mean "in practice possible". Suppose A has a right which
1
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could violate by doing a, but I cannot do a because I am in
prison, or too weak, or too far away. Still, I could
"theoretically" violate the right by doing a. Roughly, if
there is an action which it is possible (perhaps
metaphysical possibility is appropriate here) for an agent
to perform, and which, if it were performed would violate
A's right, then the agent of that action could
theoretically violate A's right. I am uncertain now well
this analysis will hold up under close scrutiny.
11. I do not see how one could reasonably grant that x
has a right against y, and deny that y has an obligation
not to violate that right.
12. Let class 0 be the class of obligations to
individuals not to violate a specific right, r, of that
individual
.
13. Let class 0 be the class of owed obligations not to
interfere with an action.
CHAPTER V I I
PROPOSED COUNTEREXAMPLES TO CORRELATIVITY EXAMINED
1. Many objections have been made to the CorreLativitv
Thesis, and to the sort of analysis of rights in terms of
obligations we have proposed. The strongest and most
interesting of these objections take the form of
counterexamples directed at (NC), the claim that rights
imply obligations. (David Lyons [l] also offered a series
of abstract arguments against correlativity
. We discuss
these in Appendix D.) We will investigate these
counterexamples. I hope to show that they fail to refute my
claim that general rights involve simple rights, and that
simple rights imply obligations.
Martin and Nickel [2] hold that the basic difficulty
with correlativity is that rights which are Hohfeldian
powers, privileges (liberties), and immunities do not
exhibit it. They suggest that their point can be found in
Lyons' work. [3] Whether or not Lyons had this in mind, his
counterexamples to correlativity do reflect this approach.
Lyons argues that the constitutional right to free speech,
apparently an immunity correlated with a disability on the
part of Congress to pass laws limiting free speech does not
imply obligations. He also points to other such rights as
counterexamples: the right to turn right on a red light,
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and the right to free speech which others violate if they
shout us down (Hofeidian liberties). Presumably, rights
which are powers will also be counterexamples, correlating
as they do, not with obligations, but with disabilities. It
is interesting that the specific rights which are produced
as counterexamples often turn out to be general rights,
which are neither simple rights, pure immunities, powers,
or liberties. My view does not imply, of course, that such
rights exhibit the full range of correlations exhibited by
simple rights. Yet they will involve at least one simple
right which does imply an obligation (NC).
One could respond to such counterexamples, as some
have done, by claiming that "rights" is ambiguous, and
that only in the claim-rights sense do rights imply
obligations. Or one could claim that there is a single
sense of "rights", but that only certain kinds of rights
exhibit correlation relations to obligations. These
responses will not save my thesis, however. The position I
have advocated implies that all rights involve simple
rights, rights which do imply obligations. The discovery of
rights which do not imply obligations (at least
conditionally) would disprove this thesis.
I do not, however, believe that close examination of
the purported counterexamples reveals the absense of (NC)
correlations .
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2 . Immuni ties
.
Some tnings which we call rights would seem to be
immunities. Legal immunities are barriers to having one's
legal relations changed by the actions of others. They
correlate, not to obligations, but to the disabilities of
others to change one's legal relations. Thus, if immunities
are rights, rights do not imply obligations. One example of
such a right would seem to be the constitutional right to
free speech. It has been claimed that this is a right which
does not correlate to an obligation.
2.1 The Constitutional Right to Free Speech.
Lyons argues that the constitutional right to free
speech is not "an area of free choice protected by
prohibitions against interference." He claims that the
constitutional right can be lost without the loss of any
protected areas of choice. For example, he suggests, the
constitutional right could be repealed without Congress
using its new power to restrict free speech. Thus speech
would be no more restricted than it is, but there would be
no constitutional right.
For Lyons this indicates two things: (a) that the
constitutional right is not implied by the legal
obligations extant against interference with free speech,
and (b) that the constitutional right does not imply them.
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(b) denies (NC) correlations, (a) denies (SC) correlations.
Concerning (a): Lyons argues that, since the repeal of
tne constitutional right would leave all extant obligations
intact, extant obligations cannot imply that right. We need
not, however, grant that the repeal of the constitutional
right would leave all obligations intact.
Concerning (b). Lyons' point is similar to a general
point he makes about standing obligations in his abstract
objections (which we consider in detail in Appendix D).
That is, that if the obligations stand by themselves, even
in the absence of the right, then there is no reason to
think that the right implies them.
Lyons, however, has not shown that repeal of the
constitutional right does not destroy certain obligations
not to interfere. For, even if one granted that, by
repealing the constitutional right, the new legal system
would disoblige the same actions as the old, it would not
follow that the constitutional right does not imply
obligations. For under the constitutional system,
obligations prohibiting certain types of interference may
be overdetermined. Or, there may be more than one
obligation prohibiting interference with free speech, one
grounded in the constitution and another grounded in other
law.
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But to complete this defense we should be able to
specify the obligation to which this right can be
correlated. Lyons suggests that the search for correlative
obligations for this right will be unsuccessful. Are there
any obligations lost in repeal of the constitutional right
which are plausible candidates for correlative obligations?
There are, and Lyons himself suggests one: the obligation
of Congress not to make laws abridging freedom of speech.
But Lyons rejects this suggestion:
Nor does it correlate with obligations incumbent
on Congress. There may be some poiint in speaking of
a Congressional "obligation" not to (try to) exceed
one's legislative powers or, more specifically, not
to restrict speech guaranteed free by the First
Ammendment. But this "obligation" would be a queer
one, for the members of Congress are not subject to
civil or criminal action against them if they
"breach" it by enacting unconstitutional laws. If
they do this their actions could be discribed as
"illegal", or "unlawful" only in the sense of
"invalid": it is not that they would break the law in
so acting, but rather that they would fail to make
valid and binding law. [4]
That is, the right correlates with a disability on the part
of Congress (not an obligation), the disabilty to make law
abridging freedom of speech.
This reply is unconvincing. First, the obligation is
incumbent on Congress, not the members of congress. But
more centrally, that no penalties accrue to Congress or its
members for breaking the law by passing an unconstitutional
law does not show that no law has been broken, and no
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obligation unfullf illed
. The First Ammendment says,
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech ...". It is contrary to law, forbidden by law,
i 1 legal is the simplest and most direct sense for Congress
to make such a law. Congress has an obligation under the
law not do do so. [5] Further, it is reasonable to suppose
that the obligation is owed to every citizen.
Thus, the obligation on the part of Congress (owed to
each citizen) not to pass laws limiting freedom of speech
is a plausible candidate for correlative obligation to the
constitutional right to free speech. This obligation would
not remain were the constitutional right to free speech
repealed, and it implies that right.
2.2 Sometimes, however, people have a different right in
mind when they speak of the constitutional right to free
speech: an active right to speak freely, a right not held
against Congress in particular, but against that state as a
whole. [6] This right would be violated by the state's
interfering with free speech. Thus, it correlates with the
obligation incumbent on the state not to interfere with
free speech. The right is created by structuring the legal
system to prevent such interference. The particular
structure employed may be essential to our constitutional
right to free speech, but an active right to free speech
could have been created by any number of alternative
systems. The method used under our system involves a
judiciary whose obligation it is to review and declare
unconstitutional laws invalid (void), and the requirement
that Congress not make Laws abridging free speech. If
Congress passes a law limiting free speech, it has not
violated this right. hut if the state enforces such a Law,
then our right has been violated, for the state is thereby
interferring with someone's speaking freely, and has failed
to fulfill its legal obligations to that person.
Obligations and rights in law are not to be read directly
from the surface of the law. "Rights", and "obligations"
are seldom used in the wording of laws, but more often in
descriptions of their general structure or function.
This obligation of the state not to interfere would be
removed were the Constitution repealed. The state would
then have no general legal obligation not to interfere with
freedom of speech. Thus nothing Lyons says proves that the
constitutional right to free speech is not an area of
freedom ( speech ) protected by obligations (not to
interfere)
.
2.3 Are other immunities rights? I think not. Some
general rights may involve immunities as dominant elements,
and perhaps this leads to the tendency to think that some
immunities are rights, but I see no reason to think that
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pure immunities qualify as rights. I suggest that the
following test can be used to tell whether a right is a
pure immunity: Ask how the right could be violated. If
there are ways that it can be violated, it is not a pure
immunity, for pure immunities cannot be violated (what
would it be to violate an immunity?). I am confident that
where this test suggests that one has a pure immunity, one
will have little confidence that a right is involved. Where
the purported immunity fails this test, it is not a pure
immunity, and will correlate to obligations (rights which
are violable will correlate, see sect. 2, Cn . 6). The right
to free speech against Congress would be violated by its
pasing laws limiting free speech (so it is not a pure
immunity). The right against the State would be violated by
the state's interferring with free speech (so it is not a
pure immunity). The Congress and the State, respectively,
have obligations to the citizens not to do things which
would violate these rights.
It is easy to confuse immunities with rights in close
legal or moral proximity to them. Let us examine two more.
In some societies parents have the legal power to
apprentice their children to others. In other societies
tnis is not the case; children are immune to having their
parents contract out their services. Any such contract
would have no legal force. This is an immunity had by
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children to having their Legal relations changed in cerain
ways by their parents. Some might suppose that this
immunity is a right on the child's part against their
parents not to be apprenticed. I think not. The parents
would not violate the child's right by signing an
apprenticeship contract. The contract would merely be void.
However, the child might have a right against the parent
not to be apprenticed which would be violated by the
parent's forcing the child into active apprenticeship.
Another right which the child might have would hold against
the state. It would be violated if the state acted to
enforce the apprenticeship contract. The state has an
obligation not to recognize or enforce changes in people's
legal relations to which they are immune. The obligation of
the state not to recognize or enforce illegal
apprenticeship contracts correlates with this right not to
be apprenticed. Per Hohfeld, the disability of the parents
to apprentice their children correlates with the immunity
of the child. But the right is not the immunity. Generally,
where a legal immunity holds there will also be a right
against the state correlating to the state's obigation not
to recognize or enforce legal relations contrary to the
immunity
.
In the moral realm: suppose that morally, parents
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cannot bind their children to an apprenticeship. Their
promising an employer that their child will be his
apprentice for three years does not obligate the child.
This is an immunity. But this is not the child's right not
to be apprenticed. He does have rights - perhaps not to be
forced to do something he has no obligation to do (eg., be
an apprentice) - but those rights correlate to obligations
of his parents and others not to force the child to do such
things. The immunity from apprenticeship is not itself a
right. The immunity is merely the fact that the parents are
unable to make the child obligated. There is, however, a
right nearby: the right not to be forced to work as an
apprentice. This right correlates to the obligation of the
parents (and perhaps the employer as well) not to force
the child to work.
Generally, the tendency to identify immunities with
rights results from the usual proximity of rights to
immunities. However, only where there are obligations to
individuals will there be rights.
This is also true for powers and liberties.
3. Powers.
If powers are rights, then my view that simple rights
are claim-rights is mistaken. Legal powers are abilities to
change the legal relations of individuals, and do not
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correlate with obligations. I will argue that powers are
not, by themselves, rights. Of course, I do not wish to
deny that general rights may include powers, and that such
powers may even be the most important element of such
rights .
That pure powers are not rights is indicated by the
fact that the concept of violation does not clearly apply
to powers. Also, while powers may be over an individual,
they do not clearly hold against individuals.
Nevertheless, where there are powers, there are
usually rights, and I suspect their proximity has led many
to suppose that powers are rights. Sometimes failure to
respect a legal power by certain individuals will violate
legal rights of those holding the power. Generally, the
holder of the power has a right against the state that the
state guarantee the power. Such a right would correlate
with an obligation of the state to enforce the exercise of
the power. That is, if x has a power to create legal status
F for y, then the state violates a right of x if it refuses
to enforce x's exercise of that power. [7] But the power is
not the right. While the power is over y, the right need
not hold against y. In fact, y's acting inconsistently with
his legal status F might well, though illegal, not violate
x's right. The state's failure to enforce this status,
however, generally would. [8] The state has an obligation to
227
x to guarantee the power. Thus powers themselves are not
rights, but there are rights cLosely associated with them
which hold against the state, and which do correlate with
obligations of the state.
The tendency to identify powers and rights can be
corrected by seeing that where it is possible to isolate
powers from relations involving obligations ( c laim- rights
)
to others there is little to suggest the existence of a
right. For example: Suppose A disputes ownership of 0 with
B. A and B decide C will arbitrate their dispute. They ask
C to listen to both sides and decide who, A or B, has
better claim to ownership. They promise each other that his
decision will be binding. Thus, C has the power to make A
or B owner of 0. Yet C has no right that either A or B
abide by his decision (no such promises were made to C).
Neither A nor B has an obligation to C to abide by the
decision. [9] Powers are not rights in the ordinary sense.
4 . Liberties .
Active rights (some) are commonly thought to be mere
liberties having no correlative obigations. These are
perhaps the most plausible proposed coun t er e xamp les to the
cor re la t i vi t y thesis, and the most instructive. Le will
discuss several examples, among them the right to turn
right on a red light, [10] and the right to pick up a $10
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bilL found in the street. [ 1 1 ]
Por Hohfeld, a liberty to do x correlates with a no-
right on the part of the individual against whom the right
holds. If x is at liberty with respect to (against) y to do
z, y has no right (against x?) that x not do z. Roughly,
liberties are the options left after all actions which
others have a right that you not do are excluded. I am
uncertain how useful this concept is in analyzing rights,
and it does not seem to me that it is a concept common to
contemporary discussions of the issue at hand. I will
employ another concept of liberty: x is (legally) at
liberty to do z iff it is (legally) permissible for x to do
z. Some rights, it seems, specify no more than that the
bearer of tne right is at liberty to act in a certain way.
4.1 Lyons proposes that the right of drivers to turn
right on a red light[l2] has no correlative obligation (not
to interfere), and that this shows that not all positive
rights are protections against unwarranted interference. He
argues that the most plausible candidate for corrrelative
,
the "obligations of law enforcement officials not to
interfere with one's making a right turn (when allowed by
the conditions of the right)"[l3] does not exist. For, "we
know that a policeman may stop a car for various reasons
even though the driver is not violating any
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regulations . "[ 14
]
This argument fails. First, that a policeman can
(legally) stop a car does not show that he has no
obligation not to. Perhaps they can do so legally only when
other obligations override or defeat this obligation. Some
circumstances may warrant, or give the police a right to,
interfere, even where there is an obligation not to.
Secondly, policemen may in certain circumstances have the
power to suspend the right (make it the case that the
driver does not have the right to turn right on tnat red
light). Thus there will be no correlative obligation; nor,
in such circumstances, will there be a right. Thirdly, the
right to turn right on a red light may be highly
conditional, conditional upon many circumstances, including
the behavior of policemen. Such subtleties, when carefully
applied to "liberty" rights, allow correlativi ty a strong
defense against counterexamples.
Can it be maintained that where there is a right to
turn right on a red light, there is also an obligation on
the part of policement not to interfere? Yes. Violation
helps here. Suppose a driver has a right to turn right on a
red light. Interference with his making such a turn
(lawfully) by a policeman, except in special circumstances,
violates that right. Policemen have an obligation not to
interfere
.
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But, Lyons seems to maintain, policemen often
interfere with such turns without violating the right.
Careful analysis of such cases of interference makes
co r r e la t i vi ty defensible. How can policemen interfere
without violating the right? Several scenarios come to
mind. (l) the policeman is directing traffic. He signals
the driver to stop. But there is a red light, and the
driver wishes to turn right. The policeman has no
obligation not to interfere with the driver's turning
right. (2) The policeman wishes to stop the driver for some
reason. Perhaps the driver has been speeding, is a suspect
to be taken into custody, or appears drunk. The policeman
decides the best way is to stop the driver as he is
attempting a legal right hand turn on a red light. The
policeman has no obligation not to do so., (3) The
policeman does not like the way the driver's hair is
combed, or perhaps he knows the driver and has a personal
grudge against him. He decides he will stop the driver when
he attempts to make a right hand turn on a red. He has no
obligation not to. (4) Policeman George thinks ail right
hand turns on reds are dangerous. He dislikes the law, and
always stops drivers when he sees them making such turns.
He has no obligation not to. (5) A policeman is at the
corner and receives an emergency call. He shoots out into
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the intersection, interferring with a driver's making a
right hand turn on a red. He has no obligation not to.
None of these are counterexamples to cor re lativi ty
.
In case (l) the driver simply does not have a right to
turn right. The signals of policemen directing traffic take
presidence over lights. Legally, there is, in effect, no
red light. The right is conditional, and the conditions on
the right do not allow a right hand turn if a policeman
signals the driver to stop. Just as the right to turn right
is conditional upon the way being clear, and a full stop
being made, it is also conditional on not having been
ordered to stop by a policeman. Since there is no right to
make the turn in this situation, there is no reason to
expect a correlative obligation on the part of the
poLiceman not to interfere. Other of the cases can be dealt
with similarly.
In (2), if the policeman signals the driver to stop,
there is no right. [15] No right, no obligation. When a
policeman has a good legal reason for stopping a citizen,
he has the power of taking away (suspending) certain of
their rights. In other situations there may be a right, and
a correlative obligation not to interfere, but the
obligation (and the right) may be overridden by other
considerations. Thus the policeman may have an obligation
not to interfere, but a right or obligation to do so which
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overrides the obligation. Eg., A is speaking provocatively
to a Large crowd, and the crowd appears about to riot and
harm A. The police may have an obligation not to interfere
with A ' s speaking. They may even be unable to suspend his
right. But they may be justified in preventing him because
they are also legally obligated to preserve the peace and
to protect A. They have a right and obligation to stop A
which overrides A's right and correlative obligation. With
legal rights, suspension of rights, or their non-existence
in certain situations, may be better accounts. But the
above sorts of conflicts do seern to arise commonly with
moral rights.
(3) is interesting, and there are several replies
which the correlationis t can make. One plausible one
(contrary to the assumptions of (3)): in this case the
driver retains the right to turn right on the red. The
policeman has an obligation not to interfere. His order is
illegal, an unsuccessful attempt to use a legal power (to
suspend the driver's right to turn) which does not exist
given the circumstances. (Perhaps, however, given the
policeman's order to stop, the driver has an obligation to
stop anyway. [17] The driver might be prosecuted for not
stopping for the police, but not for making an illegal
turn.) Similarly with (4).
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(5) The driver has no right to turn here, for his
right is conditional on the way being clear. Also,
interference here is not the sense invoLved in the
correlativity thesis (15).
The above account is not the only plausible one
consistent with corre Lativi ty
.
One other possibility: the right to turn right on a
red light is neither an active right, nor a complex right
involving only conditionals on an active right, but is,
rather, a more complex general right. While it does protect
a freedom, it is not a right to that freedom. It is the
right that those who turn right on red lights, after a full
stop, when the way is clear, not be stopped, arrested,
prosecuted, or punished for it. This right holds against
the state, and correlates to an obligation on the part of
the state to each driver not to stop, arrest, prosecute, or
punish a driver for a legally executed right turn on a red
light
.
Rather than being an example of a non-correlative
right, the main difficulty posed by the right to turn right
on a red for the correlationis t seems to be sorting out
just wnich of the many candidates are correlatives.
4.2 Hart [17] suggests that in addition to a sense of
"rights" which does correlate to duties or obligations,
there is a "liberty" sense:
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in which to say that "X has a right to" means mereLy
that X is under no "duty" not to. [18]
An example (brackets mine):
Two people walking along both see a ten-dollar bilL
in the road twenty yards away, and there is no clue
as to the owner. Neither of the two are under a
"duty" to allow the other to pick it up; each has in
this [liberty] sense a right to pick it up. [19]
Hart points out that this seems to be a sense familiar
to Hobbes. [20] The claim-right sense, however, there is no
right to pick up the ten-dollar bill, for neither has an
obligation to allow the other to pick it up. The
correlationis t need not, however, admit this "liberty"
sense. Do the two walkers really have a right to pick up
the ten-spot? No. The language is misleading here. When
this right is cited, what is really being spoken of is a
conditional right: the right to pick up the tenner if_ the
person gets to it first without violating certain
conventions. But this, a conditional stating conditions
under which a simple right may come into being, is a
general right. Should the simple right involved come into
being, it will correlate with obligations on the part of
others not to interfere with the right-holder picking up
the bill. Thus we can understand such "liberty" rights as
general rights which are conditional claim-rights. No
admission of an extra "liberty" sense of rights is
required .[21]
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4.3 Peter French uses the game Merels to illustrate his
theory that:
... a right is a permission given to someone to do
something within an institution ... to be in a
position to do something when one chooses witnout
penalty and with jus tif ication
.
[ 22 , 23
]
Indeed, sports and games often seem to involve rights which
do not imply obligations. In games in which players take
turns making moves, when a player's turn comes, he often
has a right to make any of several moves. Yet his opponents
had no obligation not to interfere with the player's making
those moves. A good player will have blocked the best of
the moves, or made them more costly. In basketball, a
player has a right, upon receiving the ball, to drive to
the basket and score. His opponent has no obligation not to
stop him. (If anything the opponent has an obligation to
stop him.) Most telling is the Boxer Problem. Suppose two
boxers agree to a match. Both have the right to nit the
other during the match. Neither has an obligation to let
his opponent hit him.
The first sort of example is easily dismissed. Prior
to a player's turn, he does not have a right to make
particular moves. When his turn comes, he gains the right
to make certain moves which play has left open to him.
Since, prior to his turn he had no such right, his opponent
had no correlative obligation not to interfere. Once nis
turn comes and he gets the right to move, his opponents do
have a correlated obligation not to interfere. Prior to his
turn, the player had conditonal rights, but conditional
rights are not simple rights, and can be dealt with as we
have already suggested.
4.4 To the basketball example the correlationist can
reply: Yes, a player does have the right specified. But it
does not hold against his opponents. It holds against
bystanders. Spectators, for example, have an obigation not
to interfere with a player who, upon receiving the ball,
drives to the basket and scores. This right should not be
confused with a right against the opposition to drive to
the basket and score, which does not exist. A player also
has the right to have the basket scored (count), i_f it was
made legally (a conditional right). If a basket is made
legally though, and the right comes into force, the other
team has an obligation not to interfere with its being
scored
.
A player will sometimes have a right to take a shot at
the basket (though he has no right to score unless he makes
the basket): when he nas been granted a foul shot. Then, of
course, the opposition has an obligation not to interfere
with his taking the shot.
There is no right against the other team to drive to
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the basket and score, and the other team has not
interferred with anything a player has a right to do by
LegalLy stealing the ball from him as he begins his drive
to the basket, or by blocking his shot. Far from violating
any right of his, they have given him nothing to complain
of except his own inability to deal with their fine
defense. A pLayer does have rights against his opponents
that tney not foul him, but he has no right to get through
their defense. If he did, he could, it seems to me, say to
his oposition, "Look here, you've been s topping me all
night. I have a right to score. Just stand there a moment
so I can get by you." Actions may be permitted by the rules
without being rights. Players may be permi t ted to make
baskets, but they do not have a right to make them.
Also, there is a right to legally drive to the basket
and score which does hold against individuals who are
central to the game. Referees do nave the correlative
obligation not to interfere with legaLly made drives to the
basket and the scoring of legally made shots. The issues
here are very similar to those concerning police and the
right to turn right on a red light. (That right does not
hoLd against other drivers, but against the police, or the
state.) In refereed games, referees are perhaps the most
important owers of rights. This explains, in part, why
controversies in refereed games so often center on the
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referee's calls (did they grant the players and teams their
rights) rather than on whether one player or team has
violated the rights of another player or team.
4.5 In a legal boxing match, both competitors have legal
rights to hit one another. Yet they seem under no
obligation not to interfere with the attempts of the other
to connect. Thus, we have an active right with no
correlative obligation not to interfere.
More careful analysis will again show the confusion
here. The boxers d_o have legal rights to hit one another.
These rights hold not against one another but against the
state, the referee (conditionally), and bystaders. They
have obligations not to interfere with the right. The
referee has the power, as did policemen in the red light
example, to take away many of those rights under cerain
conditions. But he also has obligations to the fighters
not to take away those rights except under certain
conditions (eg., a foul has been committed, the fight is
proceeding too slowly because of clinches, one fighter is
unable to defend himself, etc..). But does a fighter have
rights to hit his opponent apart from these? I think
not. [24] Suppose fighter A is much better than B, and B is
unable to connect with A. B says to A, "Hold still, I nave
a right to hit you. I can't hit you if you keep ducking." A
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can clearly reply, "Ho, Ho. You don't have a right against
rne to hit me. You have it against others. There may even be
a conditional right to hit me i_f I can't stop you by using
legal techniques (I'm not allowed to wear a football helmet
into the ring to stop you, or to carry a shield). You have
the right that I use only legal techniques to stop you. You
have a right (perhaps) to try to hit me, but you don't have
a right to succeed (not against me, anyway)."
4.6 Suppose, however, there are only two persons in the
world, A and B, who, deciding the world is not big enough
for both of them, agree to a no-no lds-barred fight to the
death. That is, there are no rules, and no outsiders. Thus
neither A nor B has rights to harm the other against
outsiders or referees, for there are none. Nor are there
any limits on the methods to be used. Suppose this
situation is morally possible. It might seem that A and 6
both have the right to kill the other. Well, yes and no.
Suppose a third party arrived on the scene, and started to
interfere. A and B might turn to him and say, "Leave us
alone. We have agreed to this fight. We have the right to
kill each other. Don't interfere. Doing so would violate
our rights. "[25] But that right does not hold against A or
B, it holds against C. C could violate it. A and B cannot.
Where there is only A and B, there is no right for them to
kill each other, only a conditonal right that, should
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others appear, wouLd hold against them.
4.7 To see that the proposed Liberty sense of "rights"
is not a secure [26] sense, exampLes of Liberty sans rights
help.
A and B are on a relay team. B runs the finaL leg, and
they win a gold medal. Driving home, B claims that because
he ran the final leg, the medal is his to keep. This is
false, but A doesn't much care. He says, "Look, if it means
that much to you, you can keep it at your place. But I may
want it someday, so I don't give up my right to my share
of it." But B never claims the trophy. A is at liberty to
keep it at his place, but he does not have a right against
A to do so. [27]
Suppose certain public lands are given over to an
administrator to manage completely as she sees fit. She
could, at whim, probibit anyone from using these lands. No
justification is required. However, she believes that
people exloring for natural resources such as oil, coal,
and metals, should be allowed to go their way on these
lands. So she seldom interferes with such activity. While
such explorers are at liberty to explore the land, they
have no right to, and can be thrown off for by the
administrator for any reason whatsoever.
5. Benditt [28] offers a number of exampLes of rights
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wnich seem to have no correlative duty, and also, no one
against whom they may be said to hold. His e xamp les are
legal rights, and there is a thread of similarity which
runs through them all.
He seems to have in mind rights which justify the
imposition of duties upon others, but which, at some
particular time are such that those duties are as yet
unimposed. Such rights may arise out of contracts. Suppose
A and B contract. A fulfills his part, but before B can
fulfill his, he dies. Benditt suggests that A may have
rights arising out of this contract which, as yet, hold
against no one. The right may be the basis for imposing
duties on others (heirs, business partners, executors,
etc.), but until it is determined just who those others
are, the right holds aginst no one. Such rights may arise
non -con t rac tua 1 1 y as well. Benditt discusses easements. A
has an easement over B's land. B dies. [29] For a time no
one owns the land (perhaps while the will is being
settled). A retains the easement (right of way) during this
time. Yet there is no one (owner) against whom Bill has
this right (and no correlative duty). Benditt cites an
example of MacCormick ' s . It seems that, in Scottish law,
the children of those who die intestate have a right to De
given their parent's property by the executor. This right
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is supposed to exist even before the executor is appointed,
and to influence the appointment. Again, this is supposed
to be a right which does not (yet) have any correlative
duty. Benditt somewhat offhandedly suggests that American
Indians may have such rights. Rights, I suppose, to
reparation for past harms, but rights to which no ower has
(yet) been assigned. That is, these rights do not vet hold
against anyone, and have, as yet, no correlative duties. I
suppose that within this category might faLl cases where
the courts have determined that rights violations have
occurred (eg., a patent infringement, an unfair business
practice, etc.), but in which there is ongoing litigation
as to exactly who is to pay wha t compenstation or penalty.
The position I have been defending offers the same
simple reply to all of these objections: nothing in my
account of such general rights implies that all rights
correlate to obligations at all times. The view that all
rights are aggregates of basic legalpmoral relations which
involve at least one claim-right (and thus a correlative
obligation) does not require that that claim-right hold
throughout the existence of the right. All of the above
examples do invo Ive a claim-right with correlative
obligation, although that part of the general right may not
be in force at every moment of the general right's
existence. We have already seen that general rights may
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involve conditional claim-rights, which only come into
force when the states of affairs on which they are
conditional occur.
A second defense is available as well. It is plausible
that the rights cited cio involve claim-rights at all times.
Briefly: Easements hold not just against the owner of the
land over which the easement holds, but also involves
rights against the state to protect the easement. When a
debtor dies, his creditor may continue to have rights
against the state that they assure repayment. Also, the
creditor may have rights against the estate, itself a legal
individual. The rights of American Indians may involve
claim-rights against the state that it assure reparation.
Also, some of these rights may be conditonal, or may cease
to exist, and later be replaced by related rights. Eg.,
children of the intestate deceased may, for a time have a
right against the state that a fair executor be appointed,
and later gain a right against that executor to their
parents' property. Perhaps it is best to think of tne
cnildren's right as composed of both of these (and perhaps
other basic relations).
6. Thus I have discovered no powerful evidence in the
form of counterexamples to disprove my view that all rights
are either general or simple, that general rights contain
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at least one simpLe right, and that simple rights are
c laims-rights implying obligations.
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interfere
.
17. Hart, op. cit.
,
reprinted in Melden, A. I. (ed.), Human
Rights
,
Wadsworth (1970) p.61-75
1 8 . ibid
.
p . 65
19. ibid, p.65
20. That Hobbes, and some other philosophers, employ
"rights" to mean "liberties" does not imply that "rights"
ever (or commonly) has this meaning in ordinary English.
21. There is some question whether general rights
containing no c laims-right
,
but containing conditioanl
claims-rights
,
are to be called "rights". Many of what seem
to be active liberty rights are like this. The
correlationis t has two options here: (l)accept such
aggregates as rights (they may be related only
conditionally to obligations). (2) Hold that such
aggregates are not true rights, but only specify the
conditions under which rights can come to exist, which
rights are true rights, and do correlate. I prefer the
former. Neither of these options require admisson of an
extra "liberty" sense of "rights", nor do they do great
damage to our intuitions about such rights.
22. Peter French, THE SCOPE OF MORALITY, (University of
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Minnesota Press, 1979) p.94
2o. Without penalty" may involve obligation on the part
of others not to impose penalties. Or perhaps it merely
means that there are no rules imposing penalties. Is there
a right to do a thing with attached penalties Lf we are
willing to accept the penality?
24. He does have rights not to have to pay compensation
for, or be convicted for harm done legally within the ring.
But these are not the rights under consideration. (The
latter two, for example, hold against the court or the
state).
25. This right might, of course, be overridden by
obligations of C to help those in need, or to prevent
unnecessary killing.
26. A clear sense in English. Perhaps in the past or
future there was or will be such a sense.
27. He does, of course, have rights to do so, but they
hold against outsiders, and this is not relevant here.
28. Theodore M. Benditt, RIGHTS (Rowman and Littlefield,
1982) .
29. Death is not essential here. Suppose A had a common
law easement. B appeared to own the land, but his title was
found to be invalid. Perhaps no one owns the land for a
time, yet the easement remains.
CHAPTER VIII
A NEW ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS
The correlations between rights and owed obligations
we have uncovered nay not be unique. I will now present an
alternative correlation which will combine several of the
other intuitions about rights we have investigated. It will
take into account the relation between rights and
obligations, and also the intuitions that rights involve
freedom, interest, benefit, and respect.
1. In chapter 6, we found that claim rights correlate
with owed obligations as follows:
For negative rights:
x has a right against y to z <=> y has an
obligation to x not to interfere with x's z-ing.
(The concept of interference employed here is (15) of
Chapter 6, section 3.4.)
For positive rights:
x has a right against y to y's z-ing <=> y has an
obligation to x to do z.
We isolated a concept of interference which made such
analyses, and the correlations between right and
obligations they imply, plausible.
2. Another approach may prove just as fruitful.
Our discussion of the will and interest theories of
rights suggests that rights involve protection. I pointed
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out, at the end of tnat discussion, that piausibie accounts
of rights along these lines must incorporate a normative
eLement which is usualLy hidden when protection theories
are stated. Rights will not involve guarantees of active
protection, that is, but merely obligations (legal or
moral) on the part of others to protect. Employing the
concept of protection rather than the concept of non-
interference, we might try, for negative rights:
x has a right against y to do z <=> y has an
obligation to x to protect x in x's doing z.
But this is too strong. Bill may have a right against Sam
to go out with Sam's daughter, Jill. Nonetheless, Sam has
no general obligation to protect Bill in his doing so. If
Jimmy asks Jill out first, and Jill turns him down because
of this, or if Jill turns him down on whim, Sam has no
obligation to try to get Jill to change her mind. Or if
Bill's boss asks him to stay late at work, thereby
interferring with his dating Jill, Sam has no obligation to
call the boss and plead with him to let Bill go out.
The problem here is that the right does not require
that y protect x against just anyone, but only that y
protect x against y's own actions. Perhaps, then, the
following will be an improvement:
x has a right against y to do z <=> y has an
obligation to x to protect x from y's preventing x
f rom doing z
.
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This analysis does not imply that Sam has an
obligation to act to protect Bill against Bill's being
prevented by others from going out with Jill. Sam merely
has the obligation not to, himself, prevent Bill from so
doing
.
This is a promising proposal; however, more
modification is needed. In Ch . 6 we learned that certain
sorts of accidental interference with x's doing z would not
violate x's right (eg., B's accidentally crashing his
airplane into A's canoe does not violate A's right to
paddle his canoe across the lake). In such a case, however,
y would fail to protect x from y's preventing x's z-ing (B
failed to protect A from B's preventing A from paddling his
canoe across the lake).
We could make similar moves to those we made there to
avoid this difficulty, but a different approach is
possible.
2.1 Perhaps the difficulty here arises from the use of a
success concept of protection. On this concept, if A
protects B from event e, then e does not occur. However,
there is another concept of protection available which
allows for failure. On this conception of protection, A
protects B from the occurrence of e when A takes reasonable
precautions in order to make sure that e does not occur.
Perhaps this concept is best thought of as "takes
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reasonable steps to protect". In this sense, the President
has a right to the protection of the secret service, but
they do not violate that right if they take aLL tne
precautions they reasonably can to protect the president,
and fail nonetheless. Just what sort of precautions are
sufficient to count as protection will vary from right to
right, and circumstance to circumstance. (This move also
does much the same job as did the concept of responsibility
in the concept of interference.)
Switching to this concept will avoid the last
difficulty. Competent flyers take reasonable precautions to
see that they do not crash. Where they do not, they are
negligent, and are responsible for rights violations
resulting from their negligence.
2.2 We also found in Ch . 6 that x's right against y to do
z requires that y not intentionally use forceful methods to
interfere with or make it difficult for x to do z, but that
it does not always protect x against persuasive methods of
preventing x's doing z. With a minor twist, our new
analysis gives a credible account of itself here.
That is, we can incorporate the will theory into this
analysis in an interesting way. In discussing the will
theory, we settled upon an interpretation on which rights
protections of free efficacious action, i.e.,were
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protections of efficacious choice or wiLL. If we
incorporate this into our anaLysis, we get:
(hP) x has a right against y to do z <=> yhas an obligation to x to protect x from y'spreventing x from being free to do z.
Where y uses persuasive techniques to influence x so
as to prevent x from doing z, he has not failed in his
obligation, or violated z's right, for ne has left x free
to do z. Thus, reminding x of potentially dangerous
consequences of his doing z does not interfere with x's
freeLy making his own choice to (efficaciously) do z.
However, where y empLoys threats in order to scare z into
refraining from doing z, or where other forceful means are
employed, y fails in his obligation to protect x from y's
preventing x from freely doing z. For by doing so, y is not
taking reasonable precautions to avoid preventing x from
freely doing z. y's use of threats or force sufficiently
endangers x's acting freely that one precaution y must take
to protect x is to refrain from such actions.
2.4 Another concept of protection might be invoked here:
A protects B from event e if A takes reasonable precautions
to make sure that B is not harmed by the occurrence of e.
This brings to bear the concept of harm in a way which
incorporates the intuitions behind the interest and
beneficiary theories. Perhaps it is in part the slippage
between these two distinct concepts of protection which
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generates different intuitions about rights: between the
interest-benefit approach, and the will approach. I wiLL,
however, concentrate on the freedom interpretation.
3. Positive rights.
If we conceive of positive rights as extending the
right-holder's range of action as was suggested in our
discussion of the will theory (Ch. 1) then positive rights
are themseLves active rights. Thus, positive rights may be
incorporated into the same model as active rights. This
unification will go as follows:
The suggestion is that, if x has a right against y to
y's doing z, then that right is the same as x's right
against y to x's doing z through y. (perhaps better, y's
doing z for x, or x's having y do z for x). x's having y do
z for x is an action of x's. x's doing z through y is an
action of x's. Thus, we have:
(R) x has a right against y to y's doing z <=> x
has a right against y to (x's) do(ing) z through y
3.1 On (DP), then, positive rights can be accounted for
as active rights, and (R) is equivalent to:
y has an obligation to x to protect x from y s
preventing x from freely doing z through y.
3.2 Using a similar assumption, the correlation for
active rights produced at the close of chapter 6,
(DI) A has a right against B to do z <=> B has an
obligation to A not to interfere (15) with A s z-
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ing
.
wiLL hv)ld for alL simple rights. On this account, (R) is
equivalent to:
t
y has an obligation to x not to interfere with
x s z-ing through y.
existence of such correlations between rights
and obligations make plausible identifications of rights
with the obligations witn whicn they are correlated by ( D I
)
or (DP)
.
5. Botn (Dl) and (DP) mesh with many of our intuitions
about rights.
5.1 First, (DP) supports the intuition that rights
generally involve claims in an intimate way. Generally, on
this account, if a person freely claims his right, then if
the person against whom the rights holds will be violating
the right if he fails to respond by giving protection, for
by claiming the right, the claimant has clearly exerted his
will to initiate the action to which he has the right. If
the ower of the right fails to respond with protection, if
needed, he is not fulfilling his obligation.
It is interesting how far this goes to explain some
intuitions we have about when rights do not hold. For
example, suppose John is holding some of my money for me,
and I have the right to get it when I choose. If I freely
go to John to claim my money, he has an obligation to give
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it to me. If, however, Mary takes me to John at gunpoint,
and nas me demand from John my money, it is doubtful that
my rignt to the money requires that John give it to me
(under those conditions). The above analysis explains why
this might be. It is because by refusing to release the
money, John has not failed to protect me from his
preventing me from freely having me give him his money. In
demanding the money, I am not acting freely. If, however, I
can prove to John that I am freely demanding my money, even
though I have a gun to my head, then he does have the
obligation to give me my money. Of course, it may be that
John should give me the money in such a situation anyway.
But that is not because I Pave a right to the money, it is
because I am in danger.
5.2 Respect. Both of these conceptions of rights explain
the intimate Link of rights to respect, whether it is
Feinberg's notion that a right is a thing one can "stand
on", or the idea that rights specify areas of respect which
others must grant us. (DP), for example, suggests tnat
rights specify areas of freedom which others must protect
us in. More that that, the ower of the right has an
obligation _to the right-holder to protect him; he owes it
to the right-holder to protect him; that he protect the
right-holder is the right-holder's due. In a sense, right
holders are the moral or legal creditors of those against
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whom the right holds.
^•3 Release. fhe analyses also illuminate one way in
wnich the demands rights place on us are at the option of
the right-holder. Since rights are equivalent to
obligations not to interfere with, or to protect, free
action, if a right-holder announces that he is not freely
choosing to act as is his right (and does not), then it is
hard to see how one could interfere with such action, and
few precautions to protect him are required. If, however,
he announces his intention to act as is his right, then
protection is required.
5.4 Dworkin. On Dworkin's view, rights are individuated
aims. Our account does make rights individuated aims, for
they are owed obligations - they involve the individual to
whom they are owed essentially. These analyses of rights,
however, avoid the unclarity of the undefined technical
concept: individuated aim. They are also prima facie
concepts, and can thus serve the justificatory function so
important to Dworkin's account of rights.
5.5 Benditt. Benditt was correct, I think, in supposing
that there is an all-in concept of rights. "Obligation to"
also seems to exhibit a prima facie/all-in ambiguity.
Employing the all-in concept in our principles will produce
correlations (identities) for all-in rignts. The all-in
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concept is also definable in terms of the prima facie
concept: x has an all-in obligation to y to do (or not do)
z <=> x has a prima facie obligation to y to do (or not do)
z, and that obligation is not overridden.
5.G fried, who's work we have not discussed in this
dissertation, attempted to link rights to wrongs. The idea,
roughly, is that a right is a legal/moral relation which is
such that, if someone violates it, then he does the right-
holder a wrong. If rights are owed obligations not to
interfere, or to protect, as our analyses suggest, then it
is plausible that if one's right is violated, one is
thereby wronged.
5.7 Feinberg has suggested that there is a special
concept of rights, the "manifesto sense" which is distinct
from c laims -rights
,
and unrelated to obligations. He had in
mind the sorts of rights often cited in the declarations of
rights often found in revolutionary documents, or in, say,
the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. One extreme example,
the right to a job with a paid vacation, as proclaimed for
citizens of poor third-world nations. It is commonly held
that such rights imply no obligations on our part, and do
little more than specify goals. But I think that those wno
say this have missed the point. Our analyses apply to such
rights, and bring out their significance clearly. Our
analysis (DP) proposes that the right of a citizen, x, of a
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third worLd nation to a job paying a decent wage (held
against the U.S.A.) comes to:
the obligation of the U.S.A. to protect x frominterference by the U.S.A. with x's freely and
efficaciously choosing to work at a ]ob which pays adecent wage.
In general, this does not require much of the U.S.A.,
except a hands off policy. However, that is significant.
Inose who accuse the U.S.A. of being Imperialist and of
exploiting third world nations would probably also accuse
the U.S.A. of violating this right. They would suggest that
the U.S.A. is not fulfilling the above obligation, that its
forgein policy does not include reasonable precautions
against interfering with the ability of people in the
exploited nations to freely work at jobs providing a decent
wage . This of course may be disputed, but the dispute will
be about whether the U.S.A. has violated a claim-right.
6. Thus we have at least two quite plausible accounts
of rights which incorporate many of our intuitions about
rights. But they differ from one another. Which is correct?
I beg off this issue. It may be that our normal concept of
rights is vague enough so that either of these accounts of
rights will handle clear cut rights, and that where these
accounts diverge, our ordinary concept is indecisive as
well.
appendix a
SOME UNDERLYING METAPHYSICAL AND LINGUISTIC ISSUES
1. A number of issues concerning the metaphysical nature
of rights, and the link between these entities and the
concept(s) and language of rights are usually passed over
entirely by writers on rights. It is important to
distinguish between theories of (a) the nature of rights,
(b) the concept of rights, (c) what it is to have a right,
and (d) what having a specific right in certain
circumstances involves. This Appendix provides a tentative
exploration of some of these issues.
1.1 It is important to remember that rights are usually
spoken of and thought of as things. Assertions of rights
almost invariably involve reference to rights. Our general
conception of rights treats them as things. Examination of
this aspect of our concept of rights may help us to
understand a number of approaches to the theory of rights.
Linguistically, there are three schema normally used
for ascription or mention of rights. All are, most
naturally, interpreted as involving reference to (or
quantification over) rights.
(1) the right to is
(eg. the right to life is inaleinable, or Bill's right to
life is inaleinable).
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(2) x has the right to
(3) x has a right to
L and 2 seem to involve direct reference to a right
a definite description. 3 seems to employ reference via
an indefinite descr iption
. [ 1 ]
if this is correct, 1 and 2 will operate by referring
to a right, and asserting of that right that it (in l) has
some property or is of some type, or (in 2) is "had" by
some individual.
(3) is of special interest. The information it conveys
about the moraL/iegai status of x will be minimal. It will
ascribe to x onLy those moral/legal relations common to ail
rights to
.
This would seem to be those moral/legal
relations guaranteed by the concept of a right (those
features common to ail rights in virtue of which they are
rights). Thus, by determining just how much information
such locutions convey we should be able to get an angLe on
the concept of a right.
If rights are indeed things
,
what sorts of things are
they? One plausible view (this seems to be Hohfeids) is
that rights are abstract particulars of the sort:
iega l/mora l relations. As such, rights may be simple or
complex. They may be simple in that they may be composed of
a single basic sort of legal/moral rights-relation. On the
other hand, they might be composi tional ly complex, composed
of many Legal/moral, relations (perhaps including, or
reducible to llohfeLd's basics). In tnis cnaDter [ will
investigate these possibilities.
1.2 Transparency
If ri. gnts are best thought of as tnings, tnen a common
assumption about rights becomes questionable: the thesis of
the conceptual completeness ( t ransparancv ) of rights. This
assumption is the view that the grasp of the general
concept(s) of rights toge finer with the content (c) of a
specific right is sufficient to guarantee complete grasp of
the legal/moral relations composing (comprising, involved
in) the right (to c) . This doctrine may have led Hohfeld
and others toward the view that "rights" is ambiguous (that
tnere are several distinct concepts of rights). Also, if
this assumption is true, then linguistic and conceptual
analysis of rights will be an exceedingly powerful tool for
understanding rignts.
L . 2
l
It might be argued, for example, that "rights" is
ambiguous (and tnat there are several distinct concepts of
rights) as foLLows:
As Hohfeld noted, expressions of either of the forms
"x has the right to...", and "x has a ri.gnt to ..." will,
in different contexts, ascribe different sorts of
legal/moral status to x: sometimes a liberty, sometimes a
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power, sometimes an immunity, and sometimes a c l.a im- r i gh t
.
But this could not be the case if in such expressions
rights expressed a single general concept which applied
to all such rights, for then it wouLd ascribe to x no more
than the minimum legal/moral features common to all rights
( to •••) (those features contained within the concept of
rights). l£> that is, rights is not ambiguous (between
several distinct concepts), and any of a wide variety of
distinct legaL/moral relations comprise rights, then none
of these relations will be common to all rights or entailed
by the concept. Thus, none will be guaranteed x by, or
ascribed to x by, (the truth of) statements of the forms "x
has a right to ..." and "x has the right to ...".
If "rights" is not ambiguous, it is difficult to see
how expressions of the form "the right to ..." could refer
at alL. Do such expressions, in a context, refer to a
liberty, a power, an immunity, or a claim-right? Does "the
right to an attorney" refer to the liberty to have an
attorney, the power to select an attorney, an immunity from
having one's choice of attorney disqualified by others, or
a claim-right to an attorney? One might have all of these
"rights" at the same time. If the concept was, say, the
disjunction of the four basic relations, it could not be
used, as alleged, to refer to one of them in particular;
for there will not be a unique right (to an attorney), but
263
several such rights. Sometimes it may he used to refer to
one, and at other times to another. Thus, one might
concLude, in some contexts, "rights" signifies Liberty, in
others, the other basic relations. Thus, "rights" is
ambiguous, and there are severaL distinct concepts of
rights. These include, at the Least, the basic Hohfeldian
relations, Liberty, immunity, power, and cLaim-right.
L.22 But why assume the transparency thesis? For
Locutions (and their conceptual parallels) such as l and 2
there seems to be LittLe reason to accept the transparancy
thesis, and much reason to doubt it. With definite
descriptions, there is no reason to think that the grasp of
the concept used to attain reference gives one a fuLL grasp
of the nature of the object referred to. "The Last clown on
the right is funny" (or the concepts clown, Last, right,
and funny) teLLs us LittLe about the nature of the clown.
Even where supposedly essentiaL features are know to be
invoLved, very incomplete information about the nature or
composition of the thing referred to is obtained, (eg. "The
Last human being on the right is funny" tells only a LittLe
about the nature of that being). The same goes for abstract
nouns. The understanding of "The Last Law passed before the
Legislative session broke up was the new tax Law, does not
convey much information about the Legal reLation(s) that
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Law creates
,
or its implications for the legal status of
actions. Similarly with rights. Understanding of "rights"
may allow reference to rights, and an adequate concept of
rights may allow us to think cLearly about them. Rut it is
doubtful that either, even together with a specific
content, guarantees fulL grasp of the nature, composition,
or implications of the particular rights we think or speak
o f .
For locutions like (3), the grasp of the concept(s) of
rights may be adequate for understanding their
s igni f icance
,
though not the f u L
l
nature of the various
rights to (one of which x has )
.
Interestingly
,
there
may, in f act
,
always be what we wi i
L
call a "minimal right"
(to ...) which invoLves only the moraL/legal relations
common to all rights ( to ). Perhaps for such rights
the transparency thesis holds, for the concept of a right
might be the concept of certain moral/legal. relations had
in common by aLl rights. [2]
While it is possible that "rights" works differently,
that the concept of a right is sufficient for full grasp of
the nature of the right, this cannot be assumed, and if it
is to be made plausible, a theory of the concept which
aLLows this must be developed.
1.23 Ambiguity argument revisited
Thus, an more powerful version of the argument of
sect. 1.21 wou Ld run : some t imeshas a right to
conveys the Information that x has a power while at other
times it conveys the information that x is at liberty to
*
or that x is immune from
,
or that x has a
cLaim-right to
,
thus it must be ambiguous.
First. Notice that this argument does not assume the
transparency thesis. [n fact, the conclusion says nothing
about the composition of rights, but concerns merely what
the term "right" must mean in order to explain the ammount
of information conveyed by certain expressions in which it
is used.
Second. The argument does not show even this. (l)
HohfeLd draws his exarnpLes from law. Even if, in Law,
"rights" is sometimes used ambiguously in this way,
technical uses may be invoLved which are not part of the
ordinary concept of rights. (2) Nor does the argument show
that such expressions, by themselves, convey the specific
information specified. This information may not be part of
the concept of rights. It may be that when such expressions
are used, the context of their use offers additional
information which narrows down the sort of rights in which
the speaker is interested, enabling the Listener to
determine whether powers, immunities, Liberties, or cLairn-
rights are at issue.
2 6b
2 . Rights as things
Ue conceive of rights as things to which persons may
be related by the relation having
. This suggests a two
stage approach to understanding rights: (A) determine what
they are, (B) determine what it is to have them (i.e., what
sort of possession is possession of a right?).
2.1 (A) On the account we are examining, rights are
abstract particulars of the sort: legal/moral relations. On
this approach to rights, we need to distinguish between:
(1) the internal relations which compose rights, and (2)
the external properties had by these composites.
(1) We shall call the legal/moral relations which
compose rights "internal" relations. If rights are composed
of iegai/morai relations, then the understanding of a
specific right will depend upon the specification of those
relations which compose it. Also, the characterization of
(definition of) the sorts of things rights are will, it is
likely, involve a specification of the sorts of legal/moral
relations which characteristically (or essentially) compose
them. Are rights composed of liberties, powers, immunities
and/or c laim- rights ? Are there other legal/moral relations
besides these which are parts of rights (eg., other basic
Hohfeldian relations)? Or is there a separate, independent
rights-relation which is the right (and which sometimes
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impLies the various Hohfeldian relations)? These are
questions of the internal features of rights. The
legal/moral implications of specific rights, and rights
generally, will be largely a function of the rights'
compos i tion .
(2) The external features of rights will also be
important. Knowledge of aspects of rights such as their
source, their importance, and perhaps their range of
application are crucial to understanding both their
justification, and their implications for the moral/legal
status of action. Many, perhaps most, of the classical
categorization of rights are based on external features.
Natural rights are rights which persons (would) have in the
state of nature (i.e., prior to any social organization or
agreement). Moral rights are rights grounded in morality.
Legal rights are rights grounded in the law. The rights of
chess players are rights grounded in the rules of chess.
Inaleinable rights are rights which cannot be aieinated
(i.e., voluntarily traded away). Absolute rights are rights
which it is always wrong to violate (as opposed to other
rights, the violation of which can sometimes by justified).
None of these distinctions seems to specify internal, or
compositional features of rights. They involve the grounds,
force, limits and so on of the legal/moral relations which
compose rights, or the composite itself.
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2*2 (B) If this is correct, then having; (possessing) a
right is, plausibly, to hold (stand in) a specific sort of
roLe in those legal/moral relations which comprise the
right. Characterization of this role, or course, will have
to wait for an account of the nature of the legal/moral
relations composing rights.
An option to this approach might hold that to have a
right is to stand in some external relation to the
lega 1/moral relation which is the right
.
However
,
this
option is not very plausible. Two sorts of position seem
immediately available along these lines. (1) To have a
right is like physical possession . It is to have the
ability to use
,
or
,
at leas t for a time, prevent others
from using, the thing possessed. (2) To have a right is to
have a special moral/legal relation of possession to that
right. One iegally/moraliy possesses something when one has
a property right in it. To have, in this sense, a thing (a
right) is to have a right to it.
Neither of these apporaches seems helpful. (l) does
not seem appropriate to rights. What could it be to
physically possess a moral/legal relation?[3]
(2) is more plausible. However, it seems circular and
regressive. On this view, to have a right is to nave a
right to the right. The latter is to have a right to the
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right to tne right, and so on. [4] In addition, it is far
from clear what it wouLd be to have a right to a
moraL/legaL relation (an abstract entity). While these
points are not conclusive against this approach (the
circuLar regression may not be a problematic (vicious) one,
and sense might, I suppose, be made of rights to moral
relations), it does seem more complex and obscure than the
view that to have a right is to stand in the moral/legal
relations which comprise the right.
2.3 Existence, Subsistence, and Instantiation
If rights are legal/moral relations, and if to have a
right is to stand in the relation(s) which comprise it,
then we should distinguish between three statuses a right
might have: subsistence, existence, and instantiation.
Subsistence. Certain legal/moral relations may subsist
which are rights-like, but not really rights. For example,
the right to torture for fun. As an abstract legal/moral
relation, such a thing would seem to be classifiable as a
right. However, it may not be a right in any actual legal
system, or in morality. It may even be impossible for
anyone to have such a moral right. Of course, almost any
such right could be actualized in legal systems, even the
right to torture. (In fact, some legal systems have
grounded this right to nobility, police, religious leaders
(during the inquisition), and military officers.) We often
speak of such subsistent, but non-existent, rights; for
exampLe, we might warn against making them LegaL rights.
MoraL debate often centers on which subsisting rights are
actuaL (existing) rights.
Existence (Actual, ReaL rights). Only some subsistent
rights are actuaL (real, existing) rights. If a subsisting
right is recognized by a LegaL system, then it exists
within that LegaL system. Some subsisting rights wiLL not
be (existing) rights under any LegaL system, and different
LegaL systems wiLL "create" different (existing) rights. If
the moral relations which comprise a subsisting moral right
are trueiy in force, then that right exists (is an actuaL
right )
.
Instantiation. Since rights are LegaL/moraL reLations,
for them to be instantiated is for them to be possessed by
someone . Not aLL existing rights are possessed by someone.
The designers of a LegaL system may, for exampLe, find it
prudent to create rights which no one wiLL ever, in fact,
possess. This may be done in preparation for the potentiaL
need for such rights. Suppose a Legislature makes provision
for the appointment of an individuaL with speciaL rights
and powers concerning the organization of medicaL care in
the event of nucLear war. No individuaL may ever come to
have those rights. Thus the possession of a right by
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someone is a distinct state of affairs from the existence
of the right.
2.4 InvoLvement
A number of terms are used to expresss relations
between rights and other closely Linked LegaL/moraL
relations: "invoLves", "includes", "generates", "contains
within", "implies", "is a part of", "is grounded in",
"derives from", and others. Most of these, I think
,
really
pickout the same reLation: involvement. Rights often
involve many moral relations, including other rights,
powers, liberties, immunities, etc., and conditionals
implying, under certain conditions, such relations. For
exampLe, the right to due process seems to invoLve
(include, contain within it, imply) a wide variety of such
relations: the right against unwarranted search, the right
to be marrandized, the right to councei, habeaus corpus,
the right to reasonable bail, the right to a swift triaL,
the power to fire one's lawyer, immunity from double
jeaporday, Liberty to plead innocent or guilty, and more.
Some of these rights are reaLiv conditional, eg., the right
to a swift triaL is more accurately: the right to a swift
trial, if charged with a crime. (Those not charged with a
crime do not have a right to be (swiftly) tried.) These
Legal relations may be further broken down: the right to
counce L involves the conditional right to have the court
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appoint a Lawyer for a defendent if he/she cannot afford
one
.
The extent
,
or (range of ) "involvement", of a right
is the Limits of the right's LegaL/moraL force, the class
of (range of) LegaL/moraL relations it involves. Four
distinct sorts of extent refLect the (some of the) ways
i nwhich a right may reLate to the moral status of
individuals: ( L ) Exis ten t ia 1 Extent, (2) EssentiaL Bearer
Extent, and (3) Situational Bearer Extent, and (4) ALL-in
SituationaL Bearer Extent.
(1) The Essential Extent of a right is the class of
LegaL/moraL relations the existence of the right involves.
We might think of this epis temical Ly (although not
compLeteLy accurately) as the cLass of legaL/moral
relations one couLd know x to have soLeLy on the grounds of
a compLete understanding of the right, and the knowledge
that x has it. (2) The Essential Bearer Extent of a right
is the class of relations involving x that x stands in in
virtue of having the right. These two sorts of extent
should be closely related: the first is just a cLass of
open relations, the second is the class of relations
involving x in which x stands in virtue of having the
right. The second will, presumably, be the first with the
open relations filled in by x.
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(3) Since, for a given right, many elements of (l) and
(2) will be conditional legal/moraL relations, another sort
of extent is important. The Situational Bearer Extent of
(x's having) a right, R, is the class of legal/moraL
relations x stands in invirtue of x's having R in x's
particular circumstances. For example, the right to nave a
Lawyer appointed if one is cnarged with a criminal offense,
and cannot afford one, is within the EssentiaL Extent of
the right to due process. x's right to have a lawyer
appointed if x is charged with a crime and cannot afford
one is within the EssentiaL Bearer Extent of R (for x).
Neither of these include the right to have a Lawyer
appointed, simpliciter; they are conditional. If, however,
x has been arrested, charged with a crime, and cannot
afford a lawyer, then in that situation he has the
unconditional right to have a lawyer appointed. x's right
to due process would, in this situation, have within its
Situational Bearer Extent this unconditional right.
(4) Things may be even more complicated if, as some
have thought, not only are some of these legal/moral
relations conditional, but prima facie as well. If so, the
concept, All-in Situational Bearer Extent, including in
addition to the Situational Bearer Extent those legal/moraL
relations the bearer stands in in the situation in virtue
of having the prima facie moral/legal relations in the that
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extent become aLL-in (in their ballance against other
relevant legal/moral considerations).
I do not intend rigor here. These distinctions are
merely meant to help bring into focus some of the variety
of ways rights relate to those who have them, and gain
their implications. These sorts of extent are at Least
loosely related to the process of drawing out the
implications of rights for behavior. To understand the
implication of a right for specific actions, one may first
try to determine (at least the relevant parts of) the
general extent of the right (Existential, and Essential
Rearer), next, apply it to the circumstances of the
individuals involved (Situational Bearer), and, finally, if
conflicts surface, weigh them (determining part of the
Expanded Situational Rearer Extent). The process may not be
so simple, but it seems to involve at least these elements.
2.5 Extent and Composition
But what determines the extent of a right? The move
from Essential Bearer Extent to Situational Bearer Extent
may be easy enough to understand, and perhaps we can
understand the weighing involved in the next move. But what
determines the Existential Extent of a right?
The expressions mentioned suggest two modes of
determination: (1) implication ("generates", "is grounded
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^ n
’
implies ), and (2) composition (parthood)
( incLudes
,
involves", "contains within it", "is part
of ). (i) suggests that rights are specific LegaL/moraL
relations whicn imply their extent. (2) suggests that
rights are themselves compLex entities composed [5] of the
moral relations they involve: their extent. It is difficult
to decide between these two approaches, especially since
rights are themselves abstracta, and the distinction
between implication and parthood for abstracta is obscure.
Also, the full explanation may well include both
imp 1 ica t iona 1 and compositional aspects.
While implication (and ballancing of prima facie
considerations) seems adequate for handling the moves from
Existential Extent downwards, there are some disadvantages
to holding that implication accounts for extent at the
Existential level, particularly if it is also held that
rights are themselves basic (irreducible) legal/moral
relations on a par with the Hohfeldian basics. In sect. 5 I
will discuss some of these problems, and propose that we
work within the compositional model.
First, however, we should examine some features of
rights which are relevant to this issue.
3. Forsenic Aspect of Rights.
Gary Hebert suggests that rights are forensic:3.1
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right s emerge discursively, as the product ofpublic debate. "Human rights talk," then, represents
verbal behavioral evidence of social relationships
which
, .
if we are to locate its significanthistorical content, requires only that we "consult
tne forum
. The content of rights is determined by
the public forum, from the consensus that emerges
from public debates. [6]
...they [rights] have origins in public
opinion, custom, or usage, in history rather than in
na ture
.
[ 7 ]
While we may not agree to Hebert’s ontological thesis
concerning the nature and source of rights, a number of
aspects of our thought about, and language of, rights may
be seen as forensic. This is especially clear for specific
general legal rights. [8]
First, I will investigaste the forensic nature of the
extent (composition) of specific general legal rights.
Later I will discuss moral rights.
It is doubtful that the composition, or extent, of a
general legal right is a simple function of the concept of
a right and the concept of its object (the content of the
right). The precise extent of a general legal right, eg.,
the right to freedom of speach, the right to due process of
law, the right to freedom of religion, is usually "up for
grabs" in at least two ways: (1) it is indeterminate, (2)
it is mutable.
3.11 Undeterminedness.
This is not merely to say that the implication, or
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involvement of specific rights are not yet fuLLy drawn out.
What is interesting and important here are tde sorts of
concerns relevant to determining the extent of specific
rights, and the nature of the process of drawing them out.
The concerns may vary from legal system to legal system.
Let us look at ours. In our system perhaps the most common
forum for determining [9] the extent of legal rights is the
courts. Often courts must determine whether a specific
action or forbearance falls under the "protection" of a
specific right (whether the right extends to having
relevance for the legal status of the action). [10]
Sometimes courts (especially the Supreme Court) will go
beyond this to specify more broadly the extent of specific
rights. Briefly, many factors are relevant to their
decisions. Among these are: (1) The tradition of
interpretation of the right found in common law, in legal
theory and in the history of political thought. (2) The
letter of the law or laws which institute the right, and
related, especially conflicting, legal relations. (3)
Legislative intent. (4) Political and social needs. (5)
Other concerns. (Often, these factors interrelate in
complicated ways). Brief discussion of these follows.
(1) Common law tradition of interpretation of the
extent of rights is important. Some rights arise, not out
of statutory law, but out of common law tradition (perhaps
278
even more so in British Law than in American). Precedent
counts strongly in favor of an interpretation, hut not
conclusively. Where precedents conflict, some must be
rejected, and sometimes there is no adequate precedent.
Even where there are clear prececents, they may be broken
from. Courts reverse other courts, and the Supreme Court
sometimes rejects (reverses) its own precedents, thereby
reinterpreting rights.
Also, where there is a common tradition of
interpretation of a right, whether by legal theorists,
political theorists, or the "Zeitgeist" of the community,
such tradition sometimes bears on the extent of rights.
(2) The specific wording of the laws thought to [ 1 L
]
institute a specific right is relevant to the specific
extent of that right. This often conflicts with (3),
legislative intent. The concept of legislative intent is
difficult to analyze, but roughly, where there is general
agreement amongs t those creating or modifying a right
(passing a law) as to what the creation of that right
(passage of the law) is supposed to accomplish [12] in
terms of what sorts of activities it is to proscribe or
allow, this area of agreement determines the limits of
legislative intent. For example, what did the founders
intend to protect in granting the constitutional right to
do afreedom of religious practice? Sometimes lawmakers
poor job of casting their intent into language (even when
there is a concensus). Courts often take both the Letter
and intent of the Law into account in determining the
extent of the right it institutes.
(4) Courts sometimes apply their own ideas of what a
right "should" invoLve in determining what it does involve.
Such "judiciaL Legislation", though criticized by some,
seems to be a feature of our system, and one which combines
with precident to generate elements of the extent of
rights. [13] Many concerns may come into pLay: general
untiLitarian considerations [ 1 4 ] and traditional
conceptions of justice and fairness often influence the
court's determination of extent. This may be especially
common where the boundary of a right is unclear in
tradition, and the court feels it has a Little leaway to
take these concerns into account.
(5) The previous list is far from compLete. How, for
example, do executive rules for delivering a Legislatively
mandated right reLate to the extent of the right. How do
conflicts of rights and other Legal concerns get resolved?
What are there implications of the Limits of the states
ability to enforce rights for the extent of rights?
(1), (2), (3), and (5) seem Largely (but not
excLusiveLy) concerned with the determination of the extent
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of an established right. (4) seems to involve more directly
the creation, or redefinition, of rights.
3.12 Mutability
The extent of a specific legal right need not be
constant over time. Legislatures may decide that the laws
they have passed instituting a right are inadequate, and
choose to modify or rescind them, or pass others, thereby
changing the extent of that right. Executive orders for the
interpretation or execution (operationalization) of laws
and rights may be changed, changing the extent of the
right. Courts may interpret a right to have unprecedented
Implications, perhaps expanding its extent, or they may
reverse themselves, and so change the extent of the right.
In a legal system, there could be several distinct
rights to due process, with distinct inclusions. For
example, the constitution might grant a right to due
process interpreted to include, say, disabilities on the
part of Congress to pass laws denying due process. At the
same time, Congress may have passed a number of laws
guaranteeing due process as well, with differing inclusion.
The expression "the right to due process" might continue to
be used to refer to the constitutional right (the other may
not even have a common name). Or it might work in other
ways. The right to due process grounded in the fifth
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ammendmen t was supplimented with the passage of the
fourteenth ammendment. Generally, now, "the right to due
process is used to refer to the protection granted under
tne union of these ammendments. Sometimes, one right to due
process must be singled out by, for example, "the right to
due process as graranteed by the fourteenth ammendment."
Notice, however, that the concept of rights combined
with the concept of due process does not seem, itself, to
determine which right is referred to, or its inclusion. It
is not impLausible that with such expressions, the
reference is determined largely socio-his tor ica 1 Ly
.
Generally, the ordinary citizen can use and understand such
an expression because s/he grasps the concepts involved.
But the reference is not determined by the concepts, but by
the tradition: what right has the expression traditionally
been used to denote? The tradition for legal rights can be
discovered by examining the way the experts have used the
expression. Relevant are: (1) the way tne right has been
interpreted in common law, in legal theory, and in the
history of political thought, (2) the letter of the law or
laws which are seen as instituting the right (which laws
are associated with a right is also a question to which the
same sorts of concerns apply), (3) legislative intent, and
perhaps even (4) political and social needs. As with
extent, other concerns may bear. These are much the same
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concerns wnich, we noted, the court takes into account in
determining the extent of a right. These concerns, which
largeLy determine the standard reference of the sorts of
expressions we have been discussing, are Largely socio-
historical
.[15,16]
3.125 Extremes of Mutability.
The mutability of a right can be so extreme, I
believe, that some things which we caLl "rights" may not be
rights at aLL. Erosions of rights can lead to calling
things rights which are not. Take, for example, property
rights. Suppose that originally the right to private
property was, in a legal system, very strong (as in ours,
one hundred and fifty years ago). The right to one's
private property might include rights to use it as one
chooses, rights to trade, sell, and lend it to others,
rights to destroy it, rights to modify it. Such a right
might also include the power to gain property rights in any
thing acquired through a voluntary exchange. Suppose that,
over a long period of time, the legal system slowly
modified this "laise faire" policy, first allowing the
state to take over property for the benefit of the
community in return for market value payment, later
allowing the state to take over property for any of its
purposes whatsoever. Also, laws restricting free trades are
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slowly introduced, first with respect to certain dangerous
items (tanks, drugs, guns, etc.), later with respect to
sports franchizes, businesses, and finally with respect to
any trade the state decided it wished to restrict. Changes
are also made, first prohibiting persons from destroying
valuable commodities (smashing their artwork, destroying
their literary output, burning down their own house, if it
could be used by others, etc.), and later expanding this to
prohibit the distruction of any property which could be
useful to others. Similarly, rights to exclusive use could
be slowly eaten away. In the end, "the right to private
property" might merely be used to refer to an individuals
liberty to use his/her "property" (the stuff they have in
their physical possession) so long as the state and others
don't want to use it too. It is doubtful that this is a
(property) right at all. The aspects of the original legal
relation which made it a right seem to have been lost over
time. Yet, because the change was gradual, and because of
the original use of "rights", this moral relation mav
continue to be referred to as "the right to property".
3.2 Inappropriate Attachment
Suppose legislators wish to create a right to
something. Suppose that in the legislative process, so many
compromises are made that the resulting law really does not
create a right, but some weaker legal relation.
Nonetheless, as a result of the intent of the Legislature,
the tradition established during the Long debate, and the
use of the expression "the right to x" by the press and
others, that expression may come to refer to this Limited
Lega L reLation. (Some Legislators might have even argued
against tne compromise that the bill would not create a
right at aLL. ) Such faLse attachment of an expression such
as tne right to x seems possibLe, thus such expressions
may not always pick out rights.
In fact, a Legislator may find it politically usefuL
to fooL citizens. Suppose that citizens are clamoring for
the protection of some sort which the Legislature finds it
inadvisable to protect. Legislators might publicize the
passage of a Law creating "the right to [this protection]"
in such a way that "the right to [this protection]" becomes
the standard way of speaking of the LegaL relations
instituted by the Law, whether or not they are reaLLy
rights. Patent medicines are often not medicines at aLL.
3.3 The Institution of Rights
One aspect of LegaL rights which encourages mutabiLity
and inappropriate at tachmen t is the fact that rights are
often instituted without the use of the term "rights".
While this term is sometimes used, rights are often
instituted by Laws cast in terms of what peopLe can and
cannot do. For example, the Constitutional right to freedom
of religion is not instituted by stating, "Citizen’s shall
have a right to the free practice of religion." it is
instituted by (Article I) "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof." This creates a disability on the
part of Congress (to pass certain sorts of laws). Similarly
for the right to freedom of speech, the press, peaceable
assembly and many other rights, both constitutional and
non-constitutional.
There are many difficulties of interpretation
(determining extent) for laws cast in terms of
"rights"
.[ 17 ] But for laws not cast in terms of "rights"
there will be questions even beyond these. For example,
which such laws create rights? How do groups of such laws
interrelate, or relate to laws cast in terms of "rights",
to institute specific rights?[l8]
The difficulty of these questions make clear at least
some ways in which inappropriate attachment and mutability
could arise. Certain laws, or groups of laws, not cast in
terms of "rights" may create legal relations which are
mistakenly termed "rights". Or, laws may create legal
relations which are correctly termed "rights"; but later
modification of these laws may result in their ceasing to
create a right, even though because of the traditional
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association of the term "rights" with the legal relations
created by tnese laws, the weaker reLation they institute
may stiLL be caLled a "right".
4. Forensic Features in Moral Rights
4.1 Indeterminacy of Extent
The inclusion of general moral rights (eg., the right
to life, the right to freedom of speech, the right to
freedom of thougnt) does not seem determinable directly
,
or perhaps even indirectly, from the concept of rights and
the concept of the content (life, freedom of speech,
freedom of thought) of the right. Socio-his tor ica 1 facts
about toe tradition of useage seem relevant. For example,
what is the extent of the moral right to freedom of speech?
Is it the rignt to say anything one wants? Does it extend
to libel? Does it protect gossip, and unwanted and un-
a s ked- f or advise? Lying? Propaganda? Overly harsh
evaluation of the characters of others? It is doubtful that
the right to free speech extends to all of these (a common
response to unwanted advise or criticism is "You have no
right to say that)."
Yet what could we say in response to the person who
cites the right to freedom of speech in support of such
talk (if we agree that there is a right to freedom of
speech)? We might argue that the right does not imply such
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extensive freedom. But, he couLd reply, "You understand
"right" don't you? "freedom"? "speech"? And you do maintain
that r have that right? You did not say "some speech", and
specify just which sorts of speech are acceptable, did you?
That is, he could point out that the meaning of "the right
to freedom of speech" suggests a right to freely speak in
any way he chooses. However, you could respond that that is
not the right generally referred to by "the right to free
speech," and cite historical evidence that traditionally
tnat expression lias been used to refer to a more limited
right, one which does not protect libel, lying, unwanted
advise, propaganda, etc.. You could point out that the lack
of rights to do these things does not refute, in fact, is
not relevant to, whether or not the right to freedom of
speech which is normally spoken of, exists. His insistance
that the meaning of "rights" and "freedom" and "speech"
makes it clear that they are relevant, and that their
absence is proof that one does not have the (or a) right to
freedom of speech, rests on his failure to recognize tnat
the right he is referring to (which he does not have) is
distinct from the right normally referred to by "the right
to freedom of speech". Notice, however, the right he refers
to seems to be the right referred to by treating "the right
to freedom of speech" most literally. In order to justify
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our judgments concerning the extent of the right, we look
not to Linguistic facts about the meaning of "rights",
freedom
,
and speech
,
but to socio-historicaL facts
about what that right has traditionally been interpreted as
involving. The socio-hi s tor ica 1 argument trumps the
linguistic argument in this case. Tne meaning of the
components of such expressions as "the right to freedom of
speech" does not seem to determine its reference, at least
not in isolation from the socio-historica 1 tradition of
usage
.
4.2 Mutability
Mutability seems possible for moral rights as well as
legal. There may be significant differences between the
extent of the right to life spoken of by Locke, and that
spoken of today. The extent of the moraL right to freedom
of religion the founders had in mind (and which they
instituted the legal right to protect) may be considerably
different than that referred to by the expression today.
The right to bear arms may have considerably different
extent today than then. [19]
The extent of moral rights may mutate in a number of
ways. Sometimes there is simply a historical drift. At
different times, different moral issues come to the fore.
It may become common to interpret a right as having certain
implications for these issues. As issues fade and reappear,
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the the popular judgment as to the implications of a right
may very. If the consensus is great enough, these
implications may become essentially linked to the right
they are attributed to. Of course, later, these links mav
be broken, and a new conception of the right may appear.
Reformers may cause radically new conceptions of rights to
become the norm, even over very short periods of time.
It is important to recognize that these changes are
linguistic and conceptual, and need not be accompanied by
(at least large) changes in the moral status of
individuals, or in their moral rights. What is involved
here is not the issue of what rights individuals have, but
of which rights are referred to by the names (and related
concepts) we use to refer to (think of) specific general
rights
.
4.3 Inappropriate Attachment
It seems possible that with some rights, mutation
could go so far as to produce inappropriate attachment.
Also, a reformer might begin to call some moral relation
(eg., a pure liberty) a "right" which is not. This practice
may be adopted generally, resulting in inappropriate
attachment
.
4.4 Socio-historical Contribution. Doppelganger Example.
The socio-historical element of the reference and
290
extent of moral rights may be illustrated by the following
example
:
[ 20
]
Imagine two worlds wl and w2. In wl the "right to
life has traditionally been thought of as involving a
limited right not to be killed, and not to be
interferred wit.n in pursuing the good life. When people use
the term they refer to such a limited right, yet the
understanding of the precise bounds of the right may not be
something they are directly aware of. In w2 the "right to
life has traditionally been interpreted more broadly to
include the right to be activeLy helped when one's life is
indangered. Bill, a competent language user, but not an
expert on rights, says of a friend in need, "Doctor, you
should help him because he has a right to life." Suppose
people do have, in both worlds, a right to be helped when
their life is indangered. Suppose it is even recognized in
both worlds, but in wl they have traditionally called that
right "the right to life-support". Bill's statement, if
made in wl, would be false. If made in w2 it would be true.
That is because it is not Bill's belief (that the right to
life involves the right to be helped), but the linguistic
tradition of use (determined socio-nistorically ) , which
determines which basic legal/moral relations are part of
the right.
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5. Rights are Composites of their Extent
As we have suggested, on the substantial approach we
have been pursuing, two natural positions as to the
composition of rights offer thernseLves: (l) GeneraL rights
are (often) complexes of legal/moral relations not
tnemseLves general rights. (2) There is a rights relation
distinct from (and not reducible to) other legal/moral
relations which itself composes rights.
5.1 (l) is the view that general rights are complexes of
tne moral/legal relations, perhaps Hohfeld's basics. A
promising version of this holds that general rights are
composed of the relations comprising their existential
extent. With most rights, the concept of a right, in
general, even in conjunction with a clear grasp of the
right's content, will not reveal the details of its
composition. Its composition will depend not only on the
intent of the mind contemplating the right, but on socio-
historical- legal facts as well, as we have suggested. We
can understand the forensic aspect of rights as
investigation into their composition. Over time, a right
may mutate by changing its composition, [21 ] even though at
the same time retaining its name. Inappropriate attacnment
is easy to understand on this approacn.
On this approach, the view that the essence of general
rights is to be found in their composition looks
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attractive, to understand rights generaLLy would largely be
a matter of understanding which Lega L/mora 1. relations are,
when compounded, necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a right. That is, this approach holds open both the
possibility of defining rights in general, and of
characterizing particular rights, in terms of their
compositional elements. The approach does not require this,
however; it is also consistent with the possibility that
the essential (defining) features of general rights are
externa l
.
5.2 On approach (2) a general right is itself a
(presumably simple) legal/moral relation, and not composed
of other legal/moral relations. This view fits weiL witn
the transparency thesis, It allows that in grasping the
concept of a right in general one grasps this general-
rights reLation. This suggests that we may understand the
composition of a specific right directly, by means of the
concept of a right in general, and that specific right's
content. On this view, involvement will presumably be
explained impi ica tiona l ly rather than compos i t iona L ly
;
rights will imply
,
under specific circumstances, other
legaf/moraL relations (eg., the Hohfeidian basics tney
invoLve). On this approach it is unlikely that rights are
to be defined externally, and, if the concept is indeed
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simple, non- reduc t i ve ly .
This second approach carries with it some
dif f icuities .
First. The pLausibiiity of this approach requires
suppLimentai theories of involvement, and the forensic
features of rights we discussed. (eg., mutahilitv,
inappropriate attachment, and so on). It is doubtfuL that
the wide range and variety of rights involvement, including
socio-his torica 1 contribution, can be accounted for on this
approach. It is difficult to formulate any completely
generaL principles linking general rights with the other
legal/moral relations they involve. Why suppose such
principles exist? That the other forensic features of
rights: mutability, false a t tac'nmen t, socio-his to rical
involvement, and so on, can be accounted for on this
approach is dubious as well.
Second. This approach postulated a basic legal/moral
relation irreducible t 0 the others with which we are
familiar. But what i s it? Some explication, if not
analysis
,
is necessary. It is unclear that this i s
possible
.
further
,
does the postulation of such an
independent entity really do any necessary explanatory
work? (What? If any, can't that also be done by treating
rights as composites of basic Hohfeldian relations?) If
not, concerns of ontological parsimony recommend against
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its postulation.
Related to this is perhaps the greatest difficulty for
such an approach. It seems that iegaL rights can be
instituted without invoking any relations other than
Hohfeid's basics. Sometimes rights are instituted not by
using the term rights
,
but merely by specifying what
people can and cannot do. For example, the Constitutional
right to freedom of speech seems instituted, not by a law
specifying a "right", but by a law instituting a disability
on the part of Congress. Thus, rights may be created by
creating disabilities, or perhaps disabilities in
conjunction with other aLready existing legal
re la t ions
.
[ 2 2 ] Not only do some rights seem to be
characterizabLe in terms of the Hohfeidian basic relations
(sans rights), but it seems that one can create rights out
of such relations. Thus, general rights seem not to be
composed of a special Legal/moraL relation, rights,
distinct from and irreducible to the other basic
legal/moral relations.
I do not claim to have conclusively refuted this
second approach. It, however, seems less clear and
promising than others we might take. UnLess we later find
some independent reason for re-examining this position, I
will concentrate on the first approach .[ 23
]
6. Meaning, Reference, and Rights.
6.1 We should not expect our theory of the nature of
general, rights to be terribLy helpfuL for the evaluation of
proposed anaLyses of the concept. There are several reasons
for tnis. First. At this point the approach is more of a
working hypothesis than a we l L -ev idenced theory. It might
be doubted that rights themselves are things at alL, and be
further maintained that theories of the concept of a right
should stand or fall on grounds other than its success or
failure at conforming to a dubious conception of rights as
things. Second. Even if this approach is correct, it is, as
yet, an incomplete theory of the nature of generaL rights.
We have not specified, as yet, what (if any) sorts of
legal/moral. relations are essentiaL [24] to a composite's
being a right. Nor have we shown that the defining features
of general rights are compositional rather than externaL.
Third. Even if we were confident in our theory of generaL
rights, there may, as we suggested at the beginning of this
chapter, be only a tenuous Link between the nature of a
right and the concept of a right.
6.2 Nonetheless, our view may serve as a guide to the
discovery and evaluation of theories of the concept of a
right.
For exampLe, on our interpretation of rights, it is
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fairly natura I to inter prat expressions like "x has a right
to z as meaning: of aLL the legal/moral relations which
could be legitimately calLed "a right to z," x has (at
least) one. What such an expression will tell us about the
legal/moral status of x is little more than the disjunction
of al.L those rights, that is, what they have in common.
Thus, if we can figure out what ail rights to things have
in common, this is a plausible candidate for what is
conveyed by "x has a right to ...", and a plausible
candidate for the concept of a right (or at least for
essential features of rights).
Such common features might be: (l) Internal features
of rights. Some candidates are: (conditional or
unconditional) liberties, powers, immunities, c iaim- rights
,
and tne other Hohfeidian basics. (2) External features of
rignts. For example, the property of being a Legal/morai
relation created to protect something
. (3) Some combination
of internal and external features. For example, the
property of being a claim-right created with the intention
of protecting something. Many proposed analyses and
explications of rights fit into this pattern.
6.21 Internal Approach
The internaL approach is fairly common. HohfeLd seems
to have concluded that there are several concepts of rights
which are common, concepts which signify the relation wnich
composes the right signified. These are his basic
relations. He also suggests a further concept which is,
roughly, the disjunction of them ail.
Mill may have had a view fitting this approach in mind
when he suggested:
When we call anything a person's right [wnen
we say the person has a right to the thing]
,
we mean
that he has a valid claim on society to protect him
in the possession of it, either by the force of law,
or by that of education and opinion. If ne has what
we consider a sufficient claim, on whatever account,
to have something guaranteed to him by society, we
say that he has a right to do it. If we desire to
prove that anything does not belong to him by right,
we think this done as soon as it is admitted that
society ought not to take measures for securing it
to him, but should leave him to chance, or to his
own exer tions
.
[ 25 ]
On one interpretation of this view, the concept of a
right would be the concept of a legal/morai relation, a
claim, which would, itself, be a component of the rignt,
perhaps the component of the right.
6.22 External Approach
Another approach might suggest that the concept of a
right is not the concept of a legaf/moral relation which is
part of the right. For example, a legal right to a thing
might be thought to be the set of legal relations created
by the government to protect an individual s ability to do
with the thing as he chooses. Such a concept would not
itself be a legal/moral relation, but it would pick out
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(refer to) the Legal./moral relations composing specific
rights. (Notice, an empirical investigation wouLd be
necessary to determine, given the concept of a right, and a
content, the Legal/morai relations composing the right.)
6.23 Combined Approach
Some anlayses of the concept might combine internal
and external features of rights. For example, a LegaL right
to a thing is a claim which is recognized by a government
in order to protect the individual who has the right in
his/her possession of that thing. Thus, a right invoLves a
claim, but only cLaims of certain sorts. [26]
6.3 Some theories fit niceLy into one of these tnree
patterns, others are difficult to classify precisely, and
some do not fit at all. However, I do not think that the
difficulty or impossibility of fitting our model of rights
to a proposal concerning the analysis of the concept of a
right, by itself, refutes either proposal.
First. It is not implausible to hold that the
hypostization of rights, and the development of theories of
their nature such as we have s ke tched , is a mistake. One
could hold, then, that while ascriptions of rights to
individuals say something about their legal/moral relation
to others, there are no sucn things as rights; our thinking
of rights as themselves things is an illusion. Thus,
analysis into a substantial modeL of rights wilL only
confuse. Whether or not Occam's razor can be successfully
used on r i g n t s is not an issue I wish to discuss here. [ am
not confident that it cannot. Thus, we cannot refute an
anaLysis of rights on the grounds that it does not fit weLL
with the view that rights are things. Such analyses must be
met on their own terms. [27]
Second. On the otner hand, one cannot successfully
argue that our model of rights as things is incorrect on
the grounds that the correct analyses of what it is to have
a right does not imply it. A theory of this concept may
tell us very little of the nature of specific rights, just
as a theory of the concept of what it is to be democratic
may tell us littLe about the nature of the things which are
democracies. (Are they all governments? No, cLubs can be
democratic. Socio-po Litical institutions? Are all groups
which are democratic institutions? Are any specific voting
procedures required? Is formal voting required at all?
Probably not.)
Nor can one conclude from the fact that there are
plausible analyses of what it is to have a right which are
incompatabLe with substantial views of rights, that those
views are mistaken. What is plausible may be false.
6.4 How, then, is the tneory of the composition of rights
related to theories of the concept of what it its to have a
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right? Well, in at ieast two ways:
(1) There is a prima facie presumption in favor of
tneories which can account for the fact that we speak and
think of rights as things. Theories of what it is to have a
right shouLd be consistent with some reasonable account of
this .
(2) A theory of the nature and composition of rights
may provide a model which suggests explanation for a wide
variety of moral and legal phenomena, including not only
the analysis of the concept of rights, but the relation of
rights to other iegal/morai relations, the importance of
rights, certain attitudes common concerning rights, and so
on. I believe the model of rights I have suggested can
serve as a clue to, and an element in, a very plausible and
powerful theory of rights wnich casts light on a wide
variety of issues.
7 . Reference
7.1 One problem for this view: How can we account for the
reference of such descriptions of rights as "the right to
Life", or "tne right to due process"? Due process, for
example, is composed of a wide variety of legal relations.
Yet there are any number of parts (subsets) of this right
which could also be legitimately called "a right to due
process". We nave seen that such rights mav mutate by tne
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addition of new legal relations. But, strictly speaking,
tne originaL, less extensive right will continue to exist
tnrougn such mutation. Why does "tne right to due process"
pick out tne new, more extensive right, rather than the
coexisting part of it which could also be called "a right
to due process"? There is a wide range of such parts of the
right to due process which could legitimately be called
"rights to due process". That is, the concept of rights
plus tne grasp of ther concept of due process are not
adequate to determine which of the many legal rights to due
process is "the" right to due process.
With moral rights, a similar difficulty arises. There
are many complex moral relations which might legitimately
be called "a right to life". Which of them is the right to
life?
In sum, these expressions do not seem to act as
definite descriptions. How do they refer? There are several
possible explanations. I would like to examine two here.
The first allows that such expressions do operate like
definite descriptions. The second that they are more like
names .
7.2 Definite Description Approach
The first approach retains the descriptive element of
such expressions, but hoLds that a contextual element of
the use of such descriptions combines with the descripti/e
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element to determine reference.
One might suggest, for example, that when such
definite descriptions are used, what is realLy meant is
"the maximal right to where "maximal" eliminates all
rights to ... which are included in other rights to . .
.
One problem with this proposal is that the tradition in a
society may be to use, for example, "the right to due
process", to refer to a specific composite of legal
relations which is not maximal. New rights to due process
may have been recently added to the old by legislation, yet
the expression, "the right to due process", may, by
tradition, be reserved for the old right.
Nevertheless, other accounts along these lines may
work. 1 would like, however, to pass on to a discussion of
an interesting alternative.
7.3 Natural Kinds Approach
A second approach is more radical. It denies that such
expressions as "the right to due process" act as definite
descriptions, holding instead that they operate more Like
names, perhaps on the model of naturaL kind terms suggested
by Putnam. [28]
That expressions which look like definite descriptions
can sometimes act as names is clear. For example: Suppose
John Doe performed for a famous circus under the name "the
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strongest man in the world" for forty years, and became so
famed for his strength that everyone used that expression
to refer to him. Suppose that on his retirement "he"
announced that he was really a woman, and a weak one at
that, and that her feats of strength had been faked. The
strongest man in the world was a weak woman. That
expression did not act as a standard definite description
in referring to John, but seems to have operated more like
a name, perhaps via something like a "dubbing", aLong with
general acceptance of that useage.
That our expressions for rights do not refer as
descriptions, but in a name-like manner, is a possibility.
(3ut how would such reference work?
7.31 Putnam argued that for natural kind terms, linguistic
competence requires little more than a paradigm of the kind
(eg., for "tiger" an idea of the features of typicaL
tigers), an idea of the sort of term involved (eg. mass
noun), and a grammatical understanding of how the term is
to be properly used. He gives strong evidence that the
classes of things such terms signify (their extension) are
determined in large part by the internal, often unknown or
ungrasped, nature of the things traditionally referred to
(or referred to by the experts), rather than by the
concepts or ideas of the kind in the minds of competent
speakers. He has us imagine two worlds icientical in every
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wav (particularly in tne internal psychological states of
language u.iers) except that in world^ H^O is referred to by
water
,
while in world2 stuff that serves as and is
called water" turns out to be a different chemical, XYZ.
H^O is not in the extension of "water" as used on world
2 ’
XYZ is. On world^, H^O is in trie extension of "water", but
XYZ is not. Yet in both worlds, tne idea competent language
users have of water is the same (they have only a medieval
understanding of chemistry). Putnam concludes that the
concepts of competent language users in these worlds do not
contain the defining features (essential features) of the
natural kind, water. He suggests that natural kind terms
get their extension in part indexically: "water" refers to
whatever kind of stuff the experts have come to call
"water". Whatever features are essential to that stuff are
the essential features of water.
It is difficult to say with confidence how well such
an approach will work for rights. While the language of
rights may not exhibit as e x t reme a degree of indexicality
as natural kind terms, it does exhibit some, and it also
exhibits a number of other relevant similarities to such
terms. In fact, the contribution of indexicality and
linguistic division of labor to reference for rights
closely parallels that for natural kinds. The similarity of
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the exampLe in Sect. 4. 4 to Putnam's "water" exampLe
iLLustrates this. It illustrates how the reference of
expressions for general rights are to a degree independent
of toe ideas the speaker may have in mind concerning the
nature of that right, and how similar this independence is
to that of natural kind terms.
Further, it should be clear from our discussion of the
vagueness, mutability and indeterminacy of rights the
degree to which the extent of the particular general rights
we speak of is dependent upon a division of linguistic
labor, and independent of our personal conceptions of them.
This is expecially clear when laymen speak of general
legal rights. The right referred to, and its extent, depend
more on general legal useage than on the layman's
conception of that right. The layman may nave a completely
wrongheaded idea of the nature of the legal right, yet he
will have no trouble referring to it. In fact, he may be
competent with the language of rights, and may understand
and be able to use expressions like "the right to due
process" while knowing almost nothing of the particular
legal/moral status that right involves. The degree to which
we depend on lawyers to explain to us the nature and extent
of rights which we are completely competent to think and
speak of indicates how little our concept of the right
tells us about the nature of the right, and how inadequate
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it is to, itself
,
determine reference.
As with natural kind terms, the reference (extension)
of the expressions used to refer to general rights is a
f unc t ion of what the experts use it to refer to
.
For
examp Le
,
"the (LegaL) right t o due process" refers to
whatever LegaL reLation gets caLLed "tne (legal) right to
due process" by the experts, the LegaL community
. As we
have seen, the reference of expressions for moral. o r
natural rights depends in much the same way on the
traditions of useage for those expressions.
7.32 It may be objected that this proposaL is circuLar,
that the question of reference is thrown back onto the
shoulders of the "experts", and that they must have an
adequate concept of the right to determine reference. But
this need not be so. The proposal here is that tne
reference of sucn terms is Largely a function of how the
community of experts has used them, and not (necessarily) a
function of the concepts of any particular member or
members of the community. The experts themselves may not
have an adequate grasp of the nature and extent of the
rights to which they refer. Courts spend a great deal of
energy investigating just these issues, and there need not
be a concensus on them. The determination of the reference
of names for general Legal rights is not a purely
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^on^eptua L task, even for experts. It is, rattier, a task
which involves an sort of investigations courts undertake
when they investigate rights, investigations in which
questions of the history of legal, useage play an important
role, as we have seen.
7.33 Perhaps an oddity, and a difficulty here, is Lack of
a corporeal underpinning to which reference can be affixed
in the case of rights. With natural kinds we can understand
how the members of a kind can come to be in the extension
of the term as an explicit two step procedure: (l) experts
actually examine an example of the kind (they grab it). (2)
the name they give the kind of thing encompasses others of
the kind because there is a real feature that thing has
which makes it what it is (is essential to it), and because
the others of its kind have it as weLl. But with rights
this picture blurs. Rights are not concreta, they do not
seem to "be there" to examine, or to have "real" features
in common with other objects. With other sorts of names
which work indexicalLy, there is, at least in the clearest
cases, also a substantial underpinning. Such names refer to
substances which can, say, be pointed to, grabbed, or have
causal relations to other things: thus they, Like natural
kinds, can be referred to first, and then understood.
Rights cannot be. It would seem that they must be
understood in order to be referred to.
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Such objections may be exaggerated. (l) One might
raise questions about the "reality" of the features which
determine natural kinds, or point out that our ways of
sorting the worLd into particulars is a function, not so
mucn of the way the world is, as of the way we see the
worLd ( sg
. ,
through the way our minds are structured
(Kant), the way we were raised, or other, alternative, more
or less productive conceptual schemes (theory relativity)).
Or (2) one could suggest that, in a way, we are capable of
getting hold of" specific rights, that we can observe them
at work within our legal and social systems, and that we
are capable of determining large parts of the extent and
nature of many of them (though others remain somewhat
cloudy and obscure). We also know what sort of thing they
are: legal/moral relations. Are they any harder to observe,
or conceptually more difficult than quarks and quanta? As
with natural kinds, it could be argued, the task before us
is to uncover the properties, essential and otherwise, of
these entities with which we find incorporated in many
legal and moral systems, and with which we are confronted
in legal and moral argument.
7.34 Whether these responses carry much weight in the end
is perhaps something we needn't be overly concerned with.
The question may come down to whether or not the reference
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or significance of Linguistic items (or even conceDts) can
be determined by the practices or conceptions of a
community as a whole, fairLy independently of the
conceptions of any member of that community, and even when
no member of the community has, by him/herself, an
understanding of that Linguistic item adequate to directly
determine its reference or (fuLL) significance. With
natural kind terms, and proper names, this seem likely. But
could it be so for terms signifying abstracta such as
rights? I know of no conclusive arguments against tnis
possibility. If we cannot explain tne functioning of the
language of rights in any other way, that in itself is
powerful evidence that this sort of linguistic phenomena
could, and does occur. The question would then be, how?
7.35 There are a number of strengths to this approach:
(1) It explains how it can be that the meaning of the
elements of the rights-descriptions we use to name specific
rights can be inadequate to determine the expression's
reference. E.g., how the meaning of "right", "the", "to",
and "life" do not seem to be by themselves sufficient to
determine just which of the many legal/moral relations
which could legitimately be called "rights to life" is the
one to which "tne right to life" refers.
(2) It makes clear sense out of the sorts of
investigations relevant to determining the nature of
particular rights. We can view courts, say, as attempting
to discover the precise legal limits (the nature of)
particular rights to which reference can be made, but which
can only be fully understood (and identified) by a socio-
his tor ical investigation which takes into account such
concerns as legislative intent, letter of law, common law
precedent, and so on.
(3) Importantly, it makes clear why attempts to define
the concept of a right in general quickly become more
historical investigations at temp ting to find common a 1 i t ies
between the various legal/moral relations wnich have
traditionally been called "rights" than introspective
conceptual investigations of what our own concept(s) of
rights is. Notice the similarity with the investigation of
natural kinds: the commonalities in the nature of the
entities identified as of the kind are important in
understanding the kind, not the concepts in the heads of
scientists
.
(4) It allows us to understand the phenomena of the
mutability of rights as sometimes involving changes in the
reference of the expressions we use to refer to tnem.
Extreme mutability, and inappropriate attachment can easily
be understood as misattachment of names. If our names for
rights are definite descriptions, it is difficult to see
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now tney could refer to anything but a right. For example
now could "my property right to my car" refer to anything
but a right?
NOTES
1 • " is a right" also seems referential.
2. Unfortunately, "a right to ", and "the rignt
to ", tend to be used interchangeably bv English
speakers. That is, "a rignt to " is often used as a
name for the right to
.
Thus, if we try to figure out
the minimal rignt relation by investigating tne
significance of such expressions as "John has a right to
practice the religion of his choice," we may be mislead
into analyzing "John has the right to practice the religion
of his choice," instead. This latter right may involve much
more than the minimal rights relation.
3. Unless it is to stand in the relation. But this
collapses into the original theory of wnat it is to have a
right
.
4. Joel Feinberg's position may incorporate a similar
regressive circularity (to have a right is to have a claim
to the right, which is to nave a right to the right, whicn
is to have,...). We will discuss this in Ch.2.
Composition here may be treated in any number of5 .
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ways. Tne two most plausible are (perhaps): (i) General
rights are sets or classes of those relations which are
tneir extent, (ii) ueneraL rights are logical constructions
out of those relations which are their extent. I think the
latter the better.
6. Gary Hebert, "Human Rights and Historicist Ontology"
Phil. Forum V.IX, No.l, pp. 26-41, p.36
7 . Ibid
. p . 37
8. Here Hebert would be right in suggesting that rights
are the creations of human institutions.
9- Such "determining" may both involve figuring out the
extent, and creating the extent.
10. And sometimes to ballance their judgment on this
against other legal concerns relevant to the status of that
action.
11. It may be an open question which laws institute
which rights. It is not obvious that all laws relating to
due process are laws which institute the right to it. Eg.,
the right to due process is important to the protection of
various other rights. Do the laws instituting the right to
due process also institute those rights due process nelps
to protect?
L2. Sometimes laws are passed for political purposes,
eg. to embarrass a president who will veto it, or to get
3 13
campaign contributions or votes from special. interest
groups, and so on. Such concerns are not part of
iegis Lative intent, wnich has do do with the legislative
conception of the extent of the law.
13. Whether or not such judicial power is constitutional
or otherwise legitimate is an interesting question, but
does not concern us here. The fact is that traditionally
courts ha/e acted in this way, and in doing so have fixed
(although not necessarily permanently) portions of the
extent of certain rights.
It is a controvercial issue in the philosophy of law
exactly how this discression is reLated to law. Many,
especially legal positivists, have held that when judges
exercise discression, they are not interpreting law, but
making it. Others, (and Dworkin is perhaps the outstanding
example), hold that even when exercising discression judges
are bound by law to rule in certain ways.
14. Some have held (eg. Fried, in RIGHT AND WRONG,
Harvard University Press, 1979) that the borders of many
rights are a function of extreme utilitarian
considerations, that rights do not extend where catastrophe
(or harm to the security of the state) will result from
their being respected.
15. This is not to say that non-standard uses are
uncommon or difficult. One might have in one s mind an idea
such as the right to due process created by the
Legislature to protect us where the constitutional rignt
breaks down" when one uses "the right to due process".
(Notice, this assumes that there is more than one rignt to
due process, that the specific one in mind must be isolated
from the other by "created to protect You know what
you mean. Stili, others wilL not, unless you telL them,
thereby reassigning "the right to due process" to that
right. If, however, the legislature has passed many
distinct Laws, at many different times, to protect peopLe,
say, in their access to the courts, against raciaL
descrimination in tne justice system, against sting
operations, and so on, it may be very unclear just what
right is being referred to. Is it the combination of all of
these, or merely some subset (perhaps where the legislature
had in mind "due process" rather than some aspect of it
such as "the right to a lawyer")?
16. Dworkin’s work suggests a different approach wnich
takes into account many of these concerns. See Chapter 3.
L7. Precise interpretation (legislative intent vs.
wording) is an issue. So is the question of how such Laws
interact with other Laws. For example, many Laws are
designed to enable other laws to be enforced. For example, a
Law might require the formation of an agency (the EPA, eg.)
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to enforce a law or laws.
13. Specific rights may be instituted not by a single
law, but by the combined action of many.
19. There is reason to think that the founders had in
mind a right connected with the need to form local militia,
which is not at all what the National Rifle Associatin has
in mind when they speak of the right to bear arms. Though,
today, people may differ as to whether we have such a moral
right, they seem to be referring to the same right as the
NRA.
20. The structure of this argument derives from
an argument of Hilary Putnam's concerning the significance
of natural kind terms. See, for example, Hilary Putnam,
"The Meaning of "Meaning"", in LANGUAGE, MIND, AND
KNOWLEDGE, Keith Gunderson, ed., (University of Minnesota
Press, 1975). Also, see section 7.3 below.
21. Whether, strictly speaking, the situation is one in
wnich a new right comes to be called by the name previously
attached to a distinct right, or whether it is one inwhich
the same right changes composition, we can leave open. Much
the same issues arise as with questions of identity of
pnysical objects over time.
22. That is, Article I, by itself, may not create the
right, but must, perhaps, be conjoined with other legal
relations, for example
,
tne claim right against the courts
3 L 6
to strike down unconstitutional Laws. Still, no speciaL
r ignts-re Lation seems essential for tnis.
^ suspect that many or our resuLts wi L L not rest
upon my choice here.
b Y "essential" I mean the feature in virtue of which
a right is a rignt, not the feature in virtue of whicn a
right is tne right it is. (viz., People may be people in
virtue of being rational animals, but they may be the
people they are in virtue of being born of their particular
parents
. )
25. J.S. Mill, UTILITARIANISM, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN
SUTART MILL, (Bantam Books, 1961) p.236
26. Perhaps this is what Mill had in mind.
27. We are entitled to expect some clarification of the
apparent reference to rights as things, however.
28. Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of "Meaning"", in
Language
,
Mind
,
and Knowledge
,
Keith Gunderson, ed.,
(University of Minnesota Press, 1975).
APPENDIX B
THE STANDARD LOCUTION
1.1 The expressions ordinarilv used in English to assert
rights are often va^ue
,
ambiguous, or idiomatic. Which
ri^ht an expression signifies is not a clear function of
its syntax, but may vary considerably from context to
context. I'o facilitate the clear, unambiguous signification
of specific rights in the rarefied contexts of
philosophical discussion (as opposed to more normal
contexts, where the expressions for rights appear in a
moraLLy and Linguistically rich environment), and to aid in
the formulation of generaL principles about rights, it is
important to empLoy Locutions which minimize these
difficulties. I find the following especiaLLv useful, and
wiLL empLoy them throughout this dissertation:
has a right against to
has a right against that [l]
where the first two blanks will be fiLLed in by expressions
denoting things (usuaLLy peopLe), and the third so filled
in that ’that ' in the second Locution, and
'
' in the first denote specific events. For exampLe, John's
right (against me) to speak his peace at the rally tomorrow
wouLd be expressed:
John has a right against me that John speak(s)
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his peace at the rally tomorrow
.
or
,
John has a right against me to John's speaking
his peace at the rally tomorrow.
Such locutions will be used to exDress a 3-Dlace
relation between the bearer of the right (x), the "ower"
(for lack of a better term) of the right (y), and the
content of the right, generally, the event (usually an
action) protected or assured by the right (z). Thus, I will
often use expressions Like:[2]
x has a right against y that z
and
x has a right against y to z.
Sometimes, where z is an action which x may perform, I will
employ
:
x has a right against y to do z.
One attraction of these locutions is that their syntax
makes very clear and explicit the three major roles created
by a right, the right-holder, the right-ower, and the
content of the right, i.e., what is owed.
1.2 It may be objected that these locutions are not
ordinary English, and require definition before they can be
understood and usefully employed.
1.21 This may seem especially true of the "against"
element of the locution. "Against" is seldom used this wav
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in ordinary language, although it has become very common in
tne philosophical literature. For our purposes, let us
tentatively say tnat a right holds against an individual
just in case there is a possible action that individual
could perform which would violate the right. (Another way
of thinking of this is that a right holds against just that
( tnose ) indi vidua 1 ( s ) by whom the right must be respected,
i.e., upon whom the right places requirements or
obligations). In most normal circumstances it is either
clear from context, or of little interest, just who a right
holds against. Thus there is little provision in ordinary
language for specifying this role. In fact, this portion of
the locution can often be omitted, and I will do so wnen it
seems otiose or confusing. Sometimes, however, it will be
important for our purposes to specify who a specific right
holds against. At his point we can leave open the questions
whether or not all rights hold against individuals, and
whether a single right can hold against more than one
individual. It is only important that we have the option of
including in our locutions signifying rights a loci for
specifying those whom the right may hold against. Tne
divergence from ordinary English is easily understood, and
should cause no problem.
1.22 The content, or z position, of our locution may
require more extensive discussion. I agree that tne
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sensitive English ear may be confounded by:
,John has a right (against his neighbor) to
John s pLaving his piano at reasonable hours.
Jonn has a right (against his neighbor) that he
pLay his piano at reasonable hours.
or
,
John has a right (against his gardener) that
the gardener cut his Lawn today.
John has a right (against his gardener) to the
gardener's cutting his lawn today.
Such locutions are rare in the classical literature of
rights, and uncommon in ordinary English. However, in
recent philosophical Literature on rights they, or
Locutions like them, have become common, and, it wouLd
seem, well understood. In what foLLows 1 will: (l) cite
tnis tradition, (2) argue that those expressions are easily
understood, and suggest how to understand them, and how
they may be translated into more natural language, and (3)
discuss some of the advantages of these locutions over more
natural ones.
2. The Tradition
2.1 While our locutions are most commonly found in
recent philosophical literature, they are not unknown
outside of the work of contemporary philosophers.
In law, many rights are rights to states of afairs or
actions the parts of others. Article (Ammendment) 6 of the
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U.S. Constitution states:
In aLL criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and
the cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have comDulsarv
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
These are rights to certain states of affairs (that certain
states of affairs obtain) - that the accused be informed of
the charges against him, that the accused be confronted by
his accusers, that the accused have compuLsory process, and
that the accused have the assistance of councel for his
defence. The use of the "that" locution to express such
rights is not unknown:
That case was but an explication of basic
rights that are enshrined in our constitution - tha
t
"no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself," and that the
accused shaLL ... have the Assistance of CounceL"
(Chief Justice Warren. [3] Underlining mine.)
Even some classical statements of rights employ the
"that" Locution:
Among these rights are the following,...
1
st That the supreme and subordinate power of the
legislature should be free and sacred in the hands
where the community have once rightfully placed
them
.
[ 4 ]
(James Otis, 1761)
Such Locutions are probably most common, however,
the work of contemporary philosophers.
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2.2 One sort of right our locutions have been used to
express are rights to non-interference. Such rights are
often associated with rights to act in certain wavs. If vou
have a right to do something, then, it would seem, you nave
a right that others not interfere (to their non-
interference). Notice, these are rights to actions or
events: non-interferences. General statements, such as: (In
this section I will underline especially relevant Dortions
of quoted expressions).
(LI) ...this right of recipience against others that
they not interfere with the exercise of one s
right of action, is the right of social
Liberty
.
[ 5 ]
(L2) ...has the right to forbearance on the part of
ail others from the use of coercion or restraint
against him save to hinder coercion or
restraint
.
[6 ]
Suggest, at the personal Level:
( LI A ) John's right against Bill that
,
Bill not
interfere with the exercise of John's right of
action
.
(L2A) John's right (against
the part of BilL
forbearing...") from
restraint against him.
BiLL) to
(why not
the use of
forbearance
II
on
to Bill's
coercion or
Other rights to states of affairs or actions fit our
Locution. It has been especially common in discussions
ot
rights to be treated in certain wavs by others.
Dworkin
speaks of :
(L3) ...a right to some minimal concern
on the part
o f others . [ 7 ]
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This, while not exactly of our form, su^ests
,
at the
personal level:
(L3A) John's right to minimal concern on the part of
Bill
.
But what is this right if not:
( L3B
)
John '
s
concern
.
right to Bill's giving him minima L
(L3C) John's
concern
right that Bill give John minima
l
Dworkin himself goes on to speak in such ways.
( L4 ) Consider the principle that each member of the
community has a right that each other member
treat him with the minimal respect due a fellow
human being. [8]
(L5) then the first has a moral right to be saved by
the second. [9]
Also, individualized, Zink's:
(L6) ... out only right is that others fulfill their
obligations
.
[ 10
]
suggests
,
(L6A) One of Bill's only rights is that John fulfill
his obligations.
Some rights are to the actions of others, and,
although often stated incompletely, fit our locution when
f i 1 Led in
.
(L7) ...or does the silent majority itself have
rights, including the right that those who break
the law be punished .[ 1 1 ]
seems concerned with a right against the government, that
is, becomes, more explicitly:
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( L7A ) silent majority's right (against thegovernment) that those who break the Law
punished by the government.
be
that is
,
(L7B) The right
Lawbreakers
.
t ba t the government punish
Uworkin speaks of a right to tne Legislature's acting
in a certain way:
( L8 ) ••• 1 might concede, that is, that he has no
constitutional right tha t tne present
Legislature enact Legislation that would violate
the constitution. [12]
Property rights may be reLated to rights to actions,
o r forbearances .
(L9) WeLL, if you have a right that it not be
taken ...[13]
Perhaps the most common use of our Locution surfaces
in discussion of rights to services (actions) on the part
of others. In discussing the extent of rights to aid,
Thompson standardly uses these Locutions.
(L10) ... take the case of Henry Fonda again ... but
that I no right against him that he should do so
[cross the room to touch my feverish brow]. [14]
(Lll) ... and nobody has the right against you that
you shaLl give him his right ... Nor has he any
right against anybody eLse that they shouLd give
him the continued use of your kidneys. Certainly
he has no right against the Society of Music
Lovers that they shouLd pLug him into you in the
first pLace .[15]
Benditt has found the "to" version handy,
( L 1 2 ) Or . . . if I am starving, do I have a right to
vour providing me food that you can spare?[l6]
as we l L as the "that" version (L9).
Mar kie employs the Locution in its fuLLest form:
( L L 3 ) It awards Archer a moral right against Spade to
Spade's keeping their appointment
.[ 17
]
Generally, our locution is expecially useful in stating and
discussing rights to actions or forbearances on the part of
others.
Grice adopts the "to" version, though he has aesthetic
reservations :
( L14 ) To say that a man has a right to play golf on
Sundays, is to say that he has a right to expect
others not to interfere with his doint so. To
say that I have a right to civil treatment is to
say that I have a right to others treating me
civillv. To say that we have a right to our
Lives and property is to sav that we have a
right to others not taking our lives nor
appropriating our property. In each case, a
right is a right to other people acting in
certain ways: a right to non-interference if we
choose to pLay golf; a right to civility from
others; a right to other's not taking our Lives
or property. The expression 'a right to others
acting in certain ways' is in many cases less
natural than, and in all cases less eLegant
than, 'a right to expect others to act in
certain ways .
'
[ 18 ]
I think the currency of such locutions has been
encouraged by the tradition, which reaches at least as far
back as HohfeLd,[l9] of trying to state in the form of
general principles, the relations between rights and otner
moral relations. Locutions like ours are almost essential
for such purposes.
326
Hohf e Id
.
(L15) ... if X nas a right against Y that he shall
stay off the former's land ...[20]
(L16) ... call up the idea of the accompanying rights
against aLl others that they shouldn't interfere
with his actual killing of the dog. [21]
Commentators on Hohfeid have not objected that his
Locutions are uncLear. Fitch, summarizing HohfeLd's
position,
(L17) Similarly, y has the right R that x pay him a
doLlar if and only if x has the duty D to pay y
a do L lar
.
[ 22 ]
and goes on to employ them himseLf,
(L18) We can aLso form a similar square of opposition
... . For example, if x has the privilege toward
y of walking on y's grass, then y has no right
that x should not walk on his grass. [23]
Such locutions have become fairly standard for tne
formulation of general principles concerning, and the
analysis of, rights.
Grice again:
(L19) The point may be generalized by saying that A's
having a right to do x consists in his having
the right to others according him x ...[24]
Sopontzis
,
(L20) If S has a right to z, where z may be a state,
an action, an object, then ...[25]
Dworkin
,
(L21) Suppose that A makes and is asked to defend a
claim of principle, that he has a right that R
not use B's own property in the way B has. [2b]
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(L22) ... as an argument that A has a right that that
act not take place. [27]
Bend i 1 1 ,
(L23) The first can be represented by the formula (c)
N has a eight to M's doing (or not doint) x.
This is the typical formula for expressing a
c laim-righ t . .
.
[ 28 ]
( L24 ) ... if A has a right that B repay borrowed
money . .
.
[ 29 ]
Pos tow
,
(L25) In this situation, however, it is C who has a
right to A's getting the benefit ...[30]
(L26) B has an unwaivable right that A be treated in X
manner
.
[ 31 ]
Fein berg
,
(L27) A has a right that B shall not strike him, and
that right (unlike a mere liberty) entails a
corresponding duty of B's not to strike A. [32]
Even less natural locutions have been employed. In
attempting to analyze the ordinary concept of rights,
Tooley suggests:
(L28) This approach has lead some to hold: "Individual
A has a right at time _t that p be true if and
only if ... [33 ]
And Markie tries:
( L29 ) S has a moral right against R to its being the
case that p.[34]
as a general form for attempting the analysis of the
concept of a right.
Many contemporary philosophers have used, and tnought
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perfectly clear, the locutions (or locutions very similar
to them) which we will be employing.
3 • But are we justified in employing this locution as
freely as we do? Are we, by use of such locutions,
employing, a technical concept of rights wnicn differs in
important ways from the ordinary concept? 1 think not.
However, being technical, the chosen Locution does signify
rignts in a manner which differs a bit from the more
ordinary locutions. Some explanation of how the syntax is
related to the right signified will perhaps be helpful.
In discussing rights, it is often suggested that (at
least among) the objects of rights, the things people have
rights _to are states of affairs or events (usually
actions )
.
The actions in which the law protects me and the
services and privileges the law awards me are my
legal rights. [35]
With active rights, these events are generally actions of
the bearer of the right. John's right to speak freely is a
right on John's part to perform the action: John's speaking
freely. Associated with such rights may be rights against
others to actions or forbearances on tneir part: their not
interferring with John's speaking freely. [3b]
Positive rights seem to be rights to the positive
actions of others: BiLl promises John to mow John's
lawn.
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BILL'S keeping his promise (an event - an action on BiLL's
part) is something John has a right to. [37] That is, John
has a right to what he was promised. What he was promised
was that a certain event wouLd occur: that BiLL would cut
his Lawn. Thus, John has a right to that event's occurring,
i.e., John nas a rignt to Bill's cutting his lawn. In other
terms, that BiLL cut Jonn's Lawn is John's right, i.e.,
John has a right that BiLL cut his Lawn. (In this case,
these rights clearLy hold against BiLL).
Generally, there is no conceptual difficulty in
understanding (at Least many) rights as being to actions,
events, or states of affairs. Our chosen locutions take
advantage of this eLement of clarity in our grasp of
rights. The third position in the locution is to be fiLLed
in by an expression which signifies a specific action,
event, or state of affairs. It is this very action, event,
or state of affairs to which the right is a right (tne
right's "content"). In ordinary Language, statements of
rights are usuaLiy rather vague, loose, or idiomatic in
their specification of the content of rights.
From another angle. The content of a right is tnat
which the right directly obliges, requires, or protects.
UsuaLiy these are actions (events or states of affairs).
Some rights protect certain actions. John's right to
practice the reLigion of his choice, for exampLe, protects
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Jonn in his (potential) action: John's practicing the
religion of his choice. That action is the content of the
right. Our locutions have the benefit of syntactically
isolating tne content of the right. Thus:
John has a right to practice the reLigion of his
choice
.
John has a right to John's practicing the religion
of his choice.
John has a right that he practice the reLigion of
his choice.
wiLL aLL express the same right. I see no reason to think
that the Latter two expressions are any less clear than the
first.
Similarly for positive rights. BiLl promises John to
mow his Lawn. This promise gives rise to a right on John's
part requiring or obliging BiLL to mow John's Lawn. It is
this action, Bill's mowing John's Lawn, which the right
requires. (It requires that BiLL mow John's Lawn.) This
action is the content of the right, what the right is to.
Thus, using our locution to express this relation, we can
express this right:
John has a right to Bill's mowing John's lawn.
John has a right that BiLl mow his Lawn.
I believe this understanding of our chosen Locutions
accords with the way they are used by contemporary
philosophers, and that read this way they are at least as
331
cLear as any ordinary language expressions for rights.
There is no need to suppose that some special technical
concept of rights is expressed by our locution, and in need
of speciaL anaLvsis.
An V lingering difficulties in understanding our
locutions should be remedied by noticing the ease with
which we can generate ordinary Language equivalents for
them
.
For rights to act, i.e., rights such as (our
locution) :
John has a right to John's singing in the shower.
John has a right that Jonn sing in the shower,
inwhich the content of the right is an action of the right-
holder (roughly), replace the expression of the content of
the right with a more abbreviated statement of what he
right-holder can do by virtue of the right. In our exampLe,
we replace "to John's singing in the shower", and "that
John sing in the shower" with "to sing in the shower" to
get
:
John has a right to sing in the shower.
Some might prefer the "to be allowed to" equivalent (
>
)
:
John has a right to be allowed to sing in the
shower .
Or even the "to expect to be aLLowed to" equivalent (?):
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John has a right to expect to he aLlowed to sine inthe snower. ^
Conversions can aLso be made for rights to the actions
of those against whom the right holds.
BlLL promises John to mow his lawn. This promise
creates in John a right to certain behavior on Bill's part,
to his mowing Jonn s lawn. We can say;
(A) John has a right to BiLl's mowing his lawn.
(b) John has a right tnat Bill mow his lawn.
There are at least three common ways of expressing
this right:[38]
(OLl) John has a right to expect Bill to mow his
lawn .
( 0L2 ) John has a right to have Bill mow his lawn.
(0L3) John has a right to demand that Bill mow his
lawn
.
Perhaps the first is the best.
Generally, such ordinary language equivalents can be
generated from our locution by inserting the "have",
"expect", or "demand" in the A form, and adjusting the
grammar of what follows to fit.
I have aLso suggested that events which are not
actions of either the right-hoLder
,
or the right ower
,
may
be the content of a right. Por exampLe, suppose Joan
promises Mary that when Mary dies, her friend BiLL will be
cared for. Then, using our Locution,
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Mary has a right against Joan that BiLL be cared
f or
.
I suggest, tentatively, that conversion of such
Locutions to ordinary Engiish proceed in two steps. Such
rights are, I think, equivalent to rights to actions on tne
part of the ower of the right, rights that the event wnich
is the content of the right be made (guaranteed) to occur.
That is, the above is equivaient to:
Mary has a right against Joan that Joan make sure
(guarantee) that Bill is cared for.
(Note, this is a different right from Mary's right against
Joan that Joan care for Bill. Joan did not promise to care
for Bill (herself)). This expression seems to express a
right to an action of the ower of the right, and can now be
converted to ordinary English as such, yielding:
Mary has a right against Joan to expect Joan to make
sure that Bill be cared for.
The ease of paraphrasing our technical locutions in
ordinary English does not negate the importance and
advantages of using them. We will discuss these advantages
in the next section.
5. These technical locutions, while expressing the
ordinary concept of a right, have numerous advantages over
the more ordinary ways of expressing rights. They minimize
ambiguity and they encourage full and clear statement of
the content of the right. They isolate syntactically tne
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three major elements of a right (bearer, ower, content).
They are to be interpreted Literally, and do not require a
rich moral and linguistic context to determine their
signification, they express the fact that the bearer x has
a right against the ower y to a specific content, event z.
As a result, they are usefuL for the formuLation of generaL
principles about rights, and they signify a specific right
fairLy independently of context. The latter is especially
important for phi losoohica 1 discussions about rights such
as ours, in which we may wish to discuss a specific right
"at a distance", so to speak (outside of the normaL sorts
of moral and linguistic contexts which help determine the
significance of ordinary language expressions of rights).
Many of the advantagaes of our technical locution stem
from problematic aspects of the ordinary language of
rights. Such problems are, perhaps minimal for rights to
act, but for general rights and rights to the actions of
others, the disadvantages of ordinary language for our
purposes are great. Ordinary English expressions for such
rights (especially) are often vague, dependent on context
for their signification, and idiomatic. With such
expressions, the right they signify cannot be determined
directly from their syntax; the reader or Listener must
make use of a great deal of background information in order
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to figure out just what right is being spoken of. Such
language is a poor tooL for tne discussion of, and
forrnuLation of principles about, rignts in the far from
ordinary, moraLLy rich, contexts of philosophical
discussion
.
5.1 In this section I will focus on the difficulties
wnicn would be created for us by the use of ordinary
language such as (0L1), (0L2), and (0L3), for expressing
rights to the actions of others.
First, such expressions may be theory-biased and
misleading as to the nature of rights. They make rights to
certain behaviors on the part of others, rights which are
simpLy requirements that others act in certain ways, look
like tney are rights for the bearer of the right to behave
in certain ways: to do things, to expect certain things, to
act so as to have certain things happen, or to demand
certain things. Admittedly, the classical rights theorists
(Hobbes, Locke, eg.) were mostly interested in rights to d_o
things. But we should guard against being forced into such
conclusions by grammar.
Second . The language is misleading in other ways . It
is often idiomatic - the precise meaning o f the words
composing t he expression for the content o f the right
having little bearing on the right signified. For example,
f the expressions (01), (02), andin some contexts, any o
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(03)
,
may be used to express the same right, that whicn (A)
and (B) express. But what does this right have to do with
expecting
,
having
,
or demanding ? It seems to me that in
such contexts, these words are doing only grammatical
(syntactic) work. To expect something, to demand it, and to
have it done, are distinct sorts of behavior. Rights to act
in tnese ways will not only be distinct rights, but they
wiLL also be distinct from the right created by the promise
(A). Notice, for example, that John may have promised Bill
never to demand that he, or take action to have him, do
anything (and even, perhaps, never to have expectations of
him). If so, BiLI's promise to mow the lawn would not
create rights for John to act to have Bill do something, to
demand that Bill do something, or even to expect that Bill
do something. Yet a right would be created by the promise,
tne right expressed by (A). In some contexts, (0L1), (0L2),
and (0L3) can express this right, in others, not. Yet when
they do so, the "expect", "have", and "demand", not only
have little bearing on the content of the right, but can
only tend to mislead.
5.2 Another perspective on this issue may make the
problem clearer. As we have seen, a standard wav ot
expressing r igh ts to do. is to specify the right holder,
followed by "has a right to", followed by an expression
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specifying the sort of action the right guarantees, eg.
,
John nas a rignt to hunt on John's Land. But (0L1), (0L2),
and (0L3) are of the same form: they specify, on this
mode L , rights to d o things, not rights to others doing
things. On this modeL, however, they do not express the
same right tney express in the context of BilL's promise.
For the right of John to have certain expectations (about
what BiLL will do) does not require BiLL to do anything,
eg. mow the lawn. The promise does create a rignt which
requires this. The right to have BiLL mow the Lawn - if
that is a right on John's part to act in a cetrtain way
does not impLy that BiLL should mow tne Lawn, but onLy that
John has a right to make him (or perhaps to hire him to).
The right to demand of BiLL that he mow the Lawn does not
imply that BiLL must mow the Lawn; not every every demand
must be satisfied. People may have a right to demand
something to which they have no right. In fact, 1 suspect
that it is this casting of rights to the actions of others
into "demands" Language which has (mis)Lead many to adopt
Feinberg- type cLaims theories of rights. On such theories,
having a right is supposed to be equivalent to being in a
position to claim or demand the right. Such a view would
"folLow" by equivocation for all rights to the actions of
others if they are aLL expressable in "demands" Language
(0L3). If one is forced by ordinary Language to state aLL
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rights to the actions of others in sucn terms, such
theories are bound to arise. [39]
Thus, the expressions of ordinary English for rignts
to the actions of others are ambiguous and idiomatic. They
sometimes express a right to act, and sometimes a right to
actions on tne part of others. When tney do the latter,
such words as "expect", "have", and "demand" seem not only
irrelevant to the right signified, but mis leading
.[ 40
]
5.3 Another problem: the significance of such expressions
is context dependent. Not only may the linguistic context
be relevant, but the Legal/moral as well. That is, in order
to understand what right is referred to by the expression,
one must often make use of one's grasp of iegai/moraL
aspects of the situation being discussed. For example, one
might not know which of several rights
(S) Bill has the right to have John sell crabapples for him
signifies until the legal/moral relations between Bill and
John have been described.
(Situation A) John is Bill's selling agent. He has a
contract with Bill to sell crabapples
when Bill supplies them and so requests.
(Situation B) Same as situation A, but Bill has
requested that John sell his crabapples.
(Situation C) John is a distributor of crabapples not
at present contracted to sell Bill s
crabapples. He does not wish to work for
Bill, but Bill claims that he has a
right to have John sell crabapples for
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him
.[41]
Tnere seem to be at Least trtree distinct rights which (S)
couLd signify. Using our Locutions, we can state them
unambiguously, precisely, clearLy and independently of
context. If A is the situation as it is understood bv the
speaker, and (S) is asserted, than (A') is probabLy toe
right signified, if (B), then ( B
' ) , and if (C), (C').
(A ) BiLl has the right that if John supplies him
crabapples and requests them sold, then John will
sell them.
(B') Bill has the right that John sell Bill's
crabapples
.
(C ) Bill has the right that if he requests John to
become his agent for selling crabapples, John
will do so.
Not only are such ordinary expressions context
dependent, but vague as well. Is (B') the right (S)
signifies in situation B, or is
(
B *
* ) Bill has the right that John try to sell his
crabapples .
Likewise for situations A and C.
We wish to be able to refer to rights clearly, with a
simple phrase which lends itself to the formulation of
principles outside of a specific moral context, and to the
making of precise distinctions between subtly differing
rights. We have seen that the ordinary language expressions
for rights to the actions of others do not allow this. They
rely heavily on context for their significance, and are
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often ambiguous and vague. Our locutions do not have these
probLerns. In addition, they aLLow the sort of direct, cLear
and precise statement of rignts which wi L L enable us to
make tne sorts of distinctions between rignts (such as that
between ( B
' ) and (B")) which we wilL need to make.
6* Of course, the use of our chosen locution does not
guarantee clarity. At least three loci for unclarity
remain: the x, y and z positions.
Even using our locutions, the expressions with which
the right-holder and ower are identified mav be cryptic,
vague, or otherwise uncLear. More common and important is
unciarity or vagueness in specification of content. This
involves two distinct problems: (l) As the Appendix A
indicated, the reductive step from general rights to rignts
to events (simpLe rights) may be difficult and
controversial. (2) Instances of our locution will be no
more clear that the discription of the content they
invoLve. "John's right (against y) to the good life,"
remains as obscure as, "The good life."
Nonetheless, our locution should help us avoid at
Least some of the vagueness inherent in the ordinary
Language of "rights."
NOTES
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as inter f erring with Ben & Jerry's right to access to
marketplace, or their right to have distributors
their ice cream.
the
carry
APPENDIX C
OWED OBLIGATIONS
A great many features of rights and obligations
indicate that there may be an intimate connection between
the two. We discuss these features in Chapter 5. Here I
provide a preliminary discussion of the relevent concept of
obligation
.
1.1 First. The close link rights and obligations holds
most clearly between rights and owed obligations. Owed
obligations seem to be a subclass of obligations, those
owed or due t_o someone. Eg., John has an obligation t_o Bill
to return his borrowed lawnmower. If S has an owed
obligation to do something, then there is someone to whom S
has an (owed) obligation to do that thing. Generally, an
obligation is due, or owed to an individual if that
individual has special claim to having the obligation
fulfilled. Not all obligations are owed. For example, the
obligation to help the needy (give to charity) does not
seem to be owed to anyone in particular. No individual has
a special claim to my fulfilling that obligation.
It is difficult to characterize what features of
obligation make an obligation an owed obligation. I will
not try to do so here. One might even question whether owed
obligations are, strictly speaking, obligations. I think
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thev are, but the following sort of example mav create some
doubt. Suppose a gangster contracts with a crime-boss to
make a "hit". It would seem that this contract wouLd
create, in nim, an obligation to the crime-boss to make the
hit. But does he reaLly have an obligation to make the nit?
Doubtful. This example can be dealt with by denying that
all contracts create owed obligations, or by granting that
he has an obligation to make the hit. Yet I am unsure now
comfortable one can be with these replies.
1.2 Second. I will work under tne assumption that owed
obligations are prima-facie. I do not take this to be
merely the epistemic view that thev are tools for judging,
or calculating, how we should behave, that is, the view
that they are merely "considerations" to be taken into
account in moral reasoning, and not some underlying feature
of the moral landscape. I take it that they are real
features of the moral landscape, things which weigh in
favor or against (tend to influence) an acts permissibility
independently of whether anyone is aware of them. I assume
this not because I am committed to this view, but because
that conception, I think, is the ordinary one, and I am
interested in the links between the ordinary concept of
(owed) obligation and the concept of rights. However, I
think that most of my discussion and conclusions will nold
independently of this assumption. In fact, the intimacy of
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the Link between rights and obligations is such tnat if
this assumption proves false, then whatever the correct
understanding of owed obligation is, learning of it will
pay benefits in improved understanding of the concept of
rights. For exampLe. There is some controversy as to
whetner rights are or are not prima facie. The existence of
a close Link between rights and obligations might help us
resolve this issue: if obligations are prima facie, then
rights are, if not, rights are not, and, if "obligation" is
ambiguous between an all-in concept and a prima facie one,
then "rights" might be similarly ambiguous.
L.3 Third. Owed obligations seem to be 3-piace relations
holding between an individual under the obligation, x, an
individual to whom the obligation is owed, y, and an action
of the individual under the obigation (the content of the
obligation), z. That is, x has an obligation to y to do z.
Concerning what sorts of things these reiata can be,
the consensus is that tne individual under the obligation
must be a being which is capable of being moraLLy or
legaLLy responsible for its action. The individual the
obligation is owed to may not be so capable, however, for
one may have obligations to the moraLLy or legalLy
incompetent (animals, very young children, the mentaLLy
retarded, and the senile). The content of owed obligations
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seems to be actions, including forbearances and inactions,
of the bearer of the obligation
.
[ L
]
1.4 Fourth. It is useful to get dear on how obligations
are individuated.
1.41 Content
It is fairly clear that content is an individuating
feature of obligations. Where obligations have wideLy
contents, there is little temptation to identify
them; they require different actions, therefore, they are
non-identical. Where obligations and their contents are
more closely related, however, it may be tempting to
identify them.
For example, more or less general obligations may be
very closely linked, as with: (1) the obligation to help
some of those in need, (2) the obligation to help Bill when
he is in need, (3) the obligation to help Bill, (4) the
obligation to pay Bill’s medical expenses, and (5) the
obligation to pay Bill's medical expenses by the end of the
week. Stu may have the last (all but the first, in fact)
because he has the first (suppose he is in a position to
help no one but Bill, and the onLy way he can help is to
pay BilL's medical expenses by the end of the week). Few
are likely to identify these obligations, vet are (2) and
(3) identical, or (4) and (5)?
No. Stu has (3) and (5) because he has (2) and (4),
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respectively. The reverse does not hold. If Bill's medical
condition suddenly cnanged, (2) would remain, but (3) would
cease to exist. If the hospital changed its billing policy,
Stu might continue to have (4), but not (5). This is
because the obligations, though closely related, require
distinct sorts of action. Overall, if obligations require
different sorts of actions, then this difference in
requirement proves their non-identity. Since distinct
contents specify distinct sorts of action obligations
require, obligations with differing content are not
identical.
1.42 Position Y
Owed obligations seem to be individuated in part bv
the y position.
Suppose x has an obligation to a to z, and also an
obligation to b to z. x has the same obligation a he does
to b, does he not?
Two positions immediately recommend themselves: (1) x
has one obligation which he owes to two individuals, a and
b. (2) x has two distinct obligations to z. One is owed to
a, and the other is owed to b.
(1) seems plausible. Suppose Jill promises her
parents her studies will not suffer if she is allowed to
buy a car, and they give their permission. She has an
3 50
obligation to her mother not to Let her studies suffer, and
she has an obligation to her father not to let her studies
suffer. (2 ] She has the same obligation to both her parents:
the obligation not to let her studies suffer. Surely Jill
has no obligations (under her promise) to one parent she
does not also have to the other. Thus the same obligations
may be owed to different individuals; the y position does
not individuate obligations.
This assessment of the situation, however, is
inadequate. There are obligations Jill has to each parent
which she does not have to the other. In fact, she has two
obligations not to let her studies suffer. One she owes to
her father, another to her mother. For her father may
excuse (forgive, cancel) the obligation sne has (under the
promise) to him not to let her studies suffer, but her
mother cannot (unless she is authorized to act his agent as
well as for herself). Similarly, the mother can excuse the
obligation owed to her, but the father cannot. It is
because these obligations are owed to different individuals
that they differ is this way. Thus obligations seem to be
individuated by the y position.
Yet it does seem correct to say that Jill has the
same obligation to each of her parents. Such apparent
identity statements are plausible and common, and it is
requisite to explain them (away). A distinction between
3 5 L
sorts (types) of obligation, and particular obligations
mucn like tnat commonly drawn between act-types and act-
tokens could help. The statement that Jill has the same
obligation to both parents: the obligation not to let her
studies suffer, can be interpreted as saving that Jill has
a (distinct) obligation to each of her parents of the type:
obligations not to let Jill's studies suffer. Obligation
types, however, are not individuated by bearer (individual
who has a token of that type).
Token obligations are individuated by creditor.
1.43 Position X
(Token) obligations are also individuated by their
bearer
.
Some would argue that this is incorrect: SupDose A
promises C to pay C $5 on Friday, and so does B. A and B
each have the same obligation: the obligation (to C) to pav
C $5 on Friday. Thus obligations are not individuated by
bearer
.
On the other hand, this apparent statement of
identity can be handled by the distinction between types of
obligations and token obligations, as it was before. [3]
Further, the obligations of A and B have different
properties: A's obligation cannot be fulfilled by B, but it
can be fulfilled by A. Similarly for B's obligation. Also,
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supposG A gives C $5 on triday, hut B does not. Then A's
obligation is fulfilled, but B's obligation is not
fulfilled. Therefore, A s obligation is not identical to
6
' s obligation
.
The defender of identity might propose distinctions
to prove that the above violations of Leibniz's Law are not
required by nis point by distinguishing three obligations
involving A, B and C: (l) the obligation of ... (to C) to
to A's paying $5 on Friday. (3) the obligation of ... (to
C) to B's paying C $5 on Friday. He would point out that
(2) and (3) are distinct obligations, and that this
explains the puzzles above: A has (2), not (3). B has (3),
not (2). But one need not suppose that (2) and (3) are
individuated by bearer, they have distinct contents as
well. Further, A and B do both have (1). Thus, tnere are
obligations (eg., (1)) which can be had by more than one
individual. Thus obligations are not individuated bv
bearer .
This response is inadequate. First, it is
questionable whether (1) is an obligation at all. What is
it's content? What action does it require? None, aparently.
What sort of behavior would fulfill it? (1) seems more
naturally thought of as a sort or type of obligation, or as
a schema for specifying obligations of a type. Secondly,
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this approach does not really soLve the puzzles. It
specifies obligations which A and B do not have in common,
and is correct that they have distinct conditions of
fulfillment. But wnat of (l)? If (l) is
,
after all
,
a real
obligation, is it one which A and B can truly nave in
common? No. The same, or similar puzzles arise for it:
Presumably, by paying $5 to C on Friday, A fulfills his
obligations to C under the promise. This includes the
fulfillment of (l). But if (1) is also B's obligation, then
A nas fulfilled one of B's obligations to C as well. Surely
A can fulfill his obligation to C in this case without
fulfilling any of B's obligations.
In sum, the more plausible position is that (token)
obligations are individuated by bearer.
1.44 Grounds
Another individuating feature of obligations is their
grounds
.
Obligations may have two distinct types of grounds.
For example, the obligation of the court to supply A with
legal council is grounded (a) in the constitution and its
judicial interpretation, and (b) in A's having been
arrested, and in A's being unable to afford a lawyer.
Similarly with moral rights. B's moral obligation not to
kill Sam is grounded in (a) natural law, or morality, and
(b) in the fact that B and Sam are living human beings.
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This distinction is that between the two elements which
together determine the moraL status of an individual and
nis/her actions: ( 3 ) abstract Legal or moral truths
(obligations, rights, principles, etc.), and (b) the
pecuLiar ( non- lega 1/mora L ) circumstances or actions of an
individual. The first I caLl "legal/moral grounds", the
second, "proximate grounds".
A strong case can be made that obligations are
individuated by their legal/moral grounds.
That this is so is indicated by the split between
moral and legaL obligations. Y may have more than one
obligation to Y's child, X, to care for X. Y mav have a
LegaL obligation to do so, and aLso a distinct moral
obligation to do so. But what distinguishes them? It wouLd
seem to be their grounds. The legal obligation is grounded
in the law, the moral in morality.
1.451 I see little reason to suppose that it is the type
of the ground (eg., legal vs. moral) which distinguishes
individual obligations, and not the particular grounds
which generate them. The following exampLe may help.
Suppose X's parent Y believes she owes it to her
chiLdren to put them through college should they wish to
go, and wishes X to know this and to commit herself (Y)
legally to it. She writes up a contract, and contracts witn
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X to put X through college. The contract is signed on
Monday. Tuesday evening X decides he doesn't want his
mother so committed, so he tears up the contract, thereby
nullifying it. On Wednesday the legislature enacts a law
requiring all parents to put their children through college
should the child choose
,
and allowing the child to sue
their parents for such support.
What obligations are involved? Monday, Y incurred,
grounded in the law of contracts, a legal obligation to X
to put X through college. On tuesday this obligation was
voided, it ceased to be. On Wednesday the legislature
created in Y a legal obligation to X to put X through
college. These were similar obligations, but tnev do not
seem identical. The first came to be (was incurred) on
Monday (not Wednesday), and was cancelled (voided) Tuesday
evening. The first was a contractual obligation, the second
was not. The first could be cancelled by X, the second
cannot. The second was the product of months of legislative
deliberation, the first was not. What seems to be the
difference that makes a difference is the difference in the
grounds of the obligations. The one is grounded in the law
of contracts and Monday's contract, the other in the
legislation of Wednesday.
Modification of the story: Suppose the legislature
passed the law Tueday morning, not Wednesday. This would
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not seem to cnange matters much. During the day on Tuesday,
Y had two simiLar but distinct obligations to X, one
grounded in the contract, not Tuesday's law, and the other
m Tuesday's law, but not the contract. Most of the other
sorts of differences already mentioned repeat themselves in
this situation. Also, on Wednesday, x could excuse the
obligation incurred by Y by Monday's contract, but not the
obligation created by Tuesday’s law. Didn't Tuesday's law
create some obligation on Y's part? Didn't tne tearing up
of (voiding) tne contract by X on Tuesday evening have an
effect on Y's obligations (excuse her from one)? Not if Y
already had the obligation.
Suppose Y does not pay X's tuition when it comes due
on Thursday. On Friday X wishes to bring suit against Y for
failing to fulifill her contractual obligation to put X
through college. Wouldn't it be appropriate for X's lawyer
to tell X that that obligation no longer exists, having
been voided Tuesday evening, but that, if X likes, suit
could be successfully brought against Y for Y's failure to
fulfill the legal obligation created by Tuesday's law?
1.452 Another way obligations may be identical in the x,
y, and z positions and yet be distinct is suggested by tne
following example: On Monday Y borrows $5 from X and
promises to pay X $5 on Friday. On Wednesday Y borrows
another $5 from X and promises to pav X $5 on Friday. Does
not Y have two distinct obligations to X to pav X $5 on
briday? What distinguishes them? I think one pLausibLe
suggestion is the fact that they are grounded in different
promises .
i.453 It we think of promises as generating obligations,
it is hard to see how two promises could be identical in
nature and content, but one give rise to an obligation, and
tbe other not. How are obligations created by promises?
Presumably by the action of promising in conjunction with
the general obligation to keep promises. Perhaps the intent
of the parties, their ability to fulfill the promise, their
status as moral agents, and so on, are relevant; such
aspects of a promise may determine whether the promise is
binding. But binding promises or contracts create
obligations. Eg., My promise to care for my parents in
their dotage presumably creates an obligation on my part to
do so. Why would some binding promises create such an
obligation and some not? Could it depend on an external
factor, such as whether or not I already have an obligation
to care for my parent? Odd. But if obligations are not
individuated by their grounds, this would seem to be tne
case.
Generally, I see no reason, if we grant that x s
moral obligation to y to z is not identical to x s legal
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obligation to y to z because they have different (types of)
grounds, to stop tnere. Do not obligations created bv
games, state Law, federal law, and constitutional
ammendment have different (types of) grounds as well? What
sorts of type differences are reLevant, and why? It seems
sirnpLest and most plausible merely to hold that distinct a -
type grounds generate distinct obligations (some may be
very s imi Lar )
.
1.454 Still, there may be a coherent model for obligations
on wnich the same obligation can have several distinct
grounds (be overdetermined) capable of nandling the sorts
of difficulties just proposed. It may also be that not all
differences in grounds individuate, and that work is needed
to distinguish those whicn do from those which do not. That
remains to be seen, and it is beyond the scope of my
investigation of rights to go into this thoroughly.
However, what these puzzles do suggest is that there is an
element to our intuitions about obligations which suggests
individuation by their grounds. There is a strong
presumption in favor of thinking of obligations in this
way, and it is not unreasonable to proceed with our
investigation of rights on this assumption. Usually,
results will not be effected by the taking of one or toe
other line on this issue, replies on one model can be
reformulated on the other). Perhaps, in the end, the choice
between toese two theories may turn on how well such views
about obligations cohere with a plausible theory of rights.
2. Two ways of reading assertions of obligation have
different implications. (We encounter these in our
discussion of Lyons' arguments against correlativitv in
Appendix D.) I will examine this distinction nere.
Let us call the first reading the "extensionaL"
reading. Suppose BilLy's mother forbids him to go to
foreign films. He has an obligation not to. Suppose Claude
is an eccentric critic who praises ail and only foreign
films. Read extensionally
,
we can say that BilLv has an
obligation not to go to films praised by Claude. This is
because any film Claude praises happens to be a film which
Billy has an obligation not to see, and for him to go to a
film praised by Claude would be for him to go to a foreign
film, a thing he has an obligation not to do.
But on the other reading, the "intensional" reading,
we cannot truly say that Billy has an obligation not to go
to films praised by Claude. Conrnonlv, assertions of
obligations imply that the type obliged (here, not going to
foreign films) is itself of moral relevance, that tnere is
something wrong about doing (or tailing to do) i_t. In t ie
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above case, there is nothing wrong, per se, in Billy's
going to films Claude has praised. There is, however,
something wrong with Billy's going to foreign films, for
tnat is what he has been forbidden. Read this way, Billy
nas an obligation not to go to forgein films, but not
obligation not to go to films praised by Claude. How
different if Billy's mother had told him not to go to films
praised by Claude! Then he would have an obligation not to.
2.1 Gary Matthews has suggested that the two readings
e xemp lify a scope distinction. He suggests that the
extensional reading means:
(x)[(x is a film & x is praised by Claude) -> Billy has
an obligation not to go to x]
The intensional means:
Billy nas an obligation to make it true that (x)[(x is a
film & x is praised by Claude) -> Billy does not go to
x]
It is fairly plausible that some sort of scope distinction
is involved here. However, the intensiona L/extens iona
1
distinction seems to apply to obligations which do not lend
themselves to the above scope patterns. For example,
suppose Joe promises not to signal the enemy, but no
restrictions have been placed on his raising his hand, per
se
.
1. Joe has an obligation not to signal the enemy.
2. Joe's raising his hand will signal the enemy.
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3. Joe has an obligation not to raise his hand.
3 is open to extensionaL and intensionaL readings. On the
extens iona I reading it is true, and follows from 1 and 2.
It is true because if Joe raises his hand he will thereby
signal the enemy, something he has an obligation not to do.
On the otner nand, Joe does not have a general obligation
not to raise his hand (he has not promised not to), nothing
is wrong with it per se. Tnat is, in the intensional sense
ne does not have the obligation not to raise his hand. Yet
I fail to see how tnis could be treated as a scope
distinction along the lines Matthews suggests.
2.2 I speculate that we can understand this ambiguity as a
scope distinction related to the metaphysical distinction
between act types and act tokens. Obligations are t_o tne
performance or non-performance of actions. Sometimes they
are to perform or not perform (any token of) an act type,
sometimes they are to perform or not perform specific act
tokens (usually of some specific type). Since many
different expressions can be used to refer to the same act
token, we may express obligations to perform such tokens in
many different ways, using any expression which refers to
it. Thus, if I have an obligation to do Bill's favorite act
token, and that token is also John's favorite, I have an
obligation to perform John's favorite token as well. Tne
extensiona 1 sense of obligation expresses obligations to
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act tokens. We can interpret 1 extensionaLly as: (Here
quantifiers range over act tokens.)
(El) (x) [ x is a signalling of the enemy by Joe -> Joe
has an obligation not to do x]
In the intensionai sense, obligations are not
d irec t Iv obligations to perform or not perform specific
tokens, but to perform or not perform tokens fo certain
specific types (they are obligations to insure the
instantiation of a specific type), the type is itself
morally relevant. John's obligation to help his neighbor,
for example, does not require any particular tokens, but
that some tokens of the type John helps his neighbor occur.
Thus, 1, read intensionaily
,
obliges Joe to the assure non-
instantiation of the tvpe, a signalling o f the enemy by
Joe. Again letting x range over event tokens, 1 can be read
intensionaily as:
(II) Joe has an obligation to make it true that 2 (Ex)(x
is a signalling of the enemy by Joe)
2.3 Employing such distinctions, we can account for many
of the logical relations between such propositions as l, 2,
and 3. 3, read extensionally , is:
(E3) (x)[x is a raising of Joe's hand by Joe -> Joe has
an obligation not to do x]
2 may be interpreted as:
(2A) ( x ) [ x is a raising of Joe's hand by Joe -> x is a
signalling of the enemy]
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(El) and (2A) together entail (E3). (Notice: (2B) "Joe
raised his hand thereby signalling the enemy"
,
might be
read (Ex)(x is a raising of Joe's hand by Joe & x is a
signalling of tne enemy by Joe)". This, together with (EL)
would not imply (E3), but only: "(Ex)(xs is a raising of
Joe's hand by Joe & Joe has an obligation not to do x)".
This might be another reading for 3, or a rendering of,
"Joe raised his hand, he had an obligation not to do
that.")
2.4 How do obligations to types (intensional
interpretation) relate to obligations to tokens? One
plausible principle linking the two is: (Let 'X' and ' Y ' be
variables not restricted to actions.)
(PIT) If Y has an obligation that 2 (Ex)(Px) then
(x)[Px -> Y has an obligation to insure that x does
not occur]
If this is correct, (II) implies:
(x)[x is a signalling of the enemy by Joe -> Joe has an
obligation to insure that x does not occur]
That is, since x is an action of Joe's,
(x)[x is a signalling of the enemy by Joe -> Joe has an
obligation not to do x]
which is (El). Thus, (II) will entail everything entailed
by (El).
2.5 However, obligations to perform types will not
generally imply (by themselves) obligations to perform a
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specific token. For exampLe, the fact that Joe nas an
obligation to help the needy does not imply,
(H) (Ex)[x_ is a helping of the needy by Joe & Joe has
an obligation to do x]
At least two interpretations of the obligation to
help the needy are possibLe. The first is tne obligation
to, from time to time, give some aid to those in need. This
obligation is fulfilled if one makes reasonable
contributions to charitv, that is, is one helps some of the
needy some of the time. Minimally, this might be read:
Joe has an obligation that (Ex)(x is a helping of the
needy by Joe)
Another obligation which is sometimes thought of in
these terms is the obligation to help each person who is in
need (wno one can help). That is,
Joe has an obligation that Joe make it the case that
( X) [ (X is needy & Joe can help X) -> ( Ey ) y is a helping
of X by Joe]
Neither of these interpretations seem to, on any
plausible principles, imply (H).
2.6 The validity of any inferences from extensional to
intensional readings are doubtful, as is appropriate.
2.7 On the proposed account, we can lav out an important
inference. Suppose Joe has an obligation not to harm tne
innocent. If act a is a harming of the innocent by Joe,
then it follows that Joe has an obligation not to do a. he
can generate this inference as follows. The first premise
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says:
Joe has an obligation to make it the case that 2 (Ex) xis a harming of the innocent by Joe.
This is equivalent to:
Joe has an obligation to make it the case that 2 (Ex) (x
is a harming of the innocent by Joe & x occurs)
Applying (PIT) to this yeilds:
(x)( x is a harming of the innocent by Joe -> Joe has an
obligation that x not occur )
which, together witn the second premise, implies:
Joe has an obligation that a not occur. [4]
2.8 A somewhat plausible principle linking intensional
obligations is:
Necessarily (x)(Px <-> Ox) & A has an obligation that
(Ex)Px -> A has an obligation that (Ex)Ox)
This proposal can help us understand the obligations
of Bill re. films and Claude. Since any attending of a film
praised by Claude is an attending of a foreign film, i.e.,
("PCx" means "x is an attending (by Billy) of a film
praised by Claude, "FFx" means "x is an attending (by
Billy) of a foreign film.)
i
.
( x) (PCx <-> FFx
)
and Billy has an obligation not to attend foreign films
( intens iona 1 ) ,
ii. Billy has an obligation to insure that 2 (Ex)(FFx)
it follows that Billy has an obligation not to attend
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foreign films (extensiona L )
,
iii. (x)[FFx -> Billy has an obligation that x not occur]
(see principle (PIT))
i and iii together imply that Billy has an obligation not
to attend films praised bv Claude (extensiona L )
:
iv. (x)(PCx -> Billy has an obligation that x not occur)
But I see no plausible principles on which to move from
there to the claim that Billy has an obligation not to
attend films praised by Claude ( intens ional )
.
[ 5
]
3. A tentative suggestion concerning the analysis of owed
obligations in terms of obligations simpliciter (suggested
by the use of the concept of protection in the analysis of
rights in chapter 8), is:
y has an obligation to x to do (not do) z <=> y has
an obligation to protect x from y's not doing (doing) z
for x .
This would mesh well, I think, with the analysis of chapter
8. However, I will not persue it further here.
NOTES
One may speak of obligations to the occurrance of
states of affairs. But such seem to come down to
obligations to make sure (act so that) those states of
affairs occur. Thus, we may allow such talk while keeping
in mind that what seems to be involved is obligation
to
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actions
.
2* She ma Y also have an obligation to ner corporate
parents not to Let her studies suffer. But tnis does not
cnan^e our argument.
3* The identity statement means: A and B have
obligations of the sort: obligation to C to pay C $5 of
F r iday
.
4. Notice. If Joe's obligation is treated as:
Joe has an obligation to make it the case that (X)(X is
innocent -> Joe does not harm X)
it is hard to see how the inference is to be accounted for.
Because of the weakness of tnis rendering of Joe's
obligation, I have my doubts about the parallel rendering
of Joe's obligation to help the needy as the simple:
Joe has an obligation to make it the case that (X)(X is
needy -> Joe helps X)
5. Gary Matthews has suggested slightly different
readings of some of the statements we have been examining.
Certain of his suggestions are consistent with mine, but
are an improvement in elegance, and suggest a more powerful
principle than (PIT).
For example, he reads:
(3) Joe has an obligation not to raise nis hand.
as :
( ex tens iona 1 ) (x)(x is a raising of the nand by Joe ->
Joe has an obligation not to make, or let, x occur.
363
( intensiona L ) . Joe has an obligation to make it true thatis a raising of Joe's hand -> x does not occur)
Notice tnat tnis approach is considerable different
from his original proposal concerning Billy's obligations
with respect to movies. Following the above patterns, we
would read:
Lj i l L v has an obligation not to go to films praised by
Claude
as :
(x)[x is a going, to a film praised by Claude by Billy ->
Billy has an obligation not to make or Let x occur]
and
,
BiLLy has an obligation to make it true that (x)(x is a
going to a fiLm praised by Claude by Billy -> x does not
occur
)
These readings fit well with my view that the
in tens iona l/extens iona L distinction involved here is
closely linked to tine distinction between obligations to
act tokens, and obligations to the occurance or non-
occurance of act types. The extensional readings above
involve specific act tokens as the object of obligations,
the second, act types.
Matthews readings are equivalent to mine. This is
obvious for the extensional readings. To see that our
intensional readings are equivalent as well, notice that my
reading of (3) would be:
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Joe has an obligation to insure that 2 (Ex)(x is a
raising of his hand by Joe).
Tnis, given tnat the variable x ' ranges only over actions,
is equivalent to:
Joe nas an obligation to insure that 2 (Ex)(x is a
raising of his hand by Joe & x occurs)
whicn is equivalent to:
Joe nas an obligation to insure that (x)(x is a raising
of his hand by Joe -> x occurs)
This is (roughly) Matthew's account.
The Matthew's account suggests an alternative to
(PIT), the equivalent:
(EXPlim) If Y nas an obligation (to insure) that (x)(Px
-> x occurs) then (x) (Px -> Y has an obligation to
insure that x occurs).
This principle, however, lends itself to generalization to:
(EXP) If Y has an obligation (to insure) that (x)(Px -
> Ox), tnen (x)(Px -> Y has an obligation (to insure)
tna t Ox ) .
I do not think that an equivalently strengthened
version of (PIT) is likely to be this elegant.
APPENDIX D
LYONS' ABSTRACT OBJECTIONS TO CORRELATIVITY
1. In "The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, "[l] David
Lyons produces a series of arguments designed to show that
not all rights correlate with obligations. I will
investigate these arguments here.
Lyons denies that (C) holds for aLl rights.
I have sketched a notion of "conceptual
correlativity" restricted to rights held "against" and
duties or obligations owed to specific persons. [2]
These do not e xhaus t the classes of rights and
obligations: such restrictions need explaining and
justifying. The notion is also restricted to "passive"
rights and "active" obligations; and one might wonder
whether some "active" rights do not also correlate with
obligations. I shall not try to answer this, but I
shall argue that some "active" rights (rights _to do
things) do not fit the pattern de lineated
.
[ 3
]
He also argues against (SC), (NC) and the Common View.
A common view is that such a right consists of an
area of free choice protected by prohibitions against
inter- ference. For example, to say that Alvin has a
legal right to do X is, on this view, to say that (l)
it is not unlawful for Alvin to do.X (or, perhaps, to
refrain from doing it) and (2) it is unlawful for
others to interfere with Alvin s doing X.LAJ
(Lyons is aware that some modification of this is necessary
to account for active moral rights.)
Lyons seems to assume that if active rights can be
correlated with some obligation , it will be with an
obligation not to interfere. He then argues that not a 1
L
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active rignts imply obligations not to interfere, and that
obligations not to interfere do not imply rights. He
focuses on legal rights, and offers both a series of
arguments against correlativity based on abstsract points
about obligations and their grounds, and a series of
counterexamples: active right which seem to have no
correlative obligations. First we turn to the abstract
arguments, examination of which will cast much light upon
the relations between rights and obigations. Later we will
consider the counterexamples proposed by Lyons and others.
2. Lyons' abstract approach seems to involve three
interlocking subarguments.
Argument L
.
Lyons argues that obligations not to interfere do not
imply active rights. Assuming that obligations not to
interfere are the only obligations likely to correlate to
such rights, this would cast doubt on (SC) and ( C ) . [ 5
]
He argues: In law (as well as in morals) there are
many obligations not to interfere with others, even where
they have no rights. We have an obligation not to kill
people to stop them from stealing candy from babies, an
obligation not to gag people to prevent tnem from lying,
and an obligation not to torture people into keeping their
promises. In law, citizens have many such standing
obligations, which make it illegal for them (create
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obligations not) to interfere in certain ways with the
activities of others. These standing obligations specify
toe general limitations on the ways we may treat others,
and hold indeDendent ly of tne rights of others to act. We
often, as in the above cases, have obligations not to
interfere with anotner s actions, even when they nave no
right to do tnose actions. Thus, obligations not to
interfere witn an action of another (or even the illegality
of doing so) do not imply a right to do the action.
Lyons argument fails. He seems to be arguing against
two different views: (l) that any obligation not to
interfere with action a ijn a s peci f ic way implies a rignt
to do a. (2) That the general obligation not to interfere
with a (in any wav) implies a right to do a. His argument
is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to both.
Consider (2). The error is clear. Tne standing
obligations Lyons refers to seem to be obligations not to
interfere with an action i_n a certain way . Such obligations
do not even suggest that there is anything wrong with
interference per se (a general obligation not to
interfere). The obligation not to interfere with people
stealing candy from babies is more general tnan tne
obligation not to interfere with such action by klling, and
it nas moral implications not had by the more limited
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obligation (eg., that one much not interfere with peopLe's
stealing candy from babies by startling them bv yelling
here come tne cops. ').[b] Notice the general failure of
such inferences: from the fact that John has an obligation
not to win by cheating it does not follow that he has an
obligation not to win. (Tne reverse inference does hold: if
John has an obligation not to win, he has an obligation not
to win by cheating.) So, the standing obligations Lyons
cites cast no doubt upon the suggestion that a general
obligation not to interfere with an action implies a right
to do the action.
The irrelevance to (1) is less obvious. There are in
law and morals obligations not to do certain sorts of
things to people (and animals). One may not kill, maim,
torture, extort, or threaten in certain wavs. The
(supposed) standing obligations not to interfere we have
been discussing seem to derive from such prohibitions. But
they do not. While it would be correct to say that it would
be illegal (that we have an obligation not) to act so as to
interfere with an individual's doing something by treating
them in one of these ways, it does not follow that tnere is
a general obligation not to interfere with them in one of
these ways. It does not follow that we have any obligation
not to interfere witn them. For such obligations do not
suggest that there is anything wrong with interference oer
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se (as we have already seen) or even interference in a
certain way per se. The logic of obligation does not work
tnat way. The interference aspect is accidental to tne
wrong. fhe wrong is the treatnent of others in tne
proscribed way - maiming, torturing, etc.. It does not, for
example, follow from my obligation to return $5 to my
creditor, and from the fact that it would make him happy
for me to do so, tnat I have an obligation to make him
happy by returning it. [7] Closer to the point, it does not
f o 1 low from the fact that one has an obligation not to kill
someone and the fact that if one did kill him it would
interfere witn his action, a, that one has an obligation
not to intefere with his action, a, by killing him. One may
have an obligation not to kill people, but not have an
obligation not to interfere with their action by killing
tnem. Such obligations "sound" plausible, (perhaps tnis
results from the fact that it would be illegal and immoral
to interfere with osmeone in such a manner). The sorce of
the illegality would not, however, be the interference, or
ever the fact that a certain sort of interference was
involved. The source of the illegality would be the
obligation not to kill.
Confusion here probably arises from the fact that are
at least two ways of reading such assertions of
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obligation, the 'ex tens iona 1 " and the "intensional"
. I
discuss these distinctions in Appendix C, sect. 2. The
extensiona L reading aLLows for the sort of inference
d i sa L lowed above. Tne intensional does not. Presumably,
corre lationis ts are proposing that active rights correlate
to obligations not to interfere, read intensionally (so
that the interference itself is morally reLevant). Read in
this way, the existence of the standing obligations not to
kill does not imply the existence of an obligation not to
interfere by killing. [8] Similarly for Lyons' other
standing obligations not to interfere. Such obligations are
obligations not to interfere only on he extensional
reading. It is accidental to the killing that it also
comprises interference. Thus, the existence of sucn
standing obligations sans correlative rights is irrelevant
to correlativity
.
It should also be remembered that tne argument we are
considering, even if successful, would not show that no
obligations can be correlated with rights as required by
(C) or (SC), but only that such correlativity does not hold
between active rights and the obligation not to interfere .
Argument 2
.
Lyons also argues, against (NC), (C) and the Common
View, that active rights do not imply obligations not to
interfere: Correlativity requires an implication relation
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between tne right and its correlative obligation. But there
are many rignts which do not imply obligations not to
interfere. Active legal rights only appear to do so. The
appearance is illusory. The obligations to whien Legal
rights appear to be correlated are "standing" obligations.
These standing obligations hold (and are grounded)
independently of the active right. Of course, Lyons
continues, it is hard to disprove the imDiication; the
abundance of sucn standing obligations makes
counterexamples impossible. But once one is aware of the
source of the illusion, one sees that there is no need, or
even reason, to suppose that obligations are implied by
active rights .
Argument 2 is clearly not, by itself, conclusive. One
reply to be found in the Literature [9] points out that the
fact that an obligation may exist i ndependen tly of the
existence of a right does not show that the right does not
imply its existence. For it may be that some obligations
are overdetermined, that they have more than one ground.
Thus Lyons' standing obligations may be grounded both in
laws creating rights, and in other laws whien do not create
rights, either of which is by itself sufficient to create
the obligations.
Perhaps. For my part I believe this reply is based on
a doubtful assumption about the individuation of
obligations
,
that a single obligation can have two wnolly
distinct grounds. More plausible, it seem to me, and at
least equally coherent, is the view that obligations are
individuated in part by their grounds. A fairly strong case
can be make tnat where there are wholly distinct grounds,
each independently adequate to generate an obligation, at
least two obligations exist, one each. I have argued for
this in Appendix C. Untill this approach is proven wrong,
the above reply to Lyons will be inconclusive.
However, with this distinction in mind the objection
to Lyons can be recast. Pointing out that there are
standing obligations not to interfere with some activity
which are grounded independently of any right to engage in
that activity does nothing to show that it is not the case
that necessarily, whatever grounds an active right to an
activity will also ground an obligation not to interfere
with that activity.
The argument does, however, seem to shift the burden
of proof onto the shoulders of the correlativity theorist:
Why should we think rights entail obligations? Given the
nature of the standing obligations, constant conjunction in
actual legal systems (and in morality) is not good
evidence .
In his response to Lyons' argument, Braybrooke [10]
responds to this burden of proof by arguing directly that
tne concept of a right involves obligation. He suggests
that if B asserts that A has a right to do x, vet maintains
that no sort of interference with A's doing x is even prima
facie pronibited, B's assertion of the right thas no
significance. In defence of this, he states:
The alleged right does not protect him; it does
not even give him a ground for complaint. Tnere is
nothing for him to gain invoking it before, during, or
after any attempts at interference; nor is there any
point in anyone eise's invoking it, whether to protect
N or redress wrongs done him, or to draw any lesson
whatever about protection or redress for other people
in other cases. Invoking it is an empLy gesture; it has
note of the uses that genuinely invoking rights may
have; it has no use at all. [11]
He is suggesting:
(l) If B asserts that A has a right to do x and
maintains that no interference with A's doing x is
even prima facie prohibited, then this assertion
that A has a right to do x is meaningless.
By "meaningless" Braybrooke does not, I think, mean to
suggest that the statement has no meaning in English, but
that the speaker is using tne expression incorrectly or
deviantly - that he is not using it in its normal sense.
For, Braybrooke seems to suggest, in its normal sense,
"rights" must have point, it must say something about the
moral status of tnose involved. If it is used in a manner
so insipid as to make no moral point, it is used
aberrantly. Thus:
(2) It is conceptual iy true that: if it is not the case
that at least one person has some obligation not tointerfere with As doing z, then A does not have a
r ignt to do z
.
[12]
Therefore
,
(3) If A nas a rignt to do z, then someone has an
obligation not to interfere with A's doing z.
There is, however, some problem with (1) and
Braybrooke's argument for it. A right may nave point -
moral force - even if it implies no obligations. There are
many possibilities here. If Ladenson [13] is correct there
is a "justification" sense of "rights" which, while
implying no obligations, does imply that it is permissible
to do the action, perhaps in spite of some reasons not to.
If so, such assertions of rights would have moral and
practical point. They prove, or convince others (and
oneself), that one is in the right. They could be used to
block criticism. Even if Ladenson is mistaken, rights might
have other significance. For example, rights might imply
tnat it is permissible to complain of, or take action to
prevent, or to avenge, their violation. they might imply
that, if violated, apology, compensation, or redress may be
owed, or even forceably extracted. While it is not clear
tnat any of these do follow, obligations not to interfere
are not the only morally important relations closely linked
to rights.
If Martin and Nickel [14] are correct, some rignts
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are really powers, immunities, or Liberties. Such rights
would correlate witn liabilities, disabilities, and no-
rights, [15] not with obligations. Such rights would have
great moral (or legaL) significance. Though Y's power
(right) to sell X s property for him (through power of
attorney) may create no obligations on X's part, Y's use of
that ri.gnt may severely limit the scope of permissible
LegaL and moral action open to X. The point of such rights
may be their implications as to what is permissible for
otners rather than as to their obligations.
Thus, Braybrooke has not shown tnat tne "point" of
rights must be the obligations they imply.
Nonetheless, the burden of proof can, it seems to me
be shifted back onto Lyons' shoulders. He makes a curious
point in argument 2. He suggests that the independent
existence of the standing obligations make it impossible to
produce counterexamples to the rights-obLigations
inference. This is incorrect. Since we are interested in a
conceptual or necessary linkage, failure of the entailment
should allow construction of non-actual but possible legal
systems incorporating minimal standing obligations, and
rights which are not protected bv any obligations (not to
interfere) at all. Thougn Braybrooke' s argument is unsound,
I agree with him tnat positive rights do involve
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conceptually (imply) obligations, in fact, obligations
wnich involve something like non-interference. Thus it
should be impossible to construct legaL systems involving
positive rignts without corresponding obligations not to
interfere. The burden of proof is upon Lyons to produce
such a system.
The irrelevance of standing obligations to the
correlativity question should now be dear. Lyons is
correct, positive rights rights do not imply standing
obligations. As we have already seen, the notion of
implication witn which we are concerned requires tna the
right and the implied obligation share their ground. On
Lyons conception, standing obligations are grounded
independently of the right. Thus their link with such
rights is contingent, and one should be able to eliminate
the standing obligation while retaining the right. Thus
positive rights will not be correlated with the standing
obligations. But this is not surprising. I earlier proposed
that such obligations merely appear to be obligations not
to interfere in the reievant sense,
[
16 ] and thus are not
even plausible candidates for correlatives. So, the even
the ability to create legal systems having rights without
s tanding obligations not to interfere is not evi d ence
against correlativity. One must be able to create a Legal
system witnout obligations not to interfere, period.
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It may be that Lyons only invisioned arguments l and
2 as establishing the non-correlativi ty of positive rights
witn standing obligations. This conclusion is correct but
does little to show that positive rights do not correlate
witn other isoiatable obligations (perhaps obligations not
to interfere). Lyons seems aware of the need for bridging
the gap in his argument.
Argument 3
.
Lyons suggests that only two possibilities remain:
(i) that the correlative obligations are specific sets of
obligations involving more than just standing obligations,
and (ii) that where tnere is a positive right, there is a
general obligation not to interfere (in addition to the
standing obligations). While these options are not
exclusive, Lyons argues against tnem separately.
One might expect Lyons to argue against these
possibilities directly by producing examples of bare rights
(rights unprotected by correlative obligations), or by
constructing possible legal systems incorporating all
present obligations not to interfere with a person's
rightful action inwhich the action is not rigotfuf. The
former Lyons later supplies in the form of a series of
counterexamples. The latter ne forgoes. He may have doubts
about it, and onLy goes as far as:
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Most of the things that we are prohibited from doin»
a
*° 0 Ai-AfbY&ia
doing wnen ne nas no right to act as ne does. [ 17]
.ms
f rom
But most is not all. The extra obligations may be
correlatives
.
Concerning (i) Lyons argues:
the
But this is not a promising line of defense. for it
is a contingent matter in the law, at least, whether
any such special obligations are imposed; and so the
existence of such obligations would not be implied by
( though they may imply) the right to speak
publically .[18]
Thus there will be no set of special obligations co-
implying the right. [19]
This argument fails. The contingency of such
obligations is irrelevant. Lyons' point requires that the
logical link between the right and the obligation be
contingent. what legal rights we have is a contingent
matter of law as well, and we can admit, with Lyons, that
the existence of all special obligations is contingent
without admitting that the link between them and some
(contingent) right is contingent. Other than his
counterexamples to correlativi ty , I see no evidence in
Lyons for the contingency of this link. We will examine
those counterexamples in the next chapter.
Against (ii) Lyons again argues that (1) the
existence of such an obligation is contingent. He also
claims that (2) such an obligation is itself a standing
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obligation, that tnere is a generaL obligation not to
interfere witn others which is independent of their status
as r ight-nolders .
But (1) fails for the same reason it did before. An
obligation may be contingent, yet it may be essentially or
necessarily linked to (contingent) rights. Lyons must show
that no such link exists. (2) is very doubtful. Even if we
ignore the points we have made about the individuation of
obligations, I see no reason to grant that there is a
general standing obligation not to interfere with people
doing what they have no right to do. I see nothing wrong,
per se, with interfering with people doing what tney have
no right to be doing (especially, for example, robbing my
neighbor)
.
So far, then, we have no proof that (C), (SC), (NC),
(SC lim), or (C lim) fail. Nor have we seen that active
rights cannot be correlated to the obligation not to
interfere using these principles, or that the Common View
is mistaken.
Thus we must look to Lyons' counterexamples. We do so
in Chapter 7 .
NOTES
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1. David Lyons, "Tne Corre lat ivi ty of Rights and Duties"
Nous 4 (1970), pp. 45-55. (Henceforth CORR)
2 * 1 am sympathetic to the view that all rights are
against individuals. In fact, my response to much of what
Lyons says depends on that, as will become clear when
counterexamples are discussed. However, muon of wnat Lyons
says concerning correiativi ty concerns the active/passive
distinction and does not depend on wnether rights hold
against individuals or are more general. We pass over this
issue for now.
3. Lyons, David op. cit. p. 48.
4. ibid. p. 49.
5. (NC) and the Common View are unaffected by this
argument
.
The common view does not suggest tha t an
obligation not to interfere implies a right, but that an
obligation no t to interfere plus liberty to do implies a
right to do.
6. Perhaps if it were logically necessary that the only
way to stop people from stealing candy from babies is to
kill them, then the limited obligation might co-imply the
obligation not to interfere with people stealing candy from
babies. But it is not.
7. Nor does it follow from the fact that I have an
obligation to return $5 to John that I do it because I wish
to see him unhappy, that I have an obligation to return the
$5 in order to make him unhappy.
8 * Suppose Bill shoots Harry, who is trying to burgle his
house. Bill may be charged with murder, or manslaughter.
But he will not be charged with interfering with Harry's
burgLary by killing him, or even with interference with
Harry s actions by killing him. To refrain from such
actions is not, in itself, a legal obligation (at least in
some legal systems).
9. Brayprooke, Abstract of Commentary on Lyons, CORR,
Nous 4, (1970) p.56-7
10. Braybrooke, "The Firm But Untidy Correlativity of
Rights and Obligations," Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
V.l No. 3, March 1972 p. 151-163
11. ibid, p. 161-2
12. Braybrooke also attempts to sketch more precisely the
relation between the content of the right and the content
of the correlated obligation. The right to act is the
right to make a certain change in the world c. Tne
correlative duty is the obligation to forbear from
obstructing c. But Braybrooke admits clarification is
needed. "Forbearance from obstruction of c" is not
equivalent to "not acting in such a way as to prevent c".
(ibid. p.162-3). One may prevent c while still forbearing
to obstruct it (thus not violating the rignt).
337
13 ' Ladenson, "Two Kinds of Rights," Journal of VaLue
Inquiry V.XIII No. 3, Fail 1979 p. 161-172
14. Martin & Nickel, "Recent Work on the Concept of
Rights," APO V . 17 No. 3, July 1980, p.165-130
15. See Honfeld, FLC
,
Also, Ch.l.
lo. Even if such obligations were obligations not to
interfere, there would still be the question of whether
tney are obligations t
o
the person not to be interfered
with, or whether they are not owed to anyone (or perhaps
they are owed to the state). Since it is doubtful that they
are owed to the individual, they are not plausible
correlatives anyway.
17. Lyons, CORR, p.52
1 8 . ibid
.
p . 53
19. Lyons suggests two ways around this objection, but
finds them ad hoc: Maintain that change in these special
obligations results in a change in the meaning of
assertions of the right. Thus the equivalence will hold
even if the obligations change. Maintain tnat changes in
these special obligations create new and different rights,
rights essentially connected to the new pattern of
obligations. I am not convinced that these approaches are
ad hoc, especially tne second.
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